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Introduction
The object o f the study and the argument
This dissertation is about the politics and economics of Outward Processing Traffic (OPT). The 
essence of this trade arrangement is that it helps firms from the European Union (EU) to shift 
their production of certain manufactures to third countries. If EU producers send material for 
processing abroad, preferential trade rules designed for the purpose allow the processed products 
to re-enter the Single European Market without being ^subject to trade protection measures 
pertaining to ‘normal' one-way trade. OPT thus promotes the relocation activities of EU firms to 
low wage countries while discriminating against the exports of local firms from these very 
countries; the latter benefit from a preferential access to the EU only in co-operation with EU 
firms, otherwise they face ‘normal’ protection.
The analysis is geographically restricted to the outward processing activities of EU firms in 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs)1 as these are the object of additional specific 
preferential treatment
This subject might seem quite narrow and specialised. But in fac t it throws very significant light 
on two matters at the centre of current theoretical and policy debate: ‘globalisation* and 
‘governance*. The focus on OPT exemplifies the attempt to establish a system of governance of 
the wider European market economy in response to the imperative of globalisation. The 
dissertation shows that the actual working of this system calls into question the adequacy of a 
conception of governance of the economy underlying the European integration process.
1 The expression was used by the Community to refer to the European COMECON countries. It is still 
utilised but with no clear-cut definitions. Roughly, 'Central Europe* includes Poland, Hungary and the 
former Czechoslovakia, whereas Eastern Europe could cover Romania and Bulgaria. See Maresceau 
(1992: 94). The dissertation is mainly concerned with the cases of the former, commonly considered to be 
‘front-runner’ in the process of accession to the EU.
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Importance o f the subject
Rationale and limitation o f the OPT policy
Globalisation -the multiplication of opportunities in a increasingly open and liberalised world 
market economy- brings many new and challenging issues to the agenda of policy-makers 
[Stopford, Strange: 1991]. The OPT arrangement is an instrument in the hands of Community 
policy-makers with outstanding potentials to simultaneously address many of them.
First, it promotes the relocation strategies of home firms while keeping the process under close 
political monitoring. By ensuring that the levels of domestic employment are not adversely 
affected, it thus reconciles the conflicting objectives .o f international competitiveness and 
domestic employment
Second, it makes sure that trade liberalisation does not harm vital domestic interests. It forces 
foreign firms into co-operation with EU partners where the former present a competitive threat 
and ties them into vertical production chains controlled by EU Arms. It thereby achieves the 
transformation of ‘rival’ patterns of trade and production into 'complementary* ones (Zysman, 
1996]. By granting specific incentives to undertake OPT in CEECs, it influences the terms of 
economic interdependence between Western and Eastern Europe and promotes the vertical 
division of labour throughout the region.
Thus, it makes possible the formation of a 'unified European economy’ under the influence o f 
decisions and objectives adopted, through negotiations at the Community level, in response to the 
challenges posed by ‘globalisation’.
In fact, the actual contribution of OPT to the patterns of economic interdependence between the 
EU and CEECs reveals that such potentials are seized by firms only in certain countries, only in 
certain sectors and without necessarily strengthening the centralisation of competence at the 
Community level.
In general, OPT played an important quantitative role in the reorientation of CEECs trade to the 
EU.
In some specific sectors (mostly Textile and Clothing), OPT effectively spurs a durable vertical 
rationalisation of business strategies at the regional scale which reconciles the conflicting 
objectives o f employment and competitiveness. But when this is the case, it is not so much due to 
measures taken at the EU level, than to incentives granted by individual governments to domestic 
firms.
In the other sectors concerned by OPT, the arrangement does not serve the above policy 
objectives. It is almost exclusively German firms who take advantage of the arrangement in order 
to carry out ‘workbench’ activities in low labour cost neighbour countries (mainly the Czech
7
Republic). Proximity and industrial legacy matter more in the choice of corporate strategies than 
policy guidelines designed by the Commission.
Thus the logic underpinning the adoption of the OPT measure is flawed in at least two ways. 
First, even if a compromise is reached at the EU level, it does not really harmonise the diverging 
interests in presence in the OPT debate. Second, the contribution of OPT to the dynamics of 
regional integration is highly uneven, and the expected complementarity between Eastern and 
Western patterns of specialisation rather unpredictable.
Overall, OPT illustrates how the terms of East-West economic interdependence owe more to 
corporate strategies decided within different national frameworks of constraint and opportunity 
than to a coherent policy devised at the Community level. '
i •
The wider significance of OPT
The OPT arrangement is devised according to a traditional conception of the Governance of the 
economy which applies to the process of European integration. But the actual developments of 
the arrangement testify to alternative mechanisms at work in the management of the wider 
European market economy.
The OPT arrangement illustrates a conception of Governance which is strongly rooted in a 
traditional view of the proper exercise of political authority over economic matters. Its 
mechanisms rest on the assumption of the congruence, over a bounded territory, between 
political competence and the structuration of economic activity: OFT patterns are to be shaped 
within an enlarged Europe under the influence of decisions taken by the Commission which 
centralises and mediates various social and political interests. Hence, OPT corresponds to an 
attempt to transpose the national model of market management at the Community level; the 
difference is merely one of scale, not of nature.
However, the OPT empirical evidence provides an alternative picture of where and how 
economic activity is effectively politicised.
The OPT example testifies to a large number of actors of distinct nature but of comparable 
weight taking part in the policy-making process which different modes of interaction within the 
Community institutions yield quite contrasted patterns of structuration of economic activity.
First, national governments with different positions and different political clout in the 
Community negotiations on OPT retain a decisive influence on the corporate strategies of 
domestic firms. Second, firms themselves prove to be players of primary importance in the game. 
Indeed, one of the main analytical contribution of the OPT analysis is to bring them at the centre 
of the stage in the study on International Political Economy. For a start, the OPT policy was
8
adopted to answer firms’ political demand. Moreover, it is firms' strategies which give their full 
significance to the political and institutional determinants of OPT. And in the last resort, it is 
firms which are among the main beneficiaries of the OPT policy devised at the EU level. 
Consequently, the patterns of OPT which develop as a result of the bargain, on the Community 
arena, between these actors, are extremely idiosyncratic involving privileged partner countries in 
specific sectors. They follow different ‘trajectories’ which contribution to the dynamics of 
regional integration, far from being univocal, depends on the countries and the sectors 
concerned.
We are thus far from a system of market management where-the economic outcome is structured 
in harmony with social and political objectives decided in a constituency territorially defined. 
Indeed, this traditional view is obsolete in the context of growing economic interdependence. 
First, the reference to a territorial unit of analysis is at odds with the patterns of 
interconnectedness shaping the world economy. More fundamentally, the pre-eminent role 
played by firms in the OPT story questions the implicit assumption that political control over the 
economic outcome is exercised solely by a centralised authority. It testifies, in fact, to the 
‘diffusion* of the exercise of power a shift of prerogatives to the benefit of market actors, at the 
expense o f traditional centralised political authorities (Strange, 1996].
The conceptual implications for the process of European integration are far-reaching. OPT 
illustrates how the European Integration process owes part of its raison d’être to the 
establishment of a system of Governance in response to the challenge of globalisation. But if 
‘Europeanisation’ is to provide a credible response to globalisation, then not much should be 
expected from a transposition of the national model at the Community level. Rather than 
justifying European integration on the grounds of the unification of an hypothetical regional 
European economy under the aegis of a centralised political authority, the OPT story insists that 
firms, alongside governments, are exercising authority over the economic outcome.
Evidence
To achieve the assessment of the political and economic consequences of the OFT policy, the 
dissertation used three sources of evidence: statistical data largely neglected by the academic 
community1, interviews with civil servants in charge of the OFT legislation-making at the 
Commission of the European Communities in Brussels, and fieldwork with local partners in two 
host countries (the Czech Republic and Hungary).
Evidence on the policy-making process
Centralisation of competence at the EU level in OPT matters is unachieved. In the Textile and 
Clothing sector (T&C), national authorities have managed to preserve part o f their traditional 
prerogatives in the fixation of quotas. This rendered the definition at the Community level of the 
terms of the preferential OFT treatment granted to EU producers particularly difficult The other 
sectors are subject to the Common External Tariff. Centralisation of competence is therefore in 
principle already achieved, and the legislation-making process has not given rise to the same 
degree of controversy as in T&C.
As a result the benefits of the arrangement have been, and still are, unevenly distributed among 
EU firms, depending on the sector and the country to which they belong. For example, German 
firms could benefit from a very liberal application of the Community legislation by German 
authorities.
Evidence from statistical data
Three important features characterise OPT relations between the EU and CEECs:
-the quantitative importance of OPT in proportion of the total exports of CEECs to the 
EU,
-the dominant share of German operators in the total OPT activities of EU firms in
CEECs,
-the prominent role of T&C in the product structure of OPT relations between the EU 
and CEECs.
A fourth important characteristic is the very contrasted evolution (‘trajectories’) followed by 
‘OPT networks’. In T&C they arc homogenous as OPT shares increase continuously; in the other
1 Even though they are in principle made easily accessible by EUROSTAT, in particular through the use of 
CD-Roms (COMEXT database).
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sectors» the trajectories of OPT networks are marked by strong country-variations. For example,
German OPT activities tend to decrease in Hungary while they are very diversified and dynamic
in the former Czechoslovakia.
Evidence from fieldwork
The actual evolution and the prospect of OPT partnerships vary widely from firm to firm. In 
certain cases, local partners are able to take over the OPT production on their own while EU 
firms switch to other locations; in other circumstances, EU partners transform OPT co-operation 
into a relatively steady and possibly up-graded partnership. More seldom, but still possible, local 
firms are forced to close down following the sudden withdrawal of their partners.
Much depends on whether EU firms actually take advantage of the potentials for control over the 
two extremes of local partners’ production chain. Paradoxically, it might prove safer for local 
firms to further their dependence on one EU partner and thus secure a steadier partnership. This 
is more likely to happen in the case of big firms, and in the T&C sector.
Theoretical backgrounds
The high heuristic value of OPT makes it possible to assess the European integration 
process in the light of the challenge that the globalisation of economic activity poses to political 
governance. This is in the last resort the ultimate relevance of an analysis of OPT; but the latter 
is actually made of several so to speak ‘sub-contributions' which are no less interesting, even 
when taken separately.
Such different contributions made by an analysis of OPT draw on several theoretical 
backgrounds which, in turn, benefit from their confrontation with the OPT empirical case. One 
first theoretical body relevant to the OPT development concerns theories on European 
Integration. Besides testing the contribution of theoretical developments on interest 
representation and policy-making at the EU level, the OPT case is relevant to the debate on the 
reason why EU governments have found it necessary to resort to the European level of action. It 
dismisses at the same times the neo-federalist view of an United States of Europe, the neo­
functionalist focus on co-operation as a necessary 2nd-best, and the neo-realist assumption of the 
continuity characterising the diplomatic game. What the evidence provided by the OPT case 
suggests is that ‘Europeanisation’ is a response to the internationalisation of firms’ strategies 
adopted by national governments in order to recapture political control over growing economic 
interdependence (Chapter 5),
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The OPT example is also useful to test various conventional theories in neo-liberal 
Economics, notably those based on the notion of comparative advantage (Samuelson, Bhagwati, 
Porter ...) which tend to presume these advantages are given. The OPT analysis identifies the 
very process of trade liberalisation, its pace and its form , as an important determinant of trade 
and production specialisation patterns. This has been seriously underrated in International Trade 
theories (Chapter 4).
At a more disaggregated level, the OPT data illustrate how Community firms actually 
take advantage of market and institutional opportunities to reorganise their international 
production activities across Europe. This is of direct relevance for the studies of International 
Business and International Production. In this respect, an important insight gained by the OPT 
analysis is that trade restrictions are a useful substitute for internalisation under certain 
conditions. They make possible the ‘quasi-vertical integration* of firms party to an OPT 
agreement which enables foreign firms to control local partners without undertaking capital 
engagement (Chapter 4). A direct implication is that statistics on Foreign Direct Investment hide 
more than they reveal in the study of Political Economy.
Finally, an analysis of the various trajectories OPT partnerships are likely to follow sheds 
some light on the terms of the dynamics of regional integration and makes an interesting 
contribution to theories of Economic Development (Chapter 5).
Overall, the analysis of OPT provides 9 useful framework of analysis weighting and 
ordering market determinants, institutie*'''1 factors, and firm-level variables impinging on 
economic activity.
Methodology and structure o f the dissertation
The methodological discovery providing important evidence for the argument was that 
OPT trade data allows us to distinguish between ‘normal* and temporary trade. Three features 
characterising these data motivated the choice of OPT as a Dissertation topic:
-the quantitative importance of OPT in proportion of CEECs’ total trade,
-the fact that OPT data offer a statistical trace of the relocation activities of Community
firms
-the fact that OPT offers empirical material on the interaction between business 
strategies and the legal framework providing for the regulation of economic activity.
On this basis, a systematic enquiry was undertaken asking all over the same question: 
what is at stake in the trends and experiences observed?
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The organisation of the chapters is determined by the strong empirical grounding of the 
present study. The available evidence on OPT is first presented. The potentially relevant theories 
are then confronted with the reality of OPT, showing how far it is necessary either to modify 
them or to reject them.
The first part offers a comprehensive description of the framework of constraints and 
opportunities within which Community firms design their strategies of OPT relocation to 
CEECs. Chapter 1 looks at the OPT legislation and the objective it follows; it accounts for the 
complex legislation-making process that yielded it. Chapter 2 is concerned with the market 
forces inciting firms to undertake OPT in CEECs. It makes clear how the latter (wage 
differentials) are actually significantly altered by the very process of trade liberalisation to which 
the OPT measures contribute.
The second part of the dissertation aims at a systematic analysis of the patterns of OPT 
relations between the EU and the CEECs resulting from the above framework of constraint and 
opportunity. The empirical investigation of OPT contained in Chapter 3 is based on statistical 
data and fieldwork. It makes possible the identification of different OPT networks characterised 
by widely diverging trajectories and different impacts on the terms under which economic 
interdependence is currently taking place between the EU and CEECs. Chapter 4  accounts for 
such a feature. With the help of two bodies of literature, International Trade and International 
Production theories, it tries to make sense of the potential OPT determinants proposed in Part I.
The final part elaborates the general implication of the development of OPT between the 
EU and CEECs. It shows how particularly relevant the OPT case is for the understanding of the 
rationale and the mechanisms underlying the European integration process in both its deepening 
and widening dimensions (Chapter 5). In the last Chapter, the ultimate relevance of the OPT 
story is fully drawn; the Chapter pieces together the different findings of the dissertation and 
shows that they all make sense with respect to the central issue of the governance of the economy 
in the context of ever growing world-wide economic interdependence.
13
I/The framework of opportunity and constraint
The Outward Processing activities of EU firms in Central and Eastern European 
countries is an extreme illustration of the politicisation of economic transactions. This is so first 
because the arrangement takes place between two geographical area which are traditionally 
prone to the political management of their economic relations, and, second, because it applies the 
mechanisms of protectionism, intended in its most traditional and ‘dirigiste’ sense.
In a first approach, the dissertation explores the framework of opportunities and 
constraints shaped by market, political and institutional determ inants within which firms take 
their strategic decisions. Three series of such determinants are relevant in the case of Outward 
Processing Traffic; interestingly enough, only one of them is directly ascribable to market forces: 
-in the specific case of Central Europe, OPT takes place within the context of economic 
transactions which have been and still are largely dependent on the course of the ‘high politics' 
governing the relations between Central Europe and the EU
-market determinants, especially wage differentials as the opening up of CEECs 
economies made readily available an abundant, cheap and relatively skilled labour force
-the action of governments aiming at fostering the international competitiveness o f their
firms
If the factors determining the quantitative and qualitative features of OPT relations 
between the EU and CEECs are easily identified, it Is nevertheless important to refrain from 
inferring too simple a determinism. In fact, a dynamic* approach allows to understand how 
intricate the causation can be. Sure, firms deploying their production activities Eastwards aim at 
taking advantage of market opportunities within the constraints fixed by the institutional setting 
enforced. But they also contribute in shaping the environment within which they take their 
strategic decisions. In other terms, firms and governments, the actors party to the game, interact 
so as to influence the development of OPT relations between the EU and CEECs.
The present part aims at identifying and ordering the various determinants of OPT 
relations between CEECs and the EU. If anything, it shows the pre-eminent role played by 
national governments mediating between the formation of EU firms' corporate strategies and the 
‘framework of opportunity and constraint’ provided by the Community arrangements, and market 
forces. Registering firms’ political demand and deciding on policy priorities and objectives, state 
authorities are at the centre of the feed-back process between institutional and market 
determinants on the one hand, and corporate strategies on the other hand.
14
This first part paves the way for the subsequent analysis of the very content of OPT 
relations and of their wider implications for the development of the pattern of interdependence 
between Eastern and Western Europe.
DfRHJUIUtll WLlIl*
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Chapter 1, Global challenge: the trade-off between domestic employment and international 
competitiveness
“Outward Processing Traffic” would not exist if there were no trade barriers. Indeed, 
OPT transactions owe their very raison d'être to the specific custom regime easing trade 
restrictions faced by HU firms relocating part of their activities abroad. OPT is therefore not an 
independent phenomenon merely constrained by legislative provisions and captured by an 
allegedly neutral statistical instrument1 On the contrary, OPT is the very product of the 
legislation providing for it
Thus, one primary set of constraint and opportunity influencing the formation and the 
development of EU firms’ OPT strategies in CEECs is the legislative framework (the 
‘straightjacket’ would, in certain cases, be more appropriate) providing for its basic principles. If 
anything, this peculiar feature characterising OPT illustrates how decisive institutional settings in 
general, and legislative frameworks in particular, can be in the formation of economic 
transactions.
Before assessing what type of incentives the OPT legislation represents, the present 
Chapter seeks to determine the very source of such constraint and opportunity, and tries to 
understand the logic governing its adoption. Looking at the decision-making process that yielded 
the OPT legislative arrangement shows that the origin of the legislation has to do with a policy 
dilemma posed by the internationalisation of production activity. Firms willing to relocate the 
totality, or part of their production process abroad on the grounds of exceedingly high domestic 
labour costs might be dissuaded to do so by the presence of trade barriers. As a matter of fact, 
‘reimporting’ products which have been processed abroad might come against trade measures 
enforced to protect against any exports from low labour costs countries. The solution proposed 
by the OPT arrangement is to discriminate between the imports of local producers and the ‘re­
imports’ resulting from the relocation strategies of Community producers.
The Chapter shows that enshrining such an apparent anodyne mechanism into law has 
actually given rise to a complex bargaining process. The debate revolves around the old 
opposition between the advocates of protection and those favourable to free trade. It has involved 
numerous actors, and has taken place on various arena: within domestic constituencies, between 
firms, federations of industry, and labour unions, and at the European level, between virtually the 
same actors plus confederations of Industries and of Labour, member states and the institutions 
of the Community participating to legislation-making at the EU level (the Commission). In the
* As a matter of fact, without such an arrangement, there would be no statistical possibility to distinguish 
between ‘temporary* and ‘normal’ trade flows.
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following, an attempt is made to ‘map’ the interests in presence in the OPT debate, and to 
understand how they translated in the legislation providing for the arrangement at the 
Community level.
1.1 Trade policy and the challenge of international competition
A major characteristic of “OPT”, its ambivalence, makes possible the conciliation o f 
different policy objectives which are in principle contradictory. On the one hand, OPT can be 
considered to be a useful instrument for preserving employment at home; on the other hand, the 
arrangement can be viewed as a window of opportunity for relocating production activities in 
otherwise highly protected sectors. It is therefore no surprise that there are numerous and 
conflicting interpretations on how to use such an instrument of trade policy. Indeed, interests in 
presence are aligned according to many sectoral and national cutting lines; the present section 
identifies them.
i .  The OPT raison d'etre: protection vs relocation
The adoption of OPT as an instrument of trade policy was bom in the context of the 
competitive pressure placed on declining industries of developed economies by exports from low 
wage countries. An immediate policy response to such a threat is protectionism. There has been 
indeed different historical waves, to be distinguished according to the nature of the protectionist 
measure adopted: tariffs and Non-Tariff Barriers (first among which quantitative restrictions like 
quotas), but also more recent and innovative devices such as anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties ... ("nco-protcctionism"). But in the long-term, the recourse to a pure and ‘classic’ 
protectionist strategy might prove unsustainable in the face of the fast-growing interdependence 
in the world-economy. For example, one serious drawback of such protectionist measures is that, 
while protecting declining sectors as a whole, they also prevent the most dynamic home-based 
firms from taking advantage of opportunities on a global scale. Indeed, protectionism might 
imperil the complete or partial relocation of production activity to low wage countries which is 
an alternative way for weathering the competitive pressure pertaining to exports from these very 
same countries. When it concerns only certain stages of the production process, relocation is 
associated with a double flow of trade: exports of material to be transformed abroad, and re­
imports of the processed goods in the country of origin. If these latter arc subject to the same
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protectionist measures as normal imports, then firms might be dissuaded from undertaking 
relocation strategies.
This dilemma was resolved by the ingenious device of OPT: to discriminate between 
"direct" and "temporary" trade flows on the basis of the motive of the transaction (further 
processing or direct sale), and the content of the products concerned (do "imports" contain 
locally-sourced components, or / and material previously exported from the country of 
destination?). If a product exported by a Community firm in order to be processed abroad faces 
‘normal*  trade restrictions when it is re-imported into the Community, then OPT makes it 
possible to lift such measures of trade protection, either partially, or even, in certain cases, 
completely.
Institutionalising a specific custom regime is the most straightforward way to implement 
and monitor the distinction between permanent and temporary trade flows. Historically, it is the 
United States who first "invented" and used such an arrangement4 On the European rim of the 
Atlantic, a version of the arrangement was adopted in 1975, and under a substantially altered 
form (see below).
Interestingly enough, the ambivalence of the arrangement as regard the trade-off 
employment / competitiveness is made explicit in the European legislation providing for the 
arrangement Indeed, the Preambles of the various texts providing for OPT at the Community 
level state that the objective is to allow for the adjustment of the EU T&C industry to "the 
conditions of international competition".1 But another priority, that of preserving production 
within the Community appears to be in clear contrast In this respect the Preamble of one of the 
first versions insists that the arrangement be reserved to producers with plants located within the 
Community whereas another version adds to the obligation o f maintaining production In the 
Community that of preserving the level of employment Thus, potential conflicting raison d'Ctres 
pertaining to the arrangement are already contained in the Preambles of the texts providing for 
economic OPT.
4 These provisions were enforced in the 30s in the then US Tariff Schedule, Items 806.30 assesses a duty 
on the foreign value added of US metal products, whereas 807,00 grants duty-free entry to other US 
material and components. They are now HTS US 9802.00.600, and 902.00.800.
* Rather euphemistically, the 1975 Preamble stales that OPT would allow Community firms to take 
advantage of 'appropriate technical facilities, or the exclusive use of a patent* in possession of foreign 
firms. Needless to say that it is low wages that are of interest here. See Footnote 7.
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2. The OPT main features: sectoral and national variations
An important feature characterising what became in the Community jargon "OPT* is 
that there are actually two OPT regimes. Indeed, to each of the two traditional protection 
measures, tariffs and quantitative restrictions, corresponds a specific OPT arrangement When 
trade barriers consist of quantitative restrictions, the OPT beneficial treatment grants additional 
specific quotas. By contrast when tariffs are enforced, European OPT, as in the American case, 
consists of a partial or a total suspension of duties.' Hence the distinction between 'Economic 
O PT  (applying to goods subject to quantitative restrictions) and 'Tariff O PT  (regulating the 
conditions under which tariff relief is authorised).
Interestingly enough, the distinction between ‘tariff and 'economic* OPT depends both 
on the nature of the adopted protective measure, and the sector where the latter is enforced. This 
feature allows the broad distinction between Textile and Clothing (T&Q, protected mostly by 
quantitative restrictions, and almost all the other sectors subject to tariff protection. Hence 
sectoral variables are a first important criteria distinguishing among the two OPT regimes.
But there is another very important dividing line: the authority which is ultimately 
responsible for the provision of the specific OPT preferential treatment In principle, since trade 
matters are the competence of the Community, OPT is subject to EU legislation. The first 
Community regulations dealing with OPT developed as of the mid-70s with the very first 
comprehensive text adopted at the end of 1975.7 It is worth stressing that it is a directive, i.e., 
that it has to be translated into national legislation before acquiring their bindingness.
In practice, however, the prerogatives of the Community were effective only in the tariff 
regime. Indeed, being the provision of quantitative restrictions one of the few trade-related 
domains where national authorities preserved their prerogatives', the management of the 
economic regime tended to escape the control of the Community. In fact, member states enjoyed 
considerable room for manoeuvre while deciding whether and under what conditions to grant 
OPT specific national quotas. This explains why economic OPT regimes were characterised by 
sometimes strongly different national variations. Hence, beside the criteria of the nature of the 
trade restrictions pertaining to the concerned good, the distinction between ‘economic’ and 
‘tariff OPT corresponds to two additional (overlapping) dividing lines:
-the sector (most products in T&C are candidates for economic OPT, whereas the other 
sectors are eligible for tariff OPT)
‘Most commonly, the incoming tariff is calculated on the basis of the value added during the processing 
abroad. But there are other possible formula.
1 Council Directive of 18 December 1975, in OJ L 24,30.1.76.
1 At least until 1993.
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-the authority in charge of the actual provision and application of the OPT legislation 
(national authorities in the case of economic OPT, and the Community in the case of tariff OPT).
Thus, the distinction between the tariff and the economic OPT regimes depends both on 
the sectors to which they respectively apply, and differences within the economic OPT regime 
depend on the country under scrutiny.
3. Guiding principles at the Community level (sectoral variations)
The existence of two distinct protective measures (tariffs and quotas) and their 
associated OPT regimes, is reflected in the Community law. At the origin, however, the 1975 
text applied to both cases and provided the basic principles of OPT without much refined details 
as to the nature of the protection measure the arrangement was supposed to lif t The benefit of 
the arrangement was meant to consist of the partial or total suspension of tariffs*; eligible 
products could be of whatever kind of origin* 10; and the type of processing activities they were 
authorised to undergo abroad was only loosely binding“. As to the beneficiaries, they just had to 
be a natural or a legal person established within the Community.** Re-imports after processing 
could be done in any member state11 *, and a transfer of ownership during the transaction was 
possible14.
On this basis, the legislation on T ariff OPT’ was adopted without much debate, and no 
substantial changes altered the above rules.11 Its 'technicaTobjective was to distinguish between a 
"pure" form of OPT, and temporary exports and reimports in the view of repairing products (the 
so-called "standard exchange system"). This second text defined more precisely the eligible 
products as goods which are either of Community origin, or in free circulation10, it also referred 
to beneficiaries as being established in the Community, and offering enough ‘guarantee’ to the
* Op. cit. Art 10 distinguishes different cases according to the nature of the incoming tariff.
10 Op. cit. Art 2,
11 Namely: the 'working of goods', the 'processing of goods', or the 'repair of goods', with no more details.
See op. cit. Art 3.
11 Op. cit. Art 4 ,1. 
u Op. cit. Art 7.
14 Op. cit. Art 9,1.
“ Council Regulation of 24 July 1986, OJ L 212,2.8.86.
M Op. cit. Art 1, 3, b. Goods that are under the "free circulation" regime were imported into the Custom 
territory of the Community and discharged from the incoming import tariff.
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relevant custom authorities.* 101 It is worth noting that no mention was made as to whether it was 
possible to re-import the processed products in a different member-state than that which issued 
the OPT authorisation. This feature contributed in making the arrangement particularly open and 
flexible.
The legislation on Economic OPT is much more complex and technical than its 
counterpart in the Tariff regime. Indeed, the ‘Economic OPT’ regime in Textile and Clothing 
gave rise to a much more tortuous process of legislation-making. The reason has to do with the 
contention of prerogatives between the national and the supranational levels in the field of 
quantitative restrictions which make the definition of dear guidelines particularly difficult to 
achieve. Two texts were adopted, the 1st in 19821' and the second in 19941* in an attempt to 
“harmonise’* the different national OPT regimes. One consequence is that recourse to the 
Economic arrangement is much more tightly regulated, with a clear resulting restrictive bias. For 
example, an attempt is made to define the level of authorised processing abroad more 
‘precisely*10, as well as quantitative restrictions set at national levels*1; also, it is made clear that 
re-imports after processing must be geared back to the country of origin**.
Before going into more details of the points of contention at stake in the Economic 
regime as provided for at the Community level, it is useful to identify the different positions of 
the member states on the matter.
4. National variations
The following description of the national OPT regulations shows how different policy 
standpoints have been adopted throughout member states when applying the Community 
guidelines concerning OPT in the T&C sector. Not only were the national positions on OPT 
widely contrasting from country to country, but they also evolved sometimes dramatically in 
quite unexpected directions. It is possible to trace these policy-orientations through the
11 Op. cit. A rts , l ,a .
'• Council Regulation 635/82,16 March 1982, OJ L 76,20.3.82.
19 Council Regulation, 3036/94, 8 December 1994, OJ L 322.
10 Council Regulation 636/82, 16 March 1982, Art 2, 2, (d). Namely, "processing from woven or knitted 
fabrics".
11 Op. cit. Art 2, 2, (b), and Art 3, parag 1. It is interesting to note that introducing specific OPT quotas 
should not entail the overall increase of the quantities allowed to penetrate the EU markets. It implies, 
therefore, that "direct" quotas be reduced proportionately. See op. cit. Art 2,3 , parag. 3.
21 Op. cit. Art 8, 2.
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respective national regimes providing for OPT prior to the harmonisation procedure undertaken 
by the Community in the 80s, and then through the application of the Community Regulations at 
the national level.
1st cutting line: the provision of an OPT regime
An important divide takes place between those member states which established liberal 
OPT regime, and those which were rather reluctant to enshrine specific measures, if at all 
adopting only very restrictive provisions. The first country to adopt specific OPT quotas was 
Germany.11 *Two other countries followed: the Netherlands and France14. At the other extreme, the 
last country to provide for specific OPT quota was the United Kingdom. Indeed, until 1986, not a 
single OPT quota has been released by the British authorities. What is more, the British 
representatives in Brussels systematically voted against any establishment and increase of 
quantitative restrictions at the European level."
2nd cutting line: liberal vs restrictive applications
Whether a specific OPT regime is provided for is one thing; whether a granted regime is 
more or less liberal is a second important feature differentiating member states. It is no surprise 
that the first countries to adopt specific measures dealing with relocation were also those which 
adopted the less stringent sets of rules. The German and the Dutch legislations were so loosely 
designed that they were almost not binding. One very important feature characterising them was 
their openness to all the companies, irrespective of their actual economic status, be they 
established producers, or retailers like C&A without production facilities. On the contrary, 
Belgium and Italy set up OPT legislations, but attached quite stringent conditions of access to 
benefit from the arrangement. Not only had beneficiaries to be producers located within the 
Community, but they also had to respect various thresholds of production levels maintained in 
the Community. In addition, a scries of provisions were explicitly designed to contain the 
intrinsic bias towards job-exports proper to the arrangement In Belgium, for example, there is a 
long-standing policy concern dealing with the detrimental impact of relocation on the level of
"Two different types of OPT were originally devised: *normal' OPT, which tigures were regularly
published, and 'co-operation1 OPT. This peculiar definition poses problems of comparison.
“French OPT business was very active in Northern Africa. But there were no quota, thus .*o figures. As a 
rule of thumbs, because of national disparities in OPT statistics, and because the Commission did not 
centralise OPT-related information, there is no way to trace the evolution of OPT back to its origin.
"It is worth stressing that member states’ initial positions in the OPT debate do not necessarily match with 
what common wisdom considers to be the traditional divide opposing free traders and protectionists within 
the Community. The most conspicuous examples are in this respect the United Kingdom and Ireland: they 
are both considered to hold relatively liberal views on trade issues, but they both actually opposed 
substantial pressure against the liberalisation of the OPT arrangement.
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employment“ Thus, the authorities imposed that OPT should be reserved to producers relocating 
less than 30% of their value-added in third countries, with a resulting employment level no lower 
than 90%. of the original position. Unions played an important role played in this respect Being 
strongly opposed to the OPT arrangement they contributed in rendering the positions of the 
government and that of the industry more difficult to harmonise.
3rd cutting line: the entrance of late-comers in the Community
Dynamic considerations significantly changed the above-described starting positions 
over time. Initial positions underwent the following significant modifications: on the one hand 
the United Kingdom, but also albeit belatedly, Italy and Belgium became converted to the 
benefits of OPT; on the other hand, new comers (especially Portugal, but also Greece and Spain) 
renewed political forces opposing OPT. The United Kingdom witnessed the most dramatic 
change of policy objectives. In 1986, under the ruling of M. Thatcher, the official position of the 
British authorities underwent a sudden U-tum; OPT was subsequently embraced as a relevant 
restructuring strategy, if anything, not to be hampered by restrictive trade policy measures. The 
Italian official position also evolved from a fundamentally wary perspective to a more openly 
positive approach, echoed by the Belgium authorities who progressively relaxed their initially 
very strong opposition against any preferential regime favouring relocation. It should be stressed 
that such evolutions never truly led the concerned national authorities to reach positions as 
liberal as the German ones. For example, each of the three above-mentioned countries remained 
hostile to the idea of extending the OPT arrangement to retailers.
Finally, the opposite tendency was registered as the result of the accession of new 
members to the Community. Overall, to the original opposition mainly organised around the 
British and German poles, the 80s come to be characterised by a North-South divide, with 
Southern newcomers hostile to OPT, and Northern members more prone to liberalise the OPT 
regime.
“  The main concern of the government finds another more direct expression in the Tlan Textile' openly 
designed to salvage employment in the T&C sector.
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1.2 Policy-making at the Community level
ƒ. Necessary harmonisation
As hinted above, the recourse to the European level in OPT matters is grounded on the 
fact that trade policy matters are in principle under the exclusive competence of the Community.
It is worth insisting on the actual sequence of the respective adoption of OPT policies at 
the national and European levels: what is stake in the Community intense legislative activity is 
actually to recapture control in a field where member states had unduly extended their 
competence. So the Erst text on economic OPT, adopted in 1982, was essentially intended to 
monitor the way national authorities were granting specific quantitative restrictions besides 
normal quotas. At the beginning, when the fust countries started to impose specific OPT quotas 
(Germany followed by the Netherlands and France), the Commission was almost automatically 
endorsing the authorisation given at the national level.
There were 3 groups of concerned host countries at that time: North Africa (Morocco 
and Tunisia), Yugoslavia, and the then Centrally Planned Economies, all of them being classified 
at the lowest degree in the hierarchy of preferences granted to the Community's trade partners.” 
However, from 1980 on, the Commission started to slow down the pace of quotas attribution as 
trade conditions with this latter group of countries looked as if they might become less restrictive 
than those with other countries supposedly benefiting from a preferential treatment Legislation 
at the Community level was thus made necessary in the Commission's view in order to curb what 
it saw as an excessive degree of autonomy enjoyed by member states. The decision to control 
OPT quotas at the Community level had logically to be accompanied by an homogeneous 
definition of the specific conditions of eligibility that distinguish the OFT regime from the 
regime on direct imports.
The 1982 text, in turn, had to be revised. The endeavour, this time, was connected to the 
necessity of eliminating any potential degree of autonomy accruing to member states that could 
prove incompatible with the objective of the Single European A ct As a matter of fact being 
seriously imprecise on several key points, the first version left significant room for manoeuvre in 
its interpretation. Contrarily to the intention, the text was thus applied very differently by 
member states. With the coming into force of the Single Market in 1993, such divergence of 
trade conditions in the different member states could no longer be tolerated; indeed with the 
complete removal of internal trade barriers, the risk is that all OPT activities be concentrated in 37
37 In the hierarchy of EU trade relations, centrally planned economies came last, after the MFA countries, 
and countries benefiting from a preferential regime. Under the "autonomous regime" that was supposed to 
regulate such trade relations, OPT quota were provided for unilaterally. With the conclusion of the Europe 
Agreements between CEECs and the EU, OPT quotas became subject to bilateral negotiations. To be 
precise direct quota were not included into bilateral negotiations until 1979, and OPT quotas... until 1992.
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the most liberal member states which would subsequently reexport ‘exceedingly* competitive 
products to other more restrictive countries. The Commission had therefore to endeavour once 
more to harmonise the different national positions. Once again the legislative exercise consisted 
in defining guiding principles as precisely as possible in order to avoid possible diverging 
interpretations. And yet, once more, the exercise was only partially successful. After two years of 
negotiations, a text was adopted in 1994 which contained several imprécisions.
However, two absolute prerequisites of a technical nature were at least fulfilled. First, 
quotas on OPT, like all the other quantitative restrictions, were no longer to be broken down into 
member states' shares, but rather fixed at the Community level.” Second, re-imports after 
processing had to be allowed in any member states, regardless of who issued the OPT 
authorisation.” Finally, it is worth noting that the text.expectedly achieved the formal task 
rendered necessary by the conclusion of "Europe Agreements*' with Central and Eastern 
European countries."
It appears that, overall, the whole raison d'être of the economic OPT arrangement is very 
much ascribable to the harmonising endeavour undertaken in the context of the working of the 
Community institutions. In this view, the initiative of the OPT decision-making process 
essentially belongs to the Commission, which is moved by the objective of achieving a smooth 
functioning of the Single Market However, it is the initial decision taken by individual member 
states to grant specific OPT quantitative restrictions which actually triggered the whole process.
2. Harmonisation in practice
The above description of the content and the principles regulating the arrangement 
underplays the outstanding degree of controversy aroused in the legislation-making in the field. It 
would be, in this context, misleading to assess the Community endeavour on the basis of the final 
texts achieved. Indeed, too literal an interpretation of the text might lead any beginner to a 
nervous breakdown. What is o f particular interest, instead, is to trace the process that led to the 
adoption of the texts. *30
"  Council Regulation, 3036/94, 8 December 1994, OJ L 322. Art 3, 1. See also Council Decision of 20 
December 1993, in L123,17/05/1994 for the actual quotas with CEECs.
”  Op. cit., see the Preamble.
30 See Chapter 2.
25
ijHHfflf WIHHglllWHBBBgSSKHflgH » g IHU!» hh www I? itqyikHM l
To see how the harmonisation endeavour proceeded* and whether it was eventually 
successful, it is worth tracing for each provisions subject to controversy what were the interests 
invested, and the channels through which they were represented. Also, when a final agreement 
was decided, which were the mechanisms to achieve it, and which interests drew the most 
benefits from the outcome? Conversely, in case no common position was reached, who was 
responsible for the dissent, and which interest eventually found satisfaction?
1st version of the Community legislation
Reserving OPT to producers: the actual victory o f the Germano-Dutch authorities
The provision concerning Community production is in principle made more restrictive in 
the 1982 text than in the 1975 version. It is not enough that the beneficiaries of the arrangement 
be established in the Community, they should also be producers.11 12This precision is Intended to 
satisfy the vested interest of the Clothing sector whose European federation, ECLA, was strongly 
opposed in self-defence to allow retailing firms to benefit from the arrangement Had the 
provision have been properly applied, the Dutch and the German governments, which were under 
the very strong pressure of big retailing chains* lobbying activities, would have clearly been 
among the losers. However, not only was a derogation formally provided fori1, but also the 
interpretation of the rule was quite loose throughout member states. If there is to be a winner and 
a loser, on this point, it is probably the national authorities as against to the position defended by 
the transnational federations. As a result the main European retailing companies could (and still 
can) benefit from the arrangement ■»
The case o f u similar products”: the form al victory o f national authorities
This is yet another illustration of the failure to exclude retailers from the benefits of the 
arrangement Indeed, to render the principle more binding, the 1982 text provides that producers 
can benefit from the arrangement only if, in their Community plants, they produce goods that are 
’'similar" to those that they re-import after processing " However, the definition of a "similar” 
product is left unclear. Indeed, shortly after the publication of the OPT legislation in the Official
11 Council Regulation 636/82,16 March 1982, OJ L 7 6 ,20.3.82. Art. 2 ,2 , (a).
12 Op. cit. Art. 2 ,3 ,2 .
11 Op. cit. Art. 2,2, (a).
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Journal of the European Communities, the Commission issued a regulation of application which 
failed to provide any clarification on the matter14.
Here lies the main factor explaining why the principle of the primacy of producers was 
actually applied very differently throughout member states: the latter could interpret the notion o f 
"similar product" more or less restrictively, according to their own priority. Thus as opposed to 
the case of the very principle of the exclusion of retailers from the arrangement, there are no 
winners and no losers. To be precise, there are only winners: national authorities, whatever there 
are, as opposed to supranational entities, be they Euro-groups or the Community itself.
The mechanisms to reach such an outcome are quite uncommon: the latter is not 
obtained through negotiation, exercise of power, concessions and agreement, but through the 
absence of confrontation and the deliberate unintelligibility of certain crucial provisions.
The origin o f the fabrics used in the transaction: the say o f Euro-Groups
One area where European federations have voiced their position and influenced the 
outcome is that of the origin of the goods eligible for the arrangement Indeed, the textile lobby, 
as represented through the channel of COMITEXTIL, the European Confederation, the principle 
that eligible products be of Community origin. In this way, the arrangement was meant to be a  
very powerful instrument promoting the Textile sector. On the face of i t  the Clothing industry 
argued strongly in favour of an unrestricted use of fabrics of whatever origin. A final agreement 
was eventually reached. As a concession made by the Textile to the Clothing interests, a  
derogatory clause was introduced: in case of shortage of Community textile”, it was made 
possible to incorporate goods of non-Community origin in the temporarily exported goods up to  
14% of the total value of the latter.”  This derogation is to be understood as a concession of the 
Textile sector to the Clothing interest. In exchange, the arrangement was restricted to producers 
alone: to obtain the principle that the arrangement be reserved to fabrics of Community origin, 
COMITEXTIL traded off its other objective of extending the benefit of the arrangement to 
retailing chains and distributors. It is as if COMITEXTIL conceded the production orientation o f  
the arrangement together with the 14% clause to the Clothing lobby, as this latter sector had the 
most to lose from OPT in terms of level of employment.
Even though the provisions concerning the origin of fabrics used in OPT transactions 
appear to be designed as the result of the political activity of Euro-groups, they do not necessarily 
illustrate the pre-eminence of European federations in the OPT decision-making. Indeed, the
” The regulation is merely concerned with the form of the so-called ’Prior Authorisations" necessary fo r 
benefiting from the arrangement. See Commission regulation 1828/83, 30 June 1983 (in OJ L 180, 
30.7.83).
” Interestingly enough, the alleged shortage is assessed on the basis of estimates made by Textile Industrial 
Federations.
” Op. cit. Art 2 ,2 , (c).
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diverging positions of the two Federations tended to weaken their respective positions rather than 
to reinforce and combine their bargaining power.
Assessment o f the text and o f its application
Overall, the Community legislation of 1982 missed its objective of harmonising 
conditions for undertaking OFT throughout member states. As expected, the Germans had the 
most liberal interpretation, and almost no restriction was effectively enforced. As in the 
Netherlands, for example, it was legally possible for traders to undertake OPT activities provided 
they "symbolically" acquired a producer, responsible for carrying out OPT activities.** On the 
contrary, the Italians, but also the Belgians imposed strict controls on OPT operations.“ Yet 
another area where member states had quite distinct, if not diverging, interpretations of the text 
is that of the relation between the level of Community production and that of authorised 
processing abroad. The further South in the Community, the more pegged the two.
2nd version of the Community legislation
As previously hinted, besides the necessity of preserving the competence of the 
Community in trade-related matters, the coming into force of the Single European Act made 
even more unacceptable the diverging conditions for undertaking economic OPT in the different 
Member states, resulting from the imprecision of the 1982 text
The 1994 text objective was to harmonise positions on the 4 points of contention raised 
by the 1983 legislation:
-the definition of ‘similar’ products
-the definition and admission of beneficiaries to the arrangement
-the restriction of the arrangement to producers located within the Community.
-and the management of the 14% derogation clause
‘Similar products*
The most notable achievement of the 1994 legislation is that it finally provides for the 
definition of the highly controversial notion of “similar" products: they are goods which fall into *3
3This explains the OPT strategics of C&A, Kaufhof, Karlstadt ...
3,In Belgium, for example, producers were not allowed to devote more than 30% of their value added to 
OPT operations, and they could not decrease the level of employment in their plant by more than 90%.
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one of the 3 categories defined in an annex.3* Concerning conditions of eligibility, the text 
introduces precisely defined rules. For example, the tasks that beneficiary producers should 
perform within their EC factories are specified, and consist in "sewing and assembly, or 
knitting"* 40. Also, a time limit is imposed on the period during which the processing tasks are 
supposed to take place in third countries.41 *
The case o f newcomers to the arrangement
An important novelty presented by the Regulation is the distinction it operates between 
past beneficiaries and newcomers. The underlying logic is to make the legislation more precise 
for newcomers, while preserving the rights of past beneficiaries.41 Interestingly enough, however, 
a number of derogations tend to mitigate the divide between the two categories. This is so, for 
example, for firms in new member states entering the Community, which are allowed to benefit, 
under certain conditions, from the previous national regime (Austria, most notably).43 Most 
importantly, the provisions extending the arrangement to retailing companies already engaged in 
OPT activities before the 1982 regulation is re-conducted.44 This is, indeed, a serious 
infringement to the principle of the restriction of the arrangement to producers alone, which is 
indeed at the core of the concessions made in the course of the OPT negotiations. Winners are all 
over still the same: those countries which are particularly prone to a liberal interpretation of the 
arrangement, and which, this is no coincidence, are those where big retailing companies are 
based: Germany and the Netherlands.
The definition o f *Community production'
A fundamental innovation in the text, however, has to do with a provision stating that, in 
the case of newcomers and past beneficiaries asking for additional authorised amounts, the value
” Council Regulation, 3036/94,8 December 1994, OJ L 322. Art 1 ,4 , (e), and Annex I. The 3 categories 
are: Outwear, Underwear, and Others: each of them corresponds to a list of MFA categories. It is also 
specified that such similar products must be at the same stage of production than those relocated.
40 Op. cit. art 2, 2, (a). Contrary to the earlier Proposals, the "cutting" stage has been ... cut from the actual 
version.
41 If the beneficiaries exceed their time limit, they lose irremediably their rights that are recredited for the 
benefit of newcomers. See op cit. Art 3. 6, parag. 3. It is interesting to note that the competence on the 
matter is left to national authorities.
41 Newcomers have their quotas distributed on a first-come first-served basis, after past beneficiaries have 
renewed their rights. It is worth noting that some new constraints are nevertheless imposed to past 
beneficiaries: for example, if past beneficiaries do not fully use their rights, they lose them once for all, 
with no possibility to transpose them into the following year. If this is the case, they fall under the regime 
reserved to newcomers. See op. cit. Art 3), 4, 3.
43 Op.cit. Art 2, 3 ,3 .
44 Op. cit. Art 2, 3, 2.
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of the goods that undergo processing abroad should be inferior by 50% to the value of the 
Community production of the former." In addition, the concerned HU producer should have used 
at least 50% of the amount previously authorised, or (re)exported 80% of the products which had 
undergone processing abroad.
The problem is that the definition of ‘Community production* is not given. This indeed 
looks like "dejà-vu". Like the 'similar product* issue, the provision on Community production is 
crucial in the whole edifice of the text. The same mechanisms as those which obfuscated the 
plain interpretation of the 1982 text were thus at work in the 1994 text as welL
A Commission Regulation was therefore made necessary; and the fate of the whole text 
(its degree of bindingness) would depend on i t  It was adopted In December 1995, i.e., about 5 
months later than what the Commission was hoping." The objective of defining the meaning of 
Community production was eventually achieved.** But some minor issues were still left 
undetermined. This is also true of the provision concerning the reduction of authorised amounts 
in case of the decreasing employment levels in the Community plants proportional to the 
undertaking of processing activities abroad. Also, in the case of the preferential treatment 
granted to CEECs, the regulation of application makes necessary the emission of a prior 
authorisation. However, the procedure to follow is not provided for.
Assessment o f the text and o f its application
The introduction of the notion of 'Community production' and its failed definition is a 
major pitfall, serious enough to incite considering the whole endeavour to be -at least- half a 
failure. Indeed, besides clarifying old rules, the legislation elaborated new ones which were not 
necessarily better designed: it was not put an end to the indeterminacy of the text
What is more, apart from the politics of deliberate vagueness, another reason making the 
text and its application regulations far from satisfactory has to do with its high degree of 
technicality. The very cumbersome procedures to follow are likely to dissuade would-be 
candidates; it is very realistic to think that firms will prefer to face rapidly decreasing trade 
restrictions rather than to deal with complex and time-consuming administrative tasks.
An important aspect of the new text is that of its apparent restrictive drift However, any 
definitive conclusion in this respect should be avoided. First if it is indeed more difficult for 
firms to resort to the arrangement this does not appear to be the result of a deliberate intent In 
other words, it does not correspond to an objective o f industrial policy taken over by the
45 Op. cit. art 3,5, parag. 2.
** A previous regulation was adopted in July of the same year (OJ L154, 5.7.95), but without addressing 
the crucial issues at stake in the 1994 basic text.
47 Art 2,4. It is “calculated on the basis of the normal ex-factory exclusive of VAT" of products listed in an 
Annex.
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Commission like slowing down the relocation of production activities outside the Community, 
and protect the level of employment within the Community. It is rather the direct and 'neutral' 
consequence of the harmonisation process: defining each single measures as precisely as possible 
in order to make diverging interpretation difficult if not impossible.
Second, the question as to whether the text is actually ‘more' restrictive should be 
gauged by comparing the latter not with its predecessor at the Community level, but with the 
national regimes of application previously enforced in the different member states. A German 
firm, for example, will find it much harder to resort to OPT under the new text than before 1993; 
on the contrary, for Italian firms, it is precisely the opposite which is true. Third, and more 
importantly, the legislation would indeed be made more restrictive were it not for the 
introduction of the highly controversial provision concerning the beneficiaries’ level of 
Community production (the 50% issue).
3. The winners and the losers
Member states, and in more general terms, the national level of policy-making, went 
through the process unchallenged by any overt threat of sovereignty transfer at the supranational 
level. It is important to make a distinction: it is not some member states which obtained 
satisfaction at the expense of some others. The Germans, say, did not impose their view to the 
Portuguese; this would indeed mean that the integration process is effective. On the contrary: the 
German and the Portuguese national authorities obtained satisfaction as both of them could 
eventually implement the policy that best suited their priorities.
The mechanisms to obtain such an outstanding outcome consist in obfuscating the plain 
interpretation of the legislation supposedly providing for the harmonisation o f diverging national 
positions. Whether deliberately maintained, or simply an unintended consequence, the result is 
the same: ambiguity makes possible different interpretations according to the particular interests 
at stake in the negotiation. In short, whenever a provision is more or less irreducibly obscure, it is 
a sign of the failure of the harmonisation process, and, consequently of the centralisation of 
competence at the supranational level.
On the face of it, supranational entities appear to be the clear losers of the game. The 
Commission, for example, was not only unable to take advantage of a potentially powerful 
instrument of industrial policy, i,e., to actively impose its own objectives, but it was also 
unsuccessful in carrying out the more neutral process of harmonisation.
One possible (partial) explanation for the weakness of the Commission is its lack of 
internal coherence. Indeed, an important point when discussing the autonomy of the
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Commission's objective is to address the potential rivalry between the different Directorates 
General in charge of the OFT legislation. Although the Commission does supposedly act as a 
collegial body, DGI (external affaire), DGIII (industrial matters), and DGXXI (Custom matters) 
had distinct positions with respect to the OPT policy. Very broadly, DGI is more concerned with 
the potential positive effect of OPT on the competitiveness of declining European industries, 
whereas DGIII is particularly sensitive to the adverse consequences OPT may have on these 
industries' level of employment One can thus imagine possible coalitions between the DGs and 
the member states. For example, DGIII is closer to member states like Portugal, whereas DGI 
shares very much the same concern on international competitiveness as Germany. Such an 
internal division within the Commission corresponds to the fundamental dilemma characterising 
the use of OPT as an instrument of industrial policy. In this debate, DGXXI has a somewhat 
intermediary position as it tries to achieve a compromise between the antagonism of the other 
DGs.*
As mentioned above, the initiative to provide for an OPT legislation at the Community 
level emanates from the Commission. A 'technical committee*' within DG XXI in charge of 
Custom Affairs submitted a proposition endorsed by the Commission* to the Council of 
Ministers. In principle, if the latter agrees on a favourable opinion, it empowers the Commission 
for the detailed application of the proposal, while maintaining its prerogatives on the broad lines 
of the text. The Committee set up by the Commission is then in charge of the application and the 
proposition is further elaborated as it goes back and forth between the Committee's group of 
experts, and COREPER.*4 In the case of the 1982 revision, however, the Committee did not reach 
the qualified majority necessary for adopting the proposal, and the latter was sent back to the 
Council of Ministers.
Nor did Euro-groups prove to be much more efficient. Generally speaking, the two 
federations representing the textile industry and the clothing sector at the European level 
COMITEXTIL, and ECLA" are weaker than their national counterparts which are more 
homogenous. Traditionally, however, COMITEXTIL benefits from quite a strong bargaining *501
*Thc problem with the identification of the DGs' respective alignment is that it comes against to the 
paucity of systematic evidence.
* The Commission is in principle a collegial body, with a unique position.
50 "Comité des Représentants Permanents". In principle, the procedure should also involve the respective 
comptent ministers.
51 Mention should be made of the existence of a 3rd federation, MAIEUROPE, representing the European 
knitting industry separately. The existence of MAIEUROPE does not properly speaking further the 
divisivcncss of the European T&C representation, as it works closely with the powerful COMITEXTIL. 
What is more, according to Cable, it has succeeded in transcending the substantial differences of interest 
between the export-oriented Italian industry and the others, including the British industry [Cable, 1983: 
199].
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Iclout, in particular at the Commission.” On the OPT issue, COMTTEXTIL did indeed reach a 
common opinion which was favourable. But, the traditional influential weight of COMTTEXTIL 
was seriously limited because of the controversy with ECLA over the restriction of the 
arrangement to the sole producers. As to ECLA, it is already traditionally weaker than 
COMTTEXTIL for the simple reason that the industry resorts to more diversified and 
internationalised adjustment strategies. Hence a lower attainable degree of consensus. The 
conflict with COMITEXnL did certainly not improve the situation. Indeed, ECLA did not reach 
a common position on the latest revision of the OPT legislation undertaken by the Commission.1* 
In this context, a more thorough accord between ECLA and COMTTEXTIL presenting an unified 
front on the OPT issue is quite unrealistic.**
In dynamic terms, however, the picture is slightly different Even though ECLA is still 
partially ineffective in defending the interests of the European clothing sectors as a whole, the 
Federation has undergone a process substantially strengthening its position on policy matters. 
This trend is illustrated by the tangible alteration of the original aversion towards offshore 
processing activities: step by step, the European federation has consolidated a liberal approach to 
OPT, favouring internationalisation against protection as an appropriate adjustment strategy. But 
its main objective is still to reserve OPT to producers. Whereas, the European clothing 
federation has, with time, adopted a more liberal political stance, the European textile industry, 
by the voice of its European federation, has kept on favouring a restrictive interpretation of the 
OPT arrangement In particular, it is determined to prevent OFT from applying to fabrics which 
do not originate in the EC. For COMTTEXTIL, OPT has been and is still a device limiting the 
use of fabrics imported from third countries.
Because of such conflicts, the effectiveness of business representation through the 
channel of the European federations is not warranted. Thus, firms, and the national industry 
associations of both textile and clothing had to rely on their respective government to have their 
interests represented in Brussels. A problem presented by this mode of representation is when 
there is no alignment between the positions of the national industry and that of the concerned 
member state's government. In Portugal, for example, the industry’s position is favourable to the 
liberalisation of the access conditions to OPT, whereas the Portuguese government is openly 
against the arrangement. Thus the Portuguese industry had to go directly to Brussels to defend its 
view. Another consequence of the imperfect endorsement o f industry positions by respective 
governments is that it renders negotiations in Brussels significantly more complex.
” By contrast with the positions of COMITEXTIL at the Council of Ministers.
** That ECLA did not reach a consensus whereas COMTTEXTIL did is not that surprising: it is probably 
due to the additional divide between retailers and producers in the Clothing sector.
54 EURATEX which is formed by ECLA and COMITEXTIL is indeed conspicuous for its inactivity.
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Overall, the legislation on OPT is the product of two series of bargain, between firms 
and national authorities and between states; on the face of it, representation of business interests 
through supranational associations proved to be relatively more marginal It is therefore member 
states’ preferences described in section 2, which is the fundamental motor of the legislation­
making process; Germany, backed by the Netherlands pressing for as liberal as possible a regime 
(with the inclusion into the arrangement of distributors) vs. the UK, taken over later by Southern 
European countries determined to tightly keep under control the potentially disruptive 
consequences of OPT on employment in the Clothing sector.
1.3 Conclusion
This Chapter shows how controversial the possible policy attitudes with respect to the 
relocation issue are. The stake is high and has to do with the options left to policy-makers in the 
face of the increasing internationalisation of production activities. The bone of contention 
involves the advocates of relocation to foster international competitiveness and firms' 
profitability, on the one hand, and those backing protectionist measures in order to preserve 
domestic employment and to gain foreign exchange, on the other hand. The great merit of OPT 
in this respect, is that the arrangement makes possible a subtle balance between the two 
objectives, blurring too clear-cut a choice. Hence the flexibility of the arrangement’s 
intciprctation and the purported simultaneous satisfaction of widely diverging interests.
The above account of the legislation-making process showed that no generalisation can 
be made about hypothetical cutting lines distinguishing between the actors party to the OPT 
legislation-making process. As a matter of fact, there is a host of discriminating variables which 
are partially overlapping, and which, in addition, are in constant evolution as time passes by. a 
strong UK/German opposition, a subsequent North/South divide, an irreducible sectoral 
distinction between the Textile and Clothing industry and the other sectors, and within the 
former, between the Textile and the Clothing sectors, and last but not least, numerous individual 
contrasting positions adopted by big corporations, in particular in the retailing business. To make 
things worse, because of the intrinsic ambivalence of the arrangement, and the conflicting 
interpretations it gave way to, OPT policy-making at the Community level triggered a necessary 
process of harmonisation. This, in turn, further exacerbated and entrenched the positions aligned 
in the OPT debate.
Overall, among the possible sets of factors influencing the formation of corporate OPT 
strategies, the OPT legislation is the privileged locus where firms are not only ‘determinant- 
takers’, but also, to some extent, ‘determinant-makers’. Hence, a ‘feed-back’ process takes place 
thereby firms contribute to the formation of the framework of opportunity and constraint within
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which they decide on their strategic decisions. In this respect, the above analysis showed that the 
fundamental motor of the negotiation and the main determinant of the outcome is the bargain 
between firms and states taking place on a forum provided by the Community institutions and 
arrangements.
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Chapter 2 Regional response: the opening up o f CEECs markets
The OPT guiding principles as depicted in Chapter 1 apply to the case of EU firms 
relocating their activities abroad, irrespective of their geographical destination. The present 
Chapter investigates the effective constraint and opportunity that the OPT arrangement 
represents in the specific case of the economic relations between the EU and the CEECs.
The sudden opening up of Central and Eastern European economies as of the demise of 
the COMECON in 1991 represents an economic opportunity of unprecedented nature in the 
world economy. It makes available at the same time markets and cheap and qualified labour 
within an area characterised by outstanding potentials for growth and development What is 
more, from a Western European perspective, the geographical and economic distance from these 
potentially fast-developing markets is reduced, if not negligible.
Thus, the liberalisation of economic transactions between the EU and the CEECs is a 
strong incentive for firms to extend international production activities throughout the region, and 
design relocation strategies so as to strengthen their international competitiveness. In the best of 
the world, OPT enables Community firms to take advantage of CEECs comparative advantage in 
labour costs by making it possible to relocate those segments of their production process which 
are the most labour-intensive, and the most subject to international competition.
But this is a half-full glass. To have a complete picture of the constraint and opportunity 
relevant to the OPT case, it is also necessary to look at the half-empty part As a matter of fact 
the process of trade liberalisation is not tantamount to the establishment all at once of free trade. 
In the case of the relations between the EU and the CEECs a transition period is expected to last 
until the year 2000, during which trade is being liberalised in a protracted way. And indeed, as 
noted in Chapter 1, OPT owes its raison d’être to measures of trade protection; more precisely in 
the case of CEECs, to the residual existence o f trade barriers during the process o f trade 
liberalisation. This means that Community firms undertake OPT activities where there are such 
trade barriers. Therefore, CEECs comparative advantages notwithstanding, the OPT activities of 
EU firms take place where trade barriers are still in place.
The present Chapter weights the respective importance of trade barriers and ‘pure’ 
market determinants in the framework of constraint and opportunity relevant to the OPT 
activities of EU firms in CEECs.
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2.1  M arket forces: the comparative advantage of CEECs
The present section is an empirical analysis of the potential market factors underlying the 
development of OFT relations between the EU and CEECs. Indeed« the demise of the 
COMECON in 1991 was accompanied by a process freeing economic transactions between the 
EU and the countries of the former Soviet bloc. Trade liberalisation« one crucial dimension of 
such process, make supposedly possible the exploitation of CEECs’ comparative advantages 
based on the availability of a quite cheap and relatively skilled labour force, and OPT is an 
instrument enabling Western producers to take advantage o f such potentialities. One is thus 
tempted to ask where exactly these comparative advantages lie to understand (and predict) where 
OPT trade between the EU and CEECs develops.
Analytical tools like Revealed Comparative Advantages and Gravity models will be used 
in the present section to identify the sectoral and geographical opportunities presenting the most 
interesting potentialities.
1. Revealed Comparative Advantages and Gravity models
In the aftermath of the demise of the COMECON, several studies undertook the task of 
determining the comparative advantages of CEECs' economies on the basis of indicators of the 
so-called revealed comparative advantage.”
Despite the variety of indicators used, and the sometimes discordant results obtained, 
there are nevertheless some converging findings. One of these is the importance of resource- 
based products as a source of comparative advantage. In Klodt (1994), and Daviddi (1992), for 
example, resource intensive goods in general, and fuels in particular, record one of the best 
performance as measured by RCA indicators”. Graziani (1994), however, shows that non 
resource-based goods have become prevalent in the 90s as compared to the 80s. The country that 
has recorded one of the steepest decrease of RCA for resource intensive goods between 1980 and 
1992 is indeed Czechoslovakia; Graziani points at this country as the most disadvantaged one in 
1991.
Another common feature concerns the relative importance of "basic manufactures" 
classified in the SITC 6 heading, Graziani (1994) for example, finds that 6 headings out of the 15
SJ See Winters, (1994); Collins, and Rodrik (1991); Daviddi (1992); Rollo, and Smith (1992); Erzan and 
Holmes (1992); Ebbers and Olson (1994); Graziani (1994); Nagarajan (1995), Fielcke (1990), among 
others.
”In 1992, and 1990, respectively.
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that recorded the highest values of RCA indexes in 1991 are products belonging to that category 
such as cork and wood, paper, textile, and iron and steel. The latter category is definitely one of 
the leading products in which CEECs have a strong comparative advantage [Daviddi, 1992; 
Ebbers and Olson, 1994],
Ebbers and Olson (1994) add chemicals and plastics to the list of best RCA indexes 
(SITC 5). Halpem (1994) corroborates, and considers chemicals to be by far the strongest pole of 
competitiveness of the Czechoslovak economy in 1991; it is also one of the categories where the 
domination of Czechoslovakia over its former partners of the COMECON is the most marked.
Finally, some products are doing well in the SITC 8 heading which comprises mostly 
apparels and especially footwear [Ebbers and Olson, 1994]. Halpem (1994) shows that although 
T&C record weak results as compared to other CEECs, they occupy a privileged position with 
respect to the other Czechoslovak exports.
An interesting feature is the rather bad performance of Czechoslovak trade compared to 
the other CEECs in the machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7). In Olson and Ebbers 
(1994), almost all the headings of the category record negative RCA indexes (electrical 
machinery, for example). However, there are exceptions which vary, depending on the source 
considered. For Olson and Ebbers (1994), these are road vehicles (SITC 78), and power 
generating machinery (SITC 71); Graziani (1994) finds certain specific transport equipment 
transport (SITC 791), and machinery specialised for particular industries (722); Halpem (1994) 
would add motor vehicles. The latter computations insist that machinery are characterised by 
relatively poor performance in the Czechoslovak trade, but not in the case of the CEECs in 
general. Indeed, the index improved from 1988 to 1991.”
This rapid survey of the RCA literature should allow us to draw some conclusions as to 
the comparative advantage supposedly characterising CEECs. To make general statements on the 
matter as accurate as possible, synthetic indicators are particularly useful. Graziani (1994), for 
example, groups the different categories of products according to the characteristics of their 
production process. He successively weights resource-based vs non resource-based products, 
mature vs new products, standardised vs unstandardised”, and labour vs capital-intensive 
products. In his findings, the stylised good exported to the EC is no longer resource-based; it is 
rather a mature, standardised, and labour-intensive product. Moreover, low technology products
”  It is important when dealing with machineries to make the distinction between Western and Eastern 
markets: as a matter of fact, RCA recorded on the basis of trade flows geared to the former COMECON 
partners, are mostly positive. This is straightforward in Fieleke (1990), for example, but also in Ebbers and 
Oslon (1994).
’’Product maturity and standardisation are notions that both refer to the product cycle theory. Whereas the 
former is defined according to the level of skill required in the production of the good, the latter classifies 
industries according to their low or high rate of product development. An example of new industry is 
machinery; whereas clothing, footwear, and glassware are mature industries.
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dominate CEECs exports. The Czechoslovak economy shows some peculiar features in this 
broad pattern. Not only it is characterised by the lowest share of resource-based exports to the 
EC (23% in 1991 as against an average of 33% for the CEECs taken as a whole), but it is one of 
the rare country that recorded an increase of new products proportion in total exports (achieving 
a level of 27% in 1991), and it is in absolute terms the country characterised by the highest share 
of unstandardised products (34% in 1991). There are even some skill-intensive products such as 
tractors and power generating products are successfully exported by the Czech Republic. The 
latter is at the same time the country still characterised by the highest proportion of capital- 
intensive exports (28% in 1991).”
Klodt (1994) provides similar synthetical pieces of information. He computed the RCA 
of the goods that CEECs traded with Germany in 1980 and 1992, and grouped them into four 
categories according to the relative factor intensity of their production process; there are 
resource-intensive, physical capital-intensive, labour-intensive, and technology intensive 
products. This latter category is itself divided into "mobile-Schumpeter goods", and "immobile 
Schumpeter goods'*. Interestingly enough, the results show that the highest RCA is still recorded 
by Czechoslovakia in resource-intensive goods; however, as compared to the other CEECs, 
Czechoslovakia presents the highest RCA in capital-intensive goods, and one of the lowest RCA 
(together with Hungary) in labour-intensive goods. As to technology-intensive products, they are 
clearly characterised by negative values of RCA, even though the relative disadvantage is 
comparatively inferior to that of other CEECs.
Finally, Neven (1995) distinguishes 5 types of industries according to their factor 
content*1, and computes their respective RCA for the 5 CEECs and the former USSR. The main 
interest of these data is that they distinguish between CEECs1 RCA with respect to Southern 
Europe and RCA with respect to Northern Europe. Basically, CEECs display a strong 
comparative advantage in industries that are intensive in both capital and unskilled labour, with 
respect to both Northern and Southern Europe. Towards Northern countries, the performances 
arc relatively advantageous in labour intensive industries, whereas with Southern European 
countries, it is goods rather intensive in human capital that are exported successfully.
In general, Neven (1995) finds a consistent pattern of CEECs comparative advantage in 
low-skilled sectors, and sectors intensive in physical capital. To conclude, he notes that long 
term comparative advantage lie rather "where a comparative advantage has recently emerged 
(...), namely in the labour intensive industries". *6
’T his has to be connected to the heavy inheritance of the COMECON specialisation.
*°See following for their description.
6IThese are: high tech goods intensive in human capital, goods intensive in human capital but using little 
physical capital, goods intensive in unskilled labour, and using little capital, goods intensive in both labour 
and capital, and goods intensive in both human capital, and physical capital.
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Overall, the above findings point at labour-intensive products as the goods for which the 
CEECs economies has a comparative advantage. With almost a shade of regret, Graziani notes 
that "cheap labour is still a reality of the CEECs” [Graziani, 1994: 231]. This result is indeed not 
surprising and is in line with the conclusion reached by an approach more respectful of the 
theoretical propositions of the HO model.
2. Possible fu ture comparative advantages
Although they converge in identifying labour as a.source for comparative advantage, the 
above-mentioned RCA studies all stress that this is probably only a temporary feature of the 
CEECs economies. As a veiled recognition of the limitations of the insight gained from RCA 
indexes, it is often referred to the very intuitive notion of "potential” comparative advantage 
based on what is generally thought to be the high level of education of CEECs' population. This 
is the case of CEPR (1990; 9), Hamilton, and Winters (1992: 95), Graziani (1994: 226), Halpem 
(1994: 21). Equally deemed important are the good R&D capabilities of these countries.
On the basis of a more or less explicit correlation between scientific skills and 
comparative advantage in mid-tech goods in Western countries, these studies conclude on the 
likelihood for certain CEECs to become exporters of sophisticated products. The comparative 
edge in human capital, and R&D capabilities of CEECs in general should, in the long run, be 
reflected in their trade specialisation. In this view, "from the existing evidence on the human 
capital' potential of the Czechoslovak economy (...). one could conclude that Czechoslovakia 
could turn into one of the most successful economies of the newly emerging market economies of 
Eastern and Central Europe” [Landesmann, 1991: 781. T
The proponents of such a point of view, however, make clear that this is more likely to 
materialise with the impetus given by foreign capital: foreign investment is deemed necessary to 
spur the exports of upgraded value added goods. Klodt (1991, and 1994) refines the argument 
and distinguishes between high tech goods, which research stage can be geographically separated 
from the very production process (mobile Schumpeter goods**), and those high tech goods, which 
research and production phases can hardly be disentangled from each other (immobile 
Schumpeter goods“). As NICs managed to attract foreign investment in the former sectors, they 
also specialised their trade in the corresponding products. So would successful CEECs, with the 
difference that rather than micro-electronics goods, CEECs would be more prone to specialise in 
chemicals or software's. As an empirical confirmation of such a view, Klodt provides some
“E.g. chemicals, office machines, software, and electrical machinery... 
“ E.g. non-electrical machineries, motorcars, optical goods...
i m a a m
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Vestimation of RCA for both mobile and immobile Schumpeter goods: although both negative, the 
RCAs of the former are slightly higher than those of technology-intensive and immobile 
Schumpeter goods.
What is at stake is whether CEECs are able to ‘move up markets*. Rather worrying, in  
this respect, is the finding made by Neven (1995) that CEECs patterns of comparative advantage 
have scarcely changed over 5 years, even though trade volumes were growing at quite 
remarkable speed. There is however infinite controversy and uncertainty on the matter. M ore 
recently, for example, Landesmann (1997) and Guerrieri (1997) both found consistent evidence 
of an upgrading process.
3. Comparative advantages and *sensitive’ products
Summing up, CEECs appear to be characterised by interesting potentials in some 
specific area which are all to some extent connected to the low-income, low-wages features 
characterising CEECs economies. A major result achieved by the above studies is that CEECs* 
comparative advantage appear to lay in labour-intensive goods like manufactures (most of them  
classified in SITC 6): T&C, footwear, wood and paper, iron and steel. Perhaps more unexpected 
and hazardous predictions concern the likely performance o f sectors such as chemical, plastics 
and software's.
Interestingly enough, there is an apparent correspondence between CEECs comparative 
advantages as identified above and the so-called “sensitive** products i.e., goods subject to a  
delayed trade liberalisation schedule (food and agricultural product, T&C, footwear, Iron and  
Steel)*4 [Neven, 1995]. Indeed, most of CEECs exports •are concentrated in these category. In  
fact, it is Polish exports which register the highest proportion of sensitive goods, and the form er 
Czechoslovakia which is the least dependent Hungary which used to have extremely h igh  
proportions has seen a marked decrease of her dependence. Overall, the rate of dependence tend 
to decrease in the 3 countries. However, if the agricultural products are not taken into 
consideration, the rates of decrease are significantly reduced.
This is a hint suggesting that it would be quite naive to believe that pure m arket 
determinants are effectively at work without alteration introduced by 'exogenous* factors like 
protection measures. Before achieving too hasty conclusions on the imperious incentives 
presented by comparative advantages, it is therefore worth investigating the influence of trade 
restrictions still in place during the transition phase towards free trade. 64
64 There is no ’official’ definition of what is a sensitive product, but rather a standard agreement. 
Sometimes Chemicals are added to the list in the name of past anti-dumping action adopted by the  
Community.
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The fact that EU trade protection tends to be the most resilient in sectors presenting the 
highest potentials in terms of trade performances invites to assess the bindingness of the former. 
All the more so, if the objective is to determine the potential factors influencing the formation of 
OFT networks. Indeed, OPT owes precisely its raison d’etre to the permanence of trade barriers 
before full trade liberalisation to take place in the year 2000.
In this respect, the ‘politicisation’ of OFT determinants appears to be double-faceted: 
first directly, the formation of OPT networks owes much to the mode (the speed and the form) of 
trade liberalisation; and second indirectly, the process of trade liberalisation on which OFT 
depends is itself ascribable to more general considerations which take their full significance in 
the context of the political relations between the EU and the CEECs.
2.2 Institutional factors: the process o f trade liberalisation
1. Historical perspective: the political function o f trade liberalisation
Economic transactions between West and East traditionally developed in a very 
politicised environment Two contending principles were governing them: the belief in economic 
interdependence to spur political convergence, and the reliance on economic containment as a 
political instrument to isolate CEECs [Bertsch, Vogel, and Zielonka, 1991]. The relations 
between the European Community and Central and Eastern European countries took place in this 
context. Until 1988, they were characterised by unilateral measures taken by the Community in 
the framework of a trade regime designed to deal specifically with 'state trading economies'*4. 
Apart from unilateralism, a second feature of the EC-CEECs relations was that 'agreements' were 
adopted by the EC with each CEEC taken separately**. Such agreements were most often 
restricted to particular and restricted issues; they actually used to endorse measures taken at the 
national level by member states.
On 25 June 1988, a joint declaration between the EC and the COMECON was signed 
establishing mutual recognition. However, the regime governing trade relations was not 
upgraded in the hierarchy of trade treatment granted by the EC to third countries. Moreover, due
“See EC Regulation 1765/82. One main peculiarity of this regime has to do with the definition of 
particularly restrictive anti-dumping laws.
**The reason was politically motivated. See for example, Benavides in Maresceau, 1989.
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to the rapid decay" of the organisation, no measure were implemented to develop closer co­
operation. Instead, a series of truly bilateral agreements were signed starting with Hungary as of 
1988. Part of the so-called "1st generation agreements" [Daviddi, 1992: 272], they were dealing 
with economic issues and paved the way for the removal of quantitative restrictions*. But most 
of the measures contained in this first wave of agreement were in turn rendered obsolete by the 
conclusion of the more ambitious PHARE programme in July 1989; dealing initially with Poland 
and Hungary, it was subsequently extended to all the former COMECON countries*.
To keep up with the pace of change in CEECs, and for the sake of more consistent and 
systematic scheme of co-operation, the Commission decided in August 1990 to conclude 
'Europe Agreements" with the CEECs, adopting once more a bilateral formula. They were 
signed on 16 December 1991 with the CSFR10, Hungary, and Poland, then in March and February 
1993 with Bulgaria and Romania, respectively. Each of the agreement contains 8 main sections’1, 
but it is the establishment of a free trade area by the year 2000 which is their central objective. 
"Interim Agreements" were adopted in March 199271 in order to speed up the coming into force 
of the trade and trade-related measures contained in the Europe Agreements” . The process of 
implementation rests on the principle of asymmetry, thereby the EU is committed to fully 
liberalise CEECs exports by 1997 i.e., 5 years before the complete liberalisation of EU exports to 
CEECs. It is worth stressing that what is at stake in the economic chapters of the Europe 
Agreements is the establishment of a free trade area (with the liberalisation of goods, service, 
persons, and capital), and not the implementation of a Custom Union that would require a 
common external tariff, and possibly harmonised trade policies. In this sense, the Europe 
Agreements differ substantially from "Association Agreements" the EU has concluded with other 
countries”.
A salient feature of the EAs is that they consider full membership of the CEECs as their 
ultimate objective. Although of a highly indeterminate form, and despite repeated attempts to
‘The system de facto stopped existing as of January 1991 when transactions started to be carried out in 
'hard currency' and at world price. De jure, the system was officially dismantled in March 1991.
“although partial and incomplete, a process was triggered that set the deadline of total liberalisation in 
1994 or 1995
‘The PHARE programme is a joint initiative of the EC Commission and the G24 (OECD members).
™New Europe Agreements were signed separately with the Czech Republic and Slovakia after the partition 
in October 1993.
’‘political co-operation, general principles, free movement of goods, movement of labour, movement of 
capital, economic co-operation, cultural co-operation, financial co-operation.
”In December, and May 1993 for Bulgaria and Romania, respectively. The Interim Agreements are in JO 
LI 14, 30/04/1992 for Poland, in JO LI 15, 30/04/1992 for Czechoslovakia, JO LI 16, 30/04/1992 for 
Hungary,
”As a matter of fact, they are 'mixed agreements' i.c., they must be signed by Council of Ministers and 
each of the member states. This is because they include relative to political co-operation, the movement of 
persons, etc.
"Malta, Cyprus, Turkey...
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procrastinate any clear-cut timetable, integration is considered by the Community to be the 
eventual outcome of the current co-operation scheme. The objective was more clearly restated at 
the European Council in Copenhagen (June 1993), and a white book is supposed to provide for 
some guidelines. According to the approach adopted by the European Community, the 
establishment of a free trade area is the first step in a process intended to culminate in the all- 
encompassing political integration of CEECs into the European Union. The area defined by the 
European Union and the Central and Eastern European Countries is thus undergoing a process of 
integration which is for the moment limited to the establishment of a free trade area.
2. Trade liberalisation in practice: the mechanisms of OPT
If the raison d ’fitre of OFT is to alleviate trade barriers, then an immediate consequence 
flows as far the incentive to resort to the arrangement is concerned. As a matter of fact, how far 
the recourse to OPT is compelling in order to by-pass trade barriers depends on the bindingness 
of the latter, in short, the more binding protection on normal trade, the higher the probability that 
local firms use OPT in order to access EU markets. On the contrary, if trade protection is 
marginal, or if the measures are not binding, there is no point in having them lifted, and there is 
therefore little incentive to undertake and/or declare OPT.
To understand how effective the incentive to resort to OPT are, the present section 
assesses the bindingness of trade restrictions imposed on East-West trade.
General schedule of trade liberalisation
Far from establishing free trade all at once, the process of trade liberalisation between 
the EU and CEECs takes in an uneven and protracted way. As a result, numerous trade 
protection measures are still constraining trade flows even if they are to be eventually lifted. 
Such a transition period is designed to last at best 6 years, if only CEECs' exports to the EU are 
considered, and 10 years if EU exports to the CEECs are also taken into account; during this 
transition period, the major CEECs' exports face "substantial" tariffs and non-tariffs barriers 
[Messerlin, 1993: 12J.
In the following, the identification of trade protection measures still in place during the 
transition process will pave the way for the assessment of their bindingness.
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The entry into force of the Interim Agreements marks the liberalisation of a significant 
part of the barriers constraining trade between the HU and the associated countries. The 
remaining trade obstacles are expected to undergo progressive elimination according to a precise 
schedule. As far as tariffs are concerned, the Europe Agreements provide for the abolition of 
about half of them upon the entry into force of the Interim Agreement on 1 March 1992. At the 
Copenhagen European Council held in June 1993, it was decided that the majority of the 
remaining half would be eliminated no later than 1 January 1995, instead of 1997 as previously 
agreed. As to quantitative restrictions, they were in principle lifted in 1992; however, textile and 
clothing MFA products, together with CSCE products are subject to quota (at least until 1997). 
As far as Outward Processing Traffic is concerned, textile and clothing MFA products that are 
eligible for the arrangement benefit from a complete exemption o f tariff as of tte  entry into force 
of the Interim Agreements.” Moreover, quantitative restrictions specific to OPT in the T&C 
sector will be completely eliminated by 1 January 1998. It goes without saying that no duties will 
be any longer associated with OPT when tariffs will be themselves completely eliminated (on l 
January 1995). It means that OPT Figures are no longer available as of 1 January 1995 for 
products subject to tariffs”,and as of 1 January 1998 for T&C products still subject to 
quantitative restrictions” Table 1 gives the detailed schedule of liberalisation as provided for by 
the Europe Agreements, and the Copenhagen declaration. *7
"See Interim Agreement OJ L 115,30.4.92, Protocol 1, Art 3.
74I.e., corresponding to the ’tariff O PT regim e...
77... i.e., corresponding to the 'economic OPT regime. See Chapter 1.
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Table 1. Trade liberalisation schedule
Products Obstacles Interim Agreements Liberalisation path Copenhagen Elimination
Sensitive 
industrial 
products 
(Annex JIa)
custom duties abolished at the end of 
the 1st year after the 
entry into force of the 
Agreemt.
reduced by 509b in 
92
/ end 1992
Sensitive 
industrial 
products 
(Annex lib)
custom duties abolished at the end of 
the 4th year after the 
entry into force of the 
Agreemt.
reduced by 20% 
per year
abolished a  
the end of 
the 2nd year
end 1993
Sensitive ind 
prdets
(GSPconsolidati 
on; Annex III)
custom duties 
within tariff 
quota or 
ceiling
abolished at the end of 
the 5th year
annual reduction of 
15%
abolished a  
the end of 
the 3rd year
end 1994
Sensitive ind 
prdets
(GSPconsolidati 
on; Annex III)
quota or 
ceiling for the 
application of 
quota
abolished at the end of 
the 5th year
increased by 20% 
per year
increased by 
30%
end 1994
Agricultural 
products 
(Annex XIa)
levies / duties 
quotas
reduced by 60% ... 
increased by 10% 
from 3rd year...
6 months 
earlier
textile products 
(Protocol 1)
custom duties abolished at the end of 
the 6th year
abolished a  
the end of 
the 5th year
end 1996
textile products
(Additional
Protocol)
quantitative
restrictions
end 1997
ECSC steel 
products 
(Protocol 2)
custom duties abolished at the end of 
the 5th year
1st reduction of 
80% on entry into 
force.
abolished a  
the end of 
the 4th year
Processed agric. 
products 
(Protocol 3)
custom duties
OPT custom duties exemption 
as of 
beginning 
1994
Source: Official Journal of the European Communities, various issues. Own elaboration.
The effectiveness o f OPT measures: quota vs tariffs
As shown in Chapter 1, since there are two types of protection measures (quota and 
tariffs), there are two OPT regimes which differ according to the type of preferential treatment 
they grant: additional specific OPT quota, and partial/total tariff suspension. This is of wide
4 6
relevance as far as the incentives to resort to OPT arc concerned. As a matter of fact, being quota 
and tariff differently ‘binding’, their associated preferential OPT treatment are differently 
‘attractive’.
The effect of tariffs on trade can be shown to be less binding and less distorting than that 
of quota. This means that whenever the protective device used is a tariff, the incentive to use 
OPT is lower than if a quota were enforced.
Trade liberalisation in the Textile and Clothing sector
1. Early measures
Before embarking on the assessment of the restrictiveness imposed to CEECs* exports of 
T&C during the current transition period, it is worth addressing the impact of previous trade 
liberalisation in the sector of T&C.7' It is important to stress that trade liberalisation in the sector 
takes place outside the framework provided for by the Europe Agreements, and within that of the 
Multi-Fiber Arrangements (MFA). The 4th round of the MFA (negotiated under the auspices of 
the GATT) provides for quantitative restrictions imposed by the European Community to the 
CEECs through bilateral agreements from 1987 to 19977’. On the basis of the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round, it was decided to dismantle the MFA regime with the achievement of free 
access to EC markets as of 1 January 1998.10 Quantitative restrictions have been thus increased in 
four waves: in 1987, January 1991 (for Czechoslovakia), April 1992, and December 1992.“
Being considered to be a ’sensitive' sector, T&C is subject to a specific regime of 
liberalisation which is slower than that scheduled in other sectors by the Europe Agreement; the 
aim is to prevent cheap CEECs exports from putting at risk the interests of EU producers by 
being liberalised too suddenly. Such an explicit objective notwithstanding, several studies agree 
to conclude that quantitative restrictions have been significantly relaxed since the demise of the 
CMEA. All the indicators of the bindingness of EC quantitative restrictions imposed on CEECs 
T&C exports by Nagarajan (1995), for example, bring about the same conclusion: the significant 
liberalisation of the constraints imposed on CEECs exports in general, and on Czechoslovak
n Because of only seriously limited data are made available by the Commission, the following analysis will 
take the Czech example as a case in point showing how the structure of trade protccrion can impact on the 
decision to undertake OFT.
77 Initially limited to the 87-91 period, the MFA IV regime was successively extended to December 92, 
then to December 93 and eventually to 1 January 1998.
*° Additional F*rotocoI on T&C in OL L 123, 17.5.94, Agreed Minute N°5.
11 Concerning Czechoslovakia (and then the Czech Republic), quota for 87-91 are in OJ L 387, 31.12.86; 
quota for 1991 in OJ L 45,20.2.92; and (revised) quota for 1993-1997 in OJ L 123,17.5.94.
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exports in particular. One of such indicators, the trade coverage ratio of quotas imposed by the 
EC on Czechoslovak T&C exports has decreased significantly since 1989 (Table 2).“
Table 2. Czechoslovak T&C exports under quotas in % of total T&C exports.
1986 1989 1992
69% 64% 57%
Source: Nagarajan, 1995.
Another series of indicator, the number of binding*1 quotas, shows that there is a 
decreasing number o f them imposed on Czechoslovak exports. Whereas there were 57 binding 
quotas in 1986, there was only one left in 1992M. As to the average quotas utilisation rate (QUR), 
it fell from 102% in 1989 to 39% in 1992 [Corado, 1995].'* Interestingly enough. Variation 
coefficients’“ computed by Corado displays a decrease from 53% in 89 to 35% in 1992.
Finally, a more synthetic indicator is given by the amount of exports which are actually 
bounded by quota compared to total exports. Table 3 shows that exports under binding quotas 
decreased dramatically. In 1992 they account for less than 0,5% of total T&C exports and for 
slightly less than 1% of exports under quotas.
Table 3. Czechoslovak T&C exports under binding quotas as a % o f ...
1986 1989 1992
tot T&C exports 52% 41% 0,5%
T&C exp. under quota 76% 64% 1%
Sources: Nagarajan, 1995
There are several problems with the above analysis: first with the indicators and their 
inherent shortcomings'7, and then with the general interpretation to draw from them. For 
example, neither the trade coverage indicators, nor the quotas utilisation rates arc entirely 
satisfactory indicators: whereas the proportion of exports under quota does not tell much about
"  The same indicator computed as a percentage of MFA exports of clothing yields higher values: 81% in 
1989, and 68% in 1992. Sec Corado (1994: 28).
(1 It is commonly agreed that a "binding" quota has an utilisation rate of more than 90% (see Erzan and 
Holmes, 1992).
M European Economy, Supplement A #7, July 1994, p 9.
M However, other sources find an average QUR in 1992 of approximately 47%. See Op. cit., p 9, 
Nagarajan (1995: 21) and CITH OSCE, 1992).
“  Defined as QURs' standard deviation divided by AQURs.
17 For a technical account of the difficulties that are associated with the interpretation of such indicators, 
see Nagarajan, 1995.
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the actual bindingness of the imposed quotas, quotas utilisation rates tend to bypass the question 
of the overall impact of quotas on total trade.
It worth noting, moreover, that the average figure for QUR may hide substantial 
differentiated situations. For example, Germany, and Italy tend to impose more binding quota 
than other EC partners. What is more, there are products that are more subject to binding 
restrictions than others: in particular cotton, whether processed, knitted or in fabrics.
Lastly, consideration should be given to tariffs pertaining to T&C exports from the 
CEECs. They are in average relatively high (12,4% for the 5 CEECs between 1985 and 1989, 
17,3% for Czechoslovakia"), and what is more, they are higher in sectors where CEECs exports 
are most dynamic. As to GSP preferences*', only few categories are characterised by GSP limits 
lower than MFA quota [Messerlin, 1993: 40].
2. Consequences on trade specialisation
More fundamentally, it should be made clear that the indicators of trade restrictiveness 
adopted until now allow to answer only quite a narrow set of questions: whether the trend of 
trade obstacles is geared toward more or less bindingness. Given that liberalisation is the general 
objective, there is no real surprise with the findings. What is o f particular interest, instead, is the 
real grip trade constraints have on actual trade. The above-analysis does not help answering such 
a question as it does not say much about the effects of trade obstacles on the structure of actual 
trade flows.
In his study on the impact of the EU trade policy with CEECs, Messerlin brings in 
additional elements necessary to complete the analysis [Messerlin, 1993]. It is argued that 
enlarging quota do not necessarily translate into more unbiased patterns of trade. For example, 
attention should be paid to the sector where the increase takes place, and to equivalent 
preferences granted simultaneously to other CEECs; an empirical illustration is that between 
1985 and 1989, EU quota in Group I of the MFA categories (consisting of the most sensitive 
products) were scarce, and to be divided by all the CEECs, whereas Group i n  was characterised 
by relatively large quota granted to barely more than two CEECs at the same time.
The share of one country in the quota granted by the EU to the CEECs is indeed an 
important variable influencing the effect of quota increase. If the share is very large, it invites the 
beneficiary to take advantage of the associated market power rather than filling the quota. 
Conversely, very small quota shares, generate dissuasive transaction costs.*0 In both cases, the
"  See Messerlin, 1993: 56.
” Consisting of tariff quota and ceilings.
*° Messerlin actually distinguishes between level and evolution analyses: he demonstrates that whether an 
increase in one CEEC quota together with a decline of the CEEC quota share leads to an unambiguous |
decline of quota utilisation rate, an increase in one CEEC quota together with an increase of the CEEC j
quota share brings about an indeterminate outcome. Op. cit.: 47. (
result is a low quota utilisation rate (QURs). Messerlin notes that it is precisely the case of 
quotas covering the 85-89 period: quota granted were either very small (in Group I), or very large 
(in group III).*1 Other factors influencing the outcome associated with quota increase have to do 
with the industrial structure of the concerned sectors. Everything else being equal, comparatively 
small outlets may favour a lower fulfilment of quota, thus yielding lower QURs.
All these are likely reasons explaining the decrease of CEECs' QURs following the 
increase of quota which took place in 1987**. In this light, some concern is also justified 
regarding the subsequent increases of quota on the 89-92 period: if they were on average very 
significant, thus reducing the previous strong discrimination against CEECs, their uneven 
distribution and growth rates do not rule out distortions of the kind described above.
Overall, the above considerations show the additional distortions quota enlargement can 
bring about They also highlight how controversial can be the interpretation of the QUR 
indicator, whose low levels should not be taken as an unconditional sign of the unbindingness of 
quantitative restrictions: the question is of importance since further quota increases are 
negotiated on the basis of past utilisation. In short, Messerlin's analysis makes clear that 
increasing quota is not an innocent move merely aimed at lifting distortions: in certain sectors, 
and under certain conditions it can influence CEECs' trade performance, thus illustrating
"the ability of the general architecture of the EC MFA regime to shape the Central 
European countries export performance" [Messerlin, 1993: 47].
3. Toward free trade
Assessing the present bindingness of quantitative restrictions in the light of the above 
considerations shows that, some weaknesses notwithstanding, liberalisation of 'normal' quotas is 
now an irreversible process. On the face of it, the specific OPT regime seems to have taken over 
as a source of potentially strong distortions, thus materialising the concern expressed by 
Messerlin (1993: 51).
a. Direct trade
There are 24 quotas presently imposed on direct trade from the Czech Republic, and this 
will be so until 1997 (they were 46 from 1991 to 1993, and 26 in 1994). Originally, quotas on 
direct trade displayed regular growth rates over the 1993-1997 period [Table 1 in Annex 1]: 
quotas were supposed to increase at an average rate of 21%, with lower peaks in the categories
*' A graph establishes a positive relation between these shares and the level of QURs. Op. cit.: 54. 
"  opxit.: 44.
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of woven fabrics (8% only). However, following the entry of EFTA countries (notably Austria) 
into the EU as of January 1994, quotas were readjusted. Eventually, the actual average growth on 
the period from 1993 to 1997 amounts to 61%, with higher peaks of +109% (in the category of 
men's jackets).
As to the distribution of direct quotas, with the exception of two categories which are 
granted particularly high quantities (woven fabrics, and stockings), it is relatively even [Table 2].
There was one binding quota as defined by Erzan and Holmes” in 1994 (they were 12 in 
1991). As to Quota Utilisation Rates, they range from 8% (men's suit) to 92% (woven fabrics) in 
1994, following a decreasing trend almost entirely concentrated between 1991 and 1992: from a 
level of 71% in 91, average quota utilisation rate stabilised at the relatively low levels of around 
45% in the following years [Table 3].
On the basis of these preliminary evidences, quantitative restrictions imposed on the 
former Czechoslovakia do not appear to be significantly binding. However, before drawing a 
definitive conclusions, their effect in relation to the structure of specific quotas imposed on OFT 
trade is to be further investigated.*4
b. OPT trade
The imposition of EU-wide specific quota pertaining to OPT has brought about some 
significant distortions in the trade liberalisation process. Until 1991 subject to the 'autonomous? 
trade regime (i.e., provided for unilaterally at the level of each member states), OPT was for the 
first time included into bilateral agreements with the CEECs in parallel with the conclusion of 
the more all-encompassing trade provisions of the Europe Agreements.” Specific OPT quota, 
endorsed by the Community were thus imposed as of 1 January 1992 [Table 4]. There are 12 of 
them imposed on Czechoslovakia, then on the Czech Republic; no decrease in the number of 
quota is provided for.” The growth of OPT quota was substantially modified as a result of the 
membership of Austria. Whereas they were supposed to grow at an average rate of +31% 
between 1993 and 1997, additional quantities granted over the 1995-97 period brought the figure 
to +52%. This is lower than the increase characterising quota on direct trade (+52% as opposed 
to +61%). Of particular significance is the fact that the average rate of growth conceals some 
significant disparities (the strongest growth of OPT quota is +89% for men's suits, the lowest is 
+36% for men's shirts). *945
” I.e., which quota utilisation rates are superior to 90% (see Erzan, Holmes, 1992). I
94 What is more, there can be possible distortions arising from other sources related to some characteristic ,
intrinsic to the concerned products like quality problems. See, for example. Business Central Europe (April ^
1994: 21). Concerning the low utilisation of quota on farm products, see The Financial Times, July 5,
1995. !
95 One of the main difference is that OPT can be subject to negotiation.
”  For Czechoslovakia, in OJ L 45,20.2.92. (
I
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Another way to characterise the situation of OPT quota is to compare OPT with direct 
quota following the EFTA adjustment,” for example, thanks to an indicator such as the 
proportion of OPT quota in total quota [Table 7]. OPT represents 55% of total quota in 1993, and 
51% in 1997. OPT quotas thus undergo an average decrease of their proportion in total quota 
amounting to approximately -7% over the 1993-97 period; the rate is broken down in the 
following way: -13% from 1993 to 1994, and -4% from 1994 until the abolishment of 
quantitative restrictions in 1998. These average figures conceal very significant disparities. 
Category 12 (stockings), for example, display variations of more than 30% in both directions, 
overall, the share is stable at around 30%. On the face of it; the share of each category in the total 
OPT quantitative restrictions remains relatively stable [Table 5].
First analyses tackling OPT found utilisation rates lower than those pertaining to direct 
trade. For example, the average QUR by Czechoslovakia in 1992 which amounts to 47% is 
broken down in the following way: the average QUR is 50% on direct exports, and 36% on OPT 
exports [European Commission, 1994: 9]. But on the basis of figures expressed in tons, 
Messerlin finds an utilisation rate of total quota amounting to 92,6%, which divides into 48,7% 
for OPT, and 105,6% for direct trade [Messerlin, 1993: 79]. Table 6 finds yet different figures 
but agrees on lower OFT utilisation rates in 1992: 38% in average (from OETH sources) which 
compares with 44% for quotas on direct trade. There were one binding quota.
Interestingly enough, in 1993 and 1994, OPT quotas are suddenly extensively utilised 
with average above 100%.** There are 8, then 9 binding quotas on a total number of 12 quotas. 
Overall, quota utilisation rates increased at the rate of + 9% from 1993 to 1994. These figures 
compare with average utilisation rates of direct quotas which do not go beyond 50% in 93 and 94 
(and even decreased by 4,5% on the same period). Indeed, comparing the growth of licences and 
that of quotas from 1993 to 1994 (on the basis of figures expressed in tons) yields a 
straightforward result: whereas the former grew at a rate o f+13%, the latter recorded an increase 
of only 7% [Corado, 1995].
But it is the comparison between the growth of OPT quota and that of quota on direct 
trade broken down on an yearly basis which is the most worrying [Table 8]. First, it appears that 
the increase of quantitative restrictions is concentrated between 1994 and 1995, as the result of 
the EFTA enlargement. What is more, there are large variations in the respective growth rates of 
OPT and direct quota; as a rule of thumbs, the former tend, on a yearly basis, to be higher than 
the latter.
"  Before the adjustment, Messerlin found proportions of OPT quota in total quantitative restrictions 
growing at non negligible pace: between 1992 and 1997, from 62,8% to 70,9% for Hungary, from 57,5% 
to 59,4% for Poland, and from 47,8% to 53,2% for Czechoslovakia.
"  The maximum theoretical rate is 113,5% for the agreements of 1986 (taking into account all the 
possibilities of transfers) (see Messerlin, 1993: 42).
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Overall, the structure of trade protection imposed, respectively, on direct and OPT trade 
provides significant incentives to undertake OPT at the expense of direct trade.
2.3 Conclusion
The finding of the Chapter is that the pattern of trade liberalisation between the HU and 
CEECs is a primary source of opportunity and constraint influencing the terms of economic 
interdependence between the two area.
This is of particular salience as far as OPT is concerned. Even if the opportunity offered 
by a sudden apparent availability of an abundant cheap and skilled labour force is without 
contest crucial in the formation of EU firms OPT strategies, it is strongly confined within the 
limits set by the form and the speed of the process of trade liberalisation.
So much so that, in fact, the development of OPT between the EU and CEECs is 
ascribable as much to trade protection measures still in place during the transition period towards 
free trade, than to compelling market forces such as wage differentials. Further, one might even 
consider CEECs’ comparative advantages to be only an ‘indirect’ determinant of OPT. Indeed, 
OPT takes place primarily where there are trade barriers. But since trade barriers themselves are 
mainly where such comparative advantages lie, it happens that OPT trade takes also place along 
their lines.
Thus, the OPT case illustrates that ‘opening up’ CEECs markets, i.e., in principle fleeing 
market forces, is, in fact, not neutral. It is a rich source of constraint and opportunity which has 
an active influence on CEECs trade specialisation and on the intra-regional division of labour. 
The present Chapter invites therefore to challenge the predictions of mainstream economic 
theory according to which foreign trade in general, and OPT in particular, takes place along the 
lines of comparative advantage as trade is being liberalised.
Overall, OPT is a striking illustration of the ‘politicisation’ of economic relations 
between CEECs and the EU, arising from the fact that the pace and the form of the liberalisation 
process have a direct effects on trade specialisation, but also because, in the last resort, trade 
liberalisation itself takes place in the context of the wider historical relations between the 
Community and the countries of the former Soviet bloc.
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Annex 1: The bindingness of trade restrictions daring the transition towards free trade
•The example of the former Czechoslovakia
Table 1. Direct Quota imposed on the former Czechoslovakia.
Direct quotas.
MFA u n it 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Growth O h * * * » )
1 t 498
2 t 9216 13900 13762.5 14038 17577 17929 18287 33% It
2a t 3577 6950 56615 5776 7817 7974 8133 44% 1*
3 t 2306 5350 4622 4807 5253 5463 5682 23% 17*
3x t 296
4 lOOOpcs 3004 5700 5920 6157 8068 8390 8726 47% 17*
5 lOOOpcs 1842 4750 3249 3379 4303 4475 4654 43% 17*
6 lOOOpcs 1186 3500 2475 2574 4336 4509 4689 89% 17*
7 lOOOpcs 300 1600 1152 1198 1757 1828 1901 65% 17*
8 lOOOpcs 1109 6000 4392 4524 5592 5760 5932 35% 13«
9 t 907 1300 1392 1448 1861 1935 2013 45% 17*
12 lOOOprs 8397 23000 12000 12600 18989 19939 20936 74% 22*
13 2841
14 255
15 lOOOpcs 577 1300 630 661.5 1069 1122 1178 87% 22*
16 lOOOpcs 502 1400 1000 1050 1759 1847 1949 95% 22*
17 lOOOpcs 476 1150 320 339 596 632 669 109% 2 6«
18 585
19 25107
20 t 1206 2400 1512 1603 2454 2601 2757 82% 2 6 *
21 582
24 lOOOpcs 3048 4500 1550 1627.5 2860 3003 3153 103% 22*
26 lOOOpcs 515 1600 1000 i u j U 1889 1984 2083 108% 22«
31 1131
32 t 2829 3900 3861 4093 4422 4688 4969 29% 26 *
32x 2472
33 571
36 t 1338 1650 1134 1191 1536 1612 1693 49% 22*
37 2451 **
39 t 1097 1350 954 1011 1368 1450 1537 61% 2 6 *
41 186
61 861
66 1087
66x 379
67 961 1400
67x 580
67y 126
69 1059
73 700
76 t 1059 3500 1387.5 1471 2458 2606 2762 99% 2 6 *
90 t 2289 3500 3234 3428 4022 4263 4519 40% 2 6 «
91 2600 2600
110 t 3103 3500 3465 3673 4101 4347 4608 33% 2 6 *
117 t 2634 3050 2880 3053 3394 3598 3814 32% 26*
118 t 596 1050 1035 1097 1225 1299 1377 33% 2 6 *
Average growth 61% 2 1 *
199 land 1992: for Czechoslovakia, then for the Czoch Republic only.
(*) 1993-1997, without taking into account the revision due to NAFTA membership 
"Working levels" for 1993 are well above the OJ figures. For 1994, only 2 categories differ.
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Table 2. Structure of direct quota imposed on the former Czechoslovakia.
Direct quotas.
MFA 1991| 1992| 1993 1994| 1995| 1996| 1997
1 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2 9% 13% 18% 17% 16% 16% 15%
2a 4% 6% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%
3 2% 5% 6% 6% 5% 5% 5%
3x 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
4 3% 5% 8% 8% 7% 7% 7%
5 2% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
6 1% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4%
7 0% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2%
8 1% 5% 6% 6% 5% 5% 5%
9 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
12 9% 21% 15% 15% 17% 18% 18%
13 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
14 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
15 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
16 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2%
17 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1%
18 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
19 26% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
20 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
21 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
24 3% 4% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3%
26 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2%
31 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
32 3% 4% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4%
32x 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
33 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
36 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
37 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
39 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
41 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
61 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
66 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
66x 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
67 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
67x 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
67y 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
69 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
73 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
76 1% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
90 2% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
91 3% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
110 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
117 3% 3% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3%
118 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
199 land 1992: for Czechoslovakia, then for the Czech Republic only.
(*) 1993-1997, without taking into account the revision due to NAFTA member
Tabic 3. Utilisation of direct quota imposed on the former Czechoslovakia.
Direct Trade r
1991(1)______________ 1 9 9 2 ( 2 ) _________ 1993________  1994
MFA license quota % license quota % license quota (3) % license quota (3) %
1 296 498 59.44%
2 9620 9216 104.38% 7530 13900 54.17% 9146.23 14794.6 61.82% 11642.1 14038 82.93%
2a 3033 3577 84.79% 3920 6950 56.40% 4447.15 6131.63 72.53% 4273.46 5776 73.99%
3 1923 2306 83.39% 2117 5350 39.57% 2555.2 4968.68 51.43% 2744.35 4807 57.09%
3x 269 296 90.88%
4 2157 3004 71.80% 2957 5700 51.88% 2178.9 6330.4 34.42% 2815.67 6157 45.73%
5 2275 1842 123.51% 2291 4750 48.23% 1634.8 3492.68 46.81% 1321.98 3379 39.12%
6 1575 1186 132.80% 1936 3500 55.31% 753.908 2648.25 28.47% 911.897 2574 35.43%
7 80 300 26.67% 326 1600 20.38% 294.51 1238.4 23.78% 312.273 1198 26.07%
8 1493 1109 134.63% 2171 6000 36.18% 145Z31 4721.4 30.76% 1748.38 4524 38.65%
9 781 907 86.11% 841 1300 64.69% 766.183 1504.32 50.93% 816.561 1448 56.39%
12 7451 8397 88.73% 10320 23000 44.87% 6995.82 12993.6 53.84% 6127.78 12600 48.63%
13 702 2841 2471%
14 126 255 49.41%
15 434 577 75.22% 483 1300 37.15% 145.61 682.65 21.33% 198.674 661.5 30.03%
16 280 502 55.78% 261 1400 18.64% 104.104 1063 9.79% 84059 1050 8.01%
17 482 476 101.26% 526 1150 45.74% 55.577 345.875 16.07% 65.607 339 19.35%
18 377 585 64.44%
19 15359 25107 61.17%
20 1388 1206 115.09% 1317 2400 54.88% 759.447 1632.96 46.51% 793.81 1603 49.52%
21 179 582 30.76%
24 2984 3048 97.90% 2155 4500 47.89% 868.426 1675.55 51.83% 863.77o 1627.5 53.07%
26 257 515 49.90% 234 1600 14.63% 84.616 1072 7.89% 190.521 1050 18.14%
31 467 1131 41.29%
32 1628 2829 57.55% 1553 3900 39.82% 2418.76 3799.19 63.67'*- 4387.43 4788.81 91.62%
32x 1334 2472 53.96%
33 465 571 81.44%
36 639 1338 47.76% 640 1650 38.79% 517.207 1227.56 42.13% 414.149 1191 34.77%
37 1161 2451 47.37%
39 1043 1097 95.08% 975 1350 72.22% 700.491 1030.55 67.97% 61S.309 1011 61.16%
41 182 186 97.85%
61 201 861 23.34%
66 388 1087 35.69%
66x 539 379 142.22%
67 686 961 71.38% 777 1400 55.50%
67x 282 580 48.62%
67y 70 126 55.56%
69 468 1059 44.19%
73 387 700 55.29%
76 933 1059 88.10% 1397 3500 39.91% 348.705 1504.05 23.18% 659.033 1471 44.80%
90 2366 2289 103.36% 3597 3500 102.77% 3049.37 3325.14 91.71% 2584.41 3428 75.39%
91 1677 2600 64.50% 0 2600 0.00%
110 1064 3103 34.29% 678 3500 19.37% 200.685 3776.85 5.31% 164.433 3386.49 4.86%
117 911 2634 34.59% 1343 3050 44.03% 1164.53 3127.05 37.24% 1659.83 3053 54.37%
118 456 596 76.51% 494 1050 47.05% 434.645 1120.05 38.81% 269.565 1097 24.57%
Average 71.39% 44.23% 40.76% 44.74%
Source: EC Commission.
Note: 1991 and 1992 data oonccm Czechoslovakia; 1993 and 1994 data, the Czech Republic only.
(1) 1 Jan 1991 to 31 Mar 1992.
(2) 1 Jan 1992 to 31 Mar 1993. OETH finds almost always slightly higher utilization rates.
(3) "Working level"
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Table 4.
Outward Processing Traffic 
Quota
MFA Unit 1992(1) 1993(2) 1994 1995(3) 1996(3) 1997(3) Growth Growth« •)
4 lOOOpcS 3500 4800 5088 5904 6259 6634 38% 26%
5 lOOOpcs 2300 3705 3927 4609 4886 5179 40% 26%
6 lOOOpcs 5500 3770 3996 5443 5770 6116 62% 26%
7 lOOOpcs 3000 2400 2544 2963 3141 3330 39% 26%
8 lOOOpcs 4500 3965 4143.5 4943 5165 5397 36% 19%
12 lOOOprs 6000 6240 6708 8235 8852 9516 53% 34%
15 lOOOpcs 3500 2025 2177 2587 2781 2989 48% 34%
16 lOOOpcs 1000 900 967.5 1470 1580 1699 89% 34%
17 lOOOpcs 1200 720 785 944 1029 1121 56% 41%
24 lOOOpcs 2000 875 941 1107 1190 1279 46% 34%
26 lOOOpcs 1800 1350 1451 1708 1836 1974 46% 34%
76 t 6000 2800 3052 4020 4381 4776 71% 41%
Average growth 52% 31%
(1) aggtegato EC level 'in L45 1992; Czechoslovakia.
(2) in LI 23 1994 (New Additional ProtoooJe); Czech Republic only
(3) For 93,9«, 97: in L94 1993 (renegotiated)
(4) without taking into account the revision due to NAFTA membership
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Table 5. OPT quota
Quota share 
In tons
MFA 1992 % 1993 % 1994 % 1995 % 1996 % 1997 %
4 540 2.80% 741 6% 785 6% 911 5% 966 5% 1024 5%
5 508 3% 818 6% 867 3% 1017 6% 1079 6% 1143 6%
6 3125 16% 2142 17% 2270 8% 3093 18% 3278 18% 3475 17%
7 541 3% 432 3% 458 2% 534 3% 566 3% 600 3%
8 978 5% 862 7% 901 3% 1075 6% 1123 6% 1173 6%
12 247 1% 257 2% 276 1% 339 2% 364 2% 392 2%
15 4167 22% 2411 19% 2592 9% 3080 18% 3311 18% 3558 18%
16 1250 6% 1125 9% 1209 4% 1838 11% 1975 11% 2124 11%
17 839 4% 503 4% 549 2% 660 4% 720 4% 784 4%
24 513 3% 224 2% 241 1% 284 2% 305 2% 328 2%
26 581 3% 435 3% 468 2% 551 3% 592 3% 637 3%
76 6000 31% 2800 22% 3052 11% 4020 23% 4381 23% 4776 24%
Sum 19288 100% 12751 100% 13669 100% 17401 100% 18660 100% 20014 100%
Note: renegotiated for 1995, 96,97.
1992: for Czechoslovakia, then (he Czech Republic only.
Tabic 6.
OPT Quota Utilisation Rate
1992 1993 .1 9 9 4
MFA (I) license(2) quota(3) QUR license(4) quota(5) QUR license(4) quota(S) QUR
4 (pcs) 880 3500 25% 6648 4800 139% 6360 5088 125%
5 (pcs) 2072 2300 90% 3162.014 3705 85% 4872.143 3927 124%
6 (pcs) 2397 5500 44% 4979.259 3770 132% 5241.673 3996 131%
7 (pcs) 718 3000 24% 2997.254 2400 125% 3260.947 2544 128%
8 (pcs) 953 4500 21% 2000.451 3965 50% 2545.33 4143.5 61%
12 (prs) 3320 6000 55% 8642.4 6240 139% 9725.8 6708 145%
15 (pcs) 1207 3500 34% 1989.381 2025 98% 2414.323 2177 111%
16 (pcs) 176 1000 18% 437.371 900 49% 398.117 967.5 41%
17 (pcs) 728 1200 61% 997.2 720 139% 981.25 785 125%
24 (pcs) 685 2000 34% 1211.875 875 139% 127.035 941 14%
26 (pcs) 338 1800 19% 1491.545 1350 110% 1972.812 1451 136%
76(t) 2098 6000 35% 2403.728 2800 86% 2758.735 3052 90%
AQUR 38% 107% 103%
Note: 1992 data concern Czechoslovakia; 1993 and 1994 data, the Czech Republic only. 
Sources: (2 ) O ETH  (3 ) O J L  45. 1992 (4) EC Commissi on (5 ) O J L 1 2 3 ,1994.
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Table 7.
OPTquota in proportion of total quota (direct + OFT), and growth.
MFA 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1993-94 1994-97 1993-97
4 43% 45% 45% 42% 43% 43% 1%
-5%
-4%
5 33% 53% 54% 52% 52% 53% 1%
-2%
-1%
6 61% 60% 61% 56% 56% 57% 1%
-7%
-6%
7 65% 68% 68% 63% 63% 64% 1%
-6%
-6%
8 43% 47% 48% 47% 47% 48% 1% 0% 0%
12 21% 34% 24% 30% 31% 31%
-31% 32%
-9%
15 73% 76% 77% 71% 71% 72% ' 1% -6%
-6%
16 42% 47% 48% 46% 46% 47% 1%
-3%
-2%
17 51% 69% 70% 61% 62% 63% 1%
-10%
-10%
24 31% 36% 37% 28% 28% 29% 2%
-21%
-20%
26 53% 57% 58% 47% 48% 49% 1% -16%
-15%
76 63% 67% 67% 62% 63% 63% 1% -6%
-5%
Aver. 48% 55% 55% 50% 51% 51%
-2%
-4%
-7%
Note: 1995-97 data ara B nryütm l
Table 8. Growth of OPT and direct quota (expressed in t).
MFA direct
°P* direct opt direct opt direct opt direct <** direct
4 4% 6% 31% 16% 4% 6% 4% 6% 47% 38% 17*
5 4% 6% 27% 17% 4% 6% 4% 6% 43% 40% 17*
6 4% 6% 68% 36% 4% 6% 4% 6% 89% 62% 17*
7 4% 6% 47% 16% 4% 6% 4% 6% 65% 39% 17*
8 3% 5% 24% 19% 3% 4% 3% 4% 35% 36% 13*
12 5% 8% 51% 23% 5% 7% 5% 8% 74% 53% 33*
15 5% 8% 62% 19% 5% 7% 5% 7% 87% 48% 22*
16 5% 8% 68% 52% 5% 7% 6% 8% 95% 89% 22*
17 6% 9% 76% 20% 6% 9% 6% 9% 109% 56% 26*
24 5% 8% 76% 18% 5% 7% 5% 7% 103% 46% 22*
26 5% 7% 80% 18% 5% 7% 5% 8% 108% 46% 22*
76 6% 9% 67% 32% 6% 9% 6% 9% 99% 71% 26*
Averaj 5% 7% 56% 24% 5% 7% 5% 7% 80% 52% 20*
54*
41«
54*
54 *
41«
31*
199land  1992: for Czechoslovakia, then for the Czech Republic only. 
(•) w ithout taking in to  account the revision due to EFT A membership
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W Outward Processing Traffic as a vehicle for the deployment of production 
activity to Central Europe
Whereas the fust part identified the different types o f constraint and opportunity 
potentially bearing upon the formation of OPT networks in CEECs, the present one accounts for 
the actual patterns of OPT relations. It proposes to ‘map' the OPT partnerships that developed 
between firms of the two area, and, on this basis, to assess the influence of the framework within 
which the latter take their strategic decisions. In other terms, which opportunities are cogent 
incentives, and which constraint is truly compelling? How effective are market, institutional and 
political determinants in shaping patterns of OPT between the EU and CEECs?
Overall, the present part aims at gauging the nature of the contribution of OPT to the 
pattern of economic interdependence between the EU and CEECs. The fundamental question, in 
this respect, has to do with the rationale underlying Western firms strategies: do the latter aim at 
reaping the advantages of wage differentials on a short term basis, or are they ready to enter into 
more demanding and equal partnerships with local firms? It is easy to see how far-reaching the 
implications of such an issue are in terms of local and regional development Indeed, in certain 
sectors, and in certain host countries, OPT has become a  major (if not the main) vehicle for 
interdependence between the EU and CEECs. Thus, in the face of the sometimes very high 
degree of dependence developed by CEECs* f~reign trade upon such ‘temporary* trade, it is 
crucial to identify the ‘trajectories' that OPT networks are most likely to follow. These latter are 
nothing but one factor contributing to the definition of the terms under which the dynamics of 
regional integration develops.
An important finding made explicit by Part II is that no general consideration can be 
made about the above issues. Looking at the possible trajectories of EU firms* deployment 
strategies, it shows that it is actually fum-specific variables which make sense of the general 
OPT determinants addressed in Part I.
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Chapter 3. Contribution of OPT to the regional division of labour: empirical evidence
The present Chapter aims at a preliminary assessment of the role of OFT in the 
formation of a unified regional economy. It starts by quantitatively ‘mapping* OFT relations 
between the EU countries and the CEECs and thus highlights two striking features: first, the 
general importance of OPT in total CEECs trade and the particularly high levels of OPT in 
certain sectors; second, the fact that, from whatever standpoint, OPT in CEECs is a very German 
story. Not only are German firms by far the main source of EU OPT in the CEECs, but also, in 
certain sectors, their OPT activities account for quite large shares of host countries' total trade to 
theEU.
In the face of the quantitative importance of OPT in the overall EU-CEECs relations, the 
question of the prospects of OPT partnerships is of crucial relevance for the terms under which 
economic interdependence between the EU and CEECs takes place.
As a matter of fact, looking at firm-level shows how ambiguous the benefits of this type 
of economic transactions can be for local firms. True, OPT proved to be an almost providential 
solution to many CEECs firms in the aftermath of the demise of the CMEA in 1991. However, a 
serious pitfall characterising OPT is the loss of control of local firms over the two extremes of 
the production chain; the resulting deprivation from market power makes it quite difficult for the 
latter to take over autonomous production after the hypothetical ending of an OPT contract This 
is particularly worrying if account is taken of likely wage increases in the CEECs risking to 
translate into foreign partners' withdrawal.
Overall, what is at stake in the future developments of OPT partnerships is the survival 
of local firms, and beyond, the terms (the price) of economic interdependence.
3.1 A statistical appraisal of OPT relations between the EU and CEECs
/. General aggregate features o f OPT between thè EU12 and thè CEEC4
Absolute levels, proportion in total trade and evolution
OPT is not entirely a new phenomena to be connected to the opening up of the CEECs 
markets. As a matter of fact, starting levels of OPT in the then Centrally Planned Economics 
were already non negligible in 1991. At that date, more than 18% of Hungary's exports to the
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EUI2 was actually ascribable to OPT (the highest proportion registered across the region).** In 
absolute terms, it is Poland which was the privileged OPT partner of the EU12 (OPT transactions 
amounted to ECU 0.8 bn in 1991, representing 13.59& of total Polish exports to the EU 12). The 
former Czechoslovakia was characterised by the lowest starting point with a total amount of OPT 
exports to the EU 2.5 times lower than that of Poland (ECU 0.3 bn, i.e., 8% of its total exports to 
the EU12).
Table 1. Exports after Outward Processing to the EU12 (1000 ECU), and proportion in total 
exports to the EU12 (%)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1993 1991-1993
% W* « W* * °P* * «V* « op* «
C 3 ( l ) 332413 8 .1 8 « 393332 1 0 .74* 7J757I 1 2 6 2 * 1022288 1 2 4 0 * 1163720 11.11* * 2 30 .08« ♦3 3 .7 3 *
Hungary 669282 18.47% 803077 2 0 .1 9 * 800266 2 0 .23* 861971 17.31* 882079 13.38« ♦3 1 .7 9 * -2& 43*
Poland 838820 1 3 .30« 1122730 1 3 .86« 1407030 1 1 3 6 * 1683318 1 1 3 1 « 1136823 16.54« ♦1 1 1 9 8 « ♦2 2 4 9 *
(1) Czedicalavakia in  1991,1992. the Czech Republic end SJaraki* in 1993.1994. A d  1993.
Overall, total OPT transactions10* between the EUI2 and the CEECs increased by 111% 
between 91 and 95 (from ECU 1.8 bn to ECU approximately ECU 4 bn in 1995, i.e., around 14% 
of total trade between the 2 area over the considered period). What is remarkable is how OPT 
activities increased since 1991 in Poland and in the former Czechoslovakia. The low starting 
points of OPT proportion characterising the two countries account for strong catching up effects: 
OPT exports to the EU 12 grew by 250% and 119% respectively between 1991 and 1995. In the 
meantime, Hungary increased its OPT exports to the EU12 by only 32%.
Interestingly enough, however, there are two phases in the 1991-1995 period. Until 1993, 
CEECs OPT clearly follows an increasing trend, with the fastest growth rates of OPT registered 
between 1991 and 1992. But whereas absolute levels continue to increase, OPT dependence 
starts to decrease in the 3 countries as of 1993 (faster in Hungary than in the two other CEECs). 
As a matter of fact, in 1993 around 20% of the total trade of Hungary and Poland is dependent 
on OPT, and slightly less than 13% of that of the former Czechoslovakia; but in 1995 the 
proportions fall to 17% in Poland (which became in 1994 the CEEC most dependent on OPT 
before Hungary), 14% in Hungary, and 11% in the former Czechoslovakia. *10
** The source of all the statistical data contained in the present session is EUROSTAT COMEXT database.
100 It is chosen, in the present Chapter, to look at re-exports after processing (from the CEECs viewpoint) 
as they arguably reflect the OPT phenomenon more accurately (imports risk indeed to be diverted from 
their supposed use and sold locally, for example; what is more, re-exports into the EU are likely to be 
monitored more carefully in the fear that they might be in contravention with trade measures enforced by 
the Community...). Hence, in the following, ‘OPT trade' actually goes for ‘OPT re-exports into the EU’.
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Table 2. Growth of OPT proportion in total exports from the CEEC4 to the HU 12, 1991-1995
(%).
CS(1)
Hungary
Poland
1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1991-1995
+31.25%
+9.34%
+17.42%
+17.46%
+0.29%
+17.05%
-1.70%
-13.52%
-0.30%
-10.44%
-22.44%
-10.61%
+35.73%
-26.45%
+22.49%
(1) Czechoslovakia in 1991,1992, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia in 1993,1994, and 1995.
Thus, Hungary succeeds in reducing its OPT dependence by 26% between 1991 and 
1995, and registers at the end of the period the lowest absolute level (ECU 900 M). Instead, in 
the former Czechoslovakia and in Poland, where OPT dependence increased over the same 
period (+36% and +22%, respectively), absolute levels were brought to ECU 1.2 and 1.8 bn, 
respectively. As a result, Poland is, in 1995, the main provider of OPT goods to the EU12 and it 
is the country most dependent on OPT for its foreign trade.
Contribution of OFT to the evolution of total trade
The contribution of OPT to the general trade performance of the CEECs is far from 
negligible. Re-exports indeed explain 14% of CEECs’ exports growth to the EU12 between 1991 
and 1995.'01 The dynamism of OPT trade between Poland and Czechoslovakia, on the one hand, 
and the EU12 on the other hand had a significant impact on the growth of total exports (defined 
as the sum of OPT exports and "direct” exports). *63
Table 3. Direct and total exports from the CEEC4to the EU12 (1000 ECU)
1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 199+95 1991 -1995
direct total direct total d irect total d irect total direct total
C S (I) +32.66% +36.46% +6.05% +8.33% +37.61% +37.27% +28.98% +27.10% + 149.72% +157.93%
Hungary +7.69% + 10.02%
-0.96% -0.89% +28.83% +25.55% +38.23% +31.94% +89.93% +79.20%
Inland + 10.89% + 13.99% +3.62% +7.07% +20.23% +20.15% +24.85% +21.91% +72.49% +78.77%
(1) Czechoslovakia in 1991.1992, the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993, 1994, and 1995.
101 See footnotes 107 and 108 for the underlying computation.
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Between 1991 and 1995, OPT exports inflate the growth rate of total exports by around 
5% in the former Czechoslovakia, and by around 10% in Poland. (+158% increase o f total trade, 
but "only" +150% without OPT for the Czech trade. For Poland: +79% with OPT, and +72% 
without). If the same computation is done on the period between 1991 and 1993, i.e., that of 
major OPT dynamism, the OPT contribution appears to be even stronger the Polish growth rate, 
for example, was inflated by more than 48% as a result of OPT trade, and that of the former 
Czechoslovakia by +18%. But as of 1993, OPT growth turns out to be systematically lower than 
that of direct trade. Total trade performances are consequently slightly eroded when account is 
taken of OPT.
In the case of Hungary, the same distinction between the pre- and the post-1993 periods 
holds. The difference is that due to a stronger deceleration since 1993, OPT has actually reduced 
the growth rate of total trade not only between 1993 and 1995, but also on the whole 1991-1995 
period. As a result, direct trade increased by 90%, OPT by 32% and total trade by less than 80%.
Overall, OPT growth explains 20% of total exports growth from Poland to the GU12 
between 1991 and 1995, 13% and 7% of total exports growth from the former Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary, respectively.
• In sum ...
-Poland is in 1995 the main host country for EU OPT operations, in absolute terms, and 
in proportion of total trade (17%)
-with the highest starting levels of OPT proportions in total trade (18% in 1991), 
Hungary is the only country characterised by a decrease of OPT dependence between 1991 and 
1995
-the 3 countries are characterised by a decrease of OPT proportion as of 1993
Main geographical patterns, and evolution
The bulk of OPT trade in CEECs is undertaken by Germany: 74% of EU OPT in the 
CEECs is of German origin. Indeed, German OPT in the CEECs amounts to ECU 2.9 bn, 
whereas the Netherlands, which is the second biggest source of OPT engage no more than ECU 
280 M. Italy, France and Denmark follow with comparable levels (ECU 214 M, 191 M, and 170 
M respectively). Finally, a last category consists of countries marginally and anecdotally 
involved in OPT operations (Belgium, the UK ... are countries registering barely more than ECU 
50 M of OPT in CEECs in 1995).
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Table 4. OPT to CEECs by member states (1000 ECU), growth (%) and proportion in total OPT 
from the EU to CEECs (%).
1991 1995 1991-1995 % in 1991 % m 1995
France 205310 190781 -7 * 6.59% 4.91%
Be(g Lux 68338 56043 48% 2.19% 1.44%
NL 251061 277111 + 10% 8.06% 7.14%
Germ 2323476 2900763 +25% 74.58% 74.71%
It 76353 214268 +181% 2.45% 5.52%
UK 53945 59989 +11% 1.73% 1.55%
Irl 212 0 •100% 0.01% 0%
DK 136323 172115 +26% 4.38% 4.43%
Greece 0 21 - “ 0% 0%
Port 6 416 +6833% 0% 0.01%
Spain 448 1049 +134% 0.01% 0.03%
EU12 3115472 3882622 +25% 100% 100%
A remarkable feature concerning German OPT activities in CEECs is that they increased 
at the very respectable rate of 25% between 1991 and 1995. Two other countries registering 
significant increases of OPT are Denmark (+26%), and most notably Italy (+181%); on the face 
of it, the Netherlands follow only a modest increasing trend (+10%). As to France, it is 
conspicuous for registering one of the rare decreasing trend (-7% over the same period). Overall, 
following the unchallenged German supremar^ the Netherlands preserve their second position 
(7%), but closely behind, the Italians are rapidly increasing their presence (6% as against 2% in 
1991).
In general terms, around half o f EU OPT is geared to Poland (47% to be precise), 
whereas both the Czech Republic and Hungary account for 23% of EU OPT to the CEECs; in 
last position, Slovakia attracts 7% of EU OPT. On this basis, it is interesting to identify 
privileged relationships between host and home countries, as there are indeed strong 
geographical proclivities.
Germany is mainly geared to Poland (Poland represents 46% of German OPT in the 
CEEC4, i.e„ ECU 1.3 bn). The second main destination of German OPT activities is the Czech 
Republic (29%). Interestingly enough, the growing German interest in OPT partnerships with 
Czech firms is at the expense of Germano-Hungarian relations (19% of German OPT in the 
CEECs).
Dutch firms favour OPT activities in Poland in particular mode (62% of total Dutch OPT 
to the CEECs, i.e., ECU 176 M), as well as French firms (43% of French OPT in the CEEC4,
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i.e., ECU 82 M). However, French firms also gear an important proportion of their OPT
activities to Hungary (36%).
On the face of it, Italian firms are comparatively more prone to undertake OPT with 
Hungarian partners. Indeed Hungary represents no less than 64% of the Italian OPT activities in 
the CEEC4. In a way, the strong Italian attraction for Hungary substitutes for the diminishing 
German interest
Figure 1. Bilateral OPT flows in ECU, % of bilateral total trade, and % of OPT trade, in 1995.
1995 Germany Netherlands Italy France EU12
Poland U b n ; 21 % total trade 
- 46% German y-CEEC* 
-73% Poland-EU
176M; 24 % total bade 
• 62% Nl-CEECs 
•10% Poland-EU
32M; 3 % total trade 
•15%Italy-CEECa 
-2% Poland-EU
82M; 11 % total trade 
-43% France-CEECt 
-4% Poland-EU
lJb n ; 17 % total trade 
-47% EU-Œ EC
Hungary 530M; 15% total trade 
-19% Germany-CEEC« 
- 62% Hungary-EU
65M; 21% total trade 
-23% Nl-CEECi 
-7% Hungvy-EU
137M; 14 % total m de 
-64% Italy-CEECe 
•16% Hing«y-EU
68M; 16% total trade 
-36% France-CEECa 
-8% Hingary-EU
880M; 14 % total rade 
-23% EU-CEEC«
Czech
Rep.
840M; 15 % lota] trade 
-29% Germany-CEEC« 
-93% CR-EU
13M; 5% total trade 
-5% Nl-CEECa 
-2% CR-EU
17M, 3% total trade 
-8% Italy-CEECa 
-2% CR-EU
21M. 6% total trade 
-11% France-CEECt
-2% CR-EU
900M; 11 % total rade 
-23% EU-Œ ECa
Slovakia 170M; 10% total trade
- 6% Germany-CEEC*
- 65% Slovakia-EU
30M; 26% total trade 
-ll% N l-C EEC i 
-11% Slovakia-EU
28M. 7% total trade 
-13% Italy-CEECa 
-11% Slovakia-EU
20M; 13% total trade 
-10% France-CEECt 
-7% Slovakia-EU
263M; 10 % total rade 
•7% of EU-CEECt
CEEC4 2.9bn; 75% EU OPT 
-17% total trade
280M ; 7% EU OPT 
-20% total trade
214M; 6% EU OPT 
•7% total trade
191M; 5% EU OPT 
-11% total trade
From the viewpoint of the host countries, additional predilection and idiosyncrasy 
appear. It is no surprise that all the CEECs are strongly oriented towards Germany. But there are 
some differences of magnitude.
It is the Czech Republic which is most dependent on the German presence: the share of 
Germany is the highest (and increasing), accounting for 93% of total Czech OPT exports to the 
EU12. Interestingly enough, the Czech Republic comes in general only 3rd in the most preferred 
destination of EU OPT; only in the case of Germany does the country rank in second position.
Instead, Poland partners tend to be (relatively) more diversified. Whereas the German 
share is about 20 points lower than in the case of the Czech Republic (73% of total Polish OPT 
to the EU12), the Netherlands account for a non negligible proportion of total EU OPT in Poland 
(10%).
As to the special relation between Hungary and Italy, it is relativised from the Hungarian 
viewpoint: indeed the Italian share of Hungarian OPT in the EU is one of the highest among non-
66
German partnerships (16%), but it still compares with the German one, which, even reduced, is 
nevertheless 62%.
The above features show how uneven the distribution of OFT activities in Central 
Europe can be with some bilateral relations strongly privileged.
Quantitatively, the most important bilateral flows always concern Germany on the one 
hand and each CEEC on the other hand. Naturally, it is the German-Polish OFT partnerships 
which are the most frequent Overall, they account for an aggregate figure of ECU 1.3 bn, i.e., 
21% of the total exports of Poland to Germany. Then come the Germano-Czech relations (ECU 
840 M), the Germano-Hungarian ones (550 M), and the Germano-Slovak partnerships (170 M).
The most important bilateral relations which do not involve partners of German origin 
are those between Dutch and Polish firms (ECU 176 M), and between Italian and Hungarian 
firms (137 M).
Finally, a last category of OPT bilateral relations gives rise to much lower aggregate 
levels of transactions: the Franco-Polish and the Franco-Hungarian partnerships, the Dutch- 
Hungarian relations, and to an lower extent the Italo-Polish ones (ECU 82 M, 68 M, 60 M, and 
32 M, respectively).
• In sum, the following points are o f particular relevance:
- the bulk of OPT trade in CEECs is undertaken by German firms: 74% of EU OPT in 
the CEECs is o f German origin (ECU 2.9 bn)
- the Netherlands is the 2nd biggest source o f OPT (ECU 280 M). Italy, France and 
Denmark follow (around ECU 200 M).
- Italian OPT in the CEEC4 registered a remarkable growth rate of more than 143%, 
whereas France is conspicuous for registering one of the rare decreasing trend
- half o f EU OPT is geared to Poland, which is the privileged destination o f German, 
Dutch, and to a lower extent of French firms. Notably, Italian firms are primarily oriented to 
Hungary.
- the Czech Republic is the country that registers the highest proportion o f OPT of 
German origin (93%!), but the country occupies only a secondary position in the OPT activities 
of Western European firms, except in the electrical machinery sector.
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Main product patterns, and evolution
An analysis o f the product structure of OFT transactions between the EU12 and CEECs 
shows a marked stability; indeed, the first 10 positions (accounting for more than 95% of the 
total OPT transactions between the EU and CEECs) are occupied by the same sectors in 1991 
and in 1995.
Table 5. Ranking of the 10 first positions of O PT between the EU 12 and CEEC4 in 1991 and 
1995; Absolute levels (M ECU) and proportion in total trade (%).
1991
Abs. %
1. t&c 1200 M 62%
¿.footwear 153 M 48%
3. elec. mach. 114M 21%
4. mech. mach. 106M 12%
5. furniture 87 M 16%
6. cars 43 M 9%
7.leathers 36 M 18%
8. edible 24 M 6%
9.I&S 16 M 1%
10. plastic 13 M 2%
total 1800 M 13%
1995
Abs. %
1. t&c 2600 M 71%
2. elec. mach. 409 M 16%
3. furniture 170 M 11%
4. footwear 144 M 28%
5. mech. mach. 131 M 5%
6. cars 59 M 3%
7. plastic 47 M 4%
8. leathers 38 M 13%
9. edible 36 M 10%
10.I&S 33 M 1%
total 3800 M 14%
The Textile and Clothing sector comes unsurprisingly first both in 1991 and 1995, with 
an overwhelming and slightly increasing share of total OPT relations between the two area (from 
64% to 68% between 1991 and 1995).
The following positions underwent some interesting changes. Most notably, the footwear 
and the mechanical machinery were downgraded in the ranking. The trend is of particular 
relevance in the case of footwear: not only the sector’s rank fell from the second position in 1991 
(8% of total EU-CEECs relations) to the 4th in 1995 (less than 4%), but also OPT in the sector 
underwent a decrease of absolute levels of transactions (ECU 144 M in 1995 as against ECU 153 
M in 1991). As to the mechanical machinery, from 6% of total EU-CEECs OPT in 1991 (i.e., a 
4th position), it represented hardly more than 3% of the very same exchanges in 1995. But in 
contrast to the footwear case, and however modest, increasing trends characterised OPT in the 
sector (+23% between 1991 and 1995).
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UOn the face of it* the electrical machinery followed extremely dynamic trends, 
registering a growth rate among the strongest (+258% between 1991 and 1995) with a resulting 
shift from the 3rd to the second position right after T&C (i.e., with ECU 410 M, more than 10% 
of total EU-CEECs OPT). Another very dynamic sector is the plastics industry (+278% between 
1991 and 1995); however absolute levels remained marginal (ECU 47 M, i.e., slightly more than 
1% of ECU-CEECs OPT relations). As a result, in 1995, the plastic industry occupies the 7th 
position among the sector most concerned by OPT relations.
Furniture is the other sector which together with the electrical machinery substituted for 
the downgrading position of the footwear and the mechanical machinery sectors; OPT in the 
sector underwent an increase of 95% between 1991 and 1995 (from ECU 87 M to 170 M). 
However, the share in total EU-CEECs OPT remained stable at 5%.
The other sectors most concerned are the automotive industry (characterised by a modest 
growth of 37% between 1991 and 1995), leathers, edible preparations, and to quite a lower 
extent iron and steel. All of them lost one position in the graduatory (with respective ranking of 
6th, 8th, 9th and 10th in 1995).
More marginal but almost systematically characterising the product structure of member 
states are the optical, the toy, and the clock sectors; as well as printing and glassware. It is worth 
noting the very strong growths that often characterised OPT in these sectors. In the base metal 
sector, for example, OPT increased by 571% between 1991 and 1995.
At this level of aggregation, it is possible to distinguish between different categories of 
sectors according to the type of evolutions undergone by OPT absolute levels and proportions in 
total trade. One first category concerns sectors experiencing strong OPT increases with non 
negligible absolute starting levels: the electrical machinery, and the T&C sectors. By contrast, 
plastics is a sector displaying sharp growth rates of OPT absolute levels as well as OPT 
proportions in total trade while being relatively new in the business. What is more, further 
distinction is to be made between sectors experiencing decreasing trends of OPT proportions 
(almost all except T&C, edible preparation and, as mentioned above, plastics), while 
characterised by increasing absolute levels and, the mechanical machinery in which not only 
OPT share in total trade but also OPT absolute levels decrease.
•In sum, the main features characterising the product structure of the EU-CEECs OPT 
exchanges are the following:
-T&C represents the bulk of OPT transactions
-T&C is nearly the only sector characterised by a simultaneous growth of absolute levels 
and a continuing increase of OPT proportion in total trade; the other one, the plastic industry, 
accounts for incomparably lower absolute levels of OPT transactions
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-despite decreasing OPT proportions, the sectors o f electrical machinery and furniture 
are characterised by dynamic absolute growths
-OPT growth in the sector of mechanical machinery is increasingly lower than that of 
direct trade. With lower levels o f transactions, the automotive industry is characterised by a 
similar trend
-there is a marked disaffection o f EU operators for OPT in the footwear sector 
translating into absolute decreases.
2. Sector- and country-specific features o f OPT between the EU12 and the CEEC4
General cross-sectoral and cross-national features of OPT in the CEECs need to be 
qualified by sometimes strong specific traits.
Absolute levels in 1995
From the viewpoint o f home countries
There are, from the viewpoint of home countries, different country-specific features 
concerning the commodity structure of their OPT relations.
In first place, the quantitative disparity between Germany and the other EU countries is, 
of course, to be stressed. The very bulk of EU OPT is often almost exclusively attributable to the 
activities of German firms. In T&C, for example, Germany undertakes 10 times more OPT than 
the others EU members (ECU 1.8 bn as against a range going from ECU 140 M in Italy to ECU 
280 M in the Netherlands). The German unmitigated domination is equally affirmed in both the 
sectors of electrical and mechanical machineries: 80% for electrical machinery, and more than 
90% of EU OPT in CEECs for mechanical machinery (ECU 360 M, and 100 M, respectively). It 
is also the case in the sectors of furniture and edible preparations (ECU 160M, and 30M, 
respectively).10*
w The list of the sectors where Germany is almost the only source of OPT is actually long... it comprises 
miscellaneous manufactures, the printing industry (ECU 21 and 14 M, respectively in 1995 in CEECs) and 
also base metals, glassware, perfumery...
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Tables 6. OPT re-imports from the CEEC4 (1000 ECU), proportion in total OPT from the
CEEC4, and proportion in total OFT from the CEEC4 to the EU12.
Germany
OFT % EU%
TT 2900763 100% 75%
tAc 1838793 63% 70%
elec. 361336 12% 88%
turn. 163073 6% 96%
mecfa. 122164 4% 93%
shoes 96138 3% 67%
can 51314 2% 87%
edib 32584 1% 91%
leathers 29367 1% 77%
optic. 28373 1% 91%
plast 27937 1% 59%
IAS 27907 1% 85%
misc. 21148 1% 100%
print 13872 0.5% 100%
ba semen 13556 0.5% 97%
toys 12268 0.3% 85%
glm w 8750 0.5% 95%
clock 7483 0.5% 88%
Italy
OPT % EU%
TT 214268 100% 6%
tAc 143403 67% 5%
shoes 30418 14% 21%
plait 16649 8% 35%
raech. 5147 2% 4%
elec. 4066 2% 1%
can 2578 1% 4%
phann. 2137 1% 77%
railways 1644 1% -■'19%
France
OPT % EU%
TT 190781 100% 5%
tAc 158894 83% 6%
elec. 11360 6% 3%
shoes 4325 2% 3%
leathen 3516 2% 9%
can 3438 2% 6%
Netherlands
OPT % EU%
TT 277111 100% 7%
tAc 249493 90% 9%
elec. 15480 6% 4%
DK
OPT % EU%
TT 170811 100% 4%
tAc 154696 91% 6%
shoes 10397 6% 7%
Belg-Lua
OPT % EU%
TT 56043 100% 1%
tAc 36295 65% 1%
elec 15531 28% 4%
UK
OPT % EU%
TT
tAc
59989
5935?
100%
99%
2%
2%
Yet, whenever the Germans have a weaker grip on the OPT business in CEECs, it is the 
Italians who fill the gap. For example, Italy is characterised by ‘somewhat’1“ dominant positions 
in the sector of plastics (35% of total EU OPT) and in footwear (21%). Also, it is interesting to 
note that, despite very low absolute levels, Italy represents the majority of EU OPT in the 
pharmaceutical sector (77%),#4 (as well as in organical chemicals: 67%).
The other countries involved in OPT operations in CEECs are massively oriented to the 
T&C sector, the Netherlands and Denmark, as well as the United Kingdom but with almost 
irrelevant absolute levels (around 90% of their OPT operations in CEECs, i.e. ECU 250 and 170 
M, in the Dutch and Danish case, respectively). As to French partners, they also undertake some 
OPT activities in the electrical machinery sector, and they used to be more active in the footwear 
sector (see below the analysis in dynamic terms). As a result, the share of T&C in total French 
OPT with CEECs is ‘only’ 83%.
Some special cases of surprisingly dynamic second positions are worth noting. For 
example, the Dutch and Belgium OPT presence in the sector of electrical machinery 10
101 Everything is made “relative" by the overwhelming domination of Germany.
)W Such figures probably reflect the activities of a limited number of firms, if not that of one unique 
company.
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(approximately ECU 15 M each) and the Danish OPT activity in the footwear industry (ECU 10 
M).
Another way to grasp differences from home-country to home-country is to go beyond 
the magnitude of the volumes involved, and to look at the very structure of OPT trade.
For example, the sectors of electrical and mechanical machinery occupy significant 
positions in the German structure (resp. 2nd and 4th position), but on the face of it, Italy 
undertakes OPT only in the mechanical machinery sector, whereas, on the contrary, France and 
the Netherlands have OPT only in the electrical machinery sector.
Also, in the German product structure, it is worth noting the third position (after T&C, 
and electrical machinery) of furniture which is almost the exclusive source of EU OPT in the 
CEECs.
As to Italy, it has definitely the most peculiar product structure characterised as it is by a 
strong edge in footwear, plastics (second and third after the T&C sector, with ECU 30 M and 17 
M, respectively), as well as in pharmaceuticals.
• Summing u p ...
- Germany is always the major, and often the only source of OPT in CEECs (in particular 
in furniture, in mechanical machinery and in the electrical machinery)
- the Italian OPT pattern is relatively diversified, with sectors like footwear, plastics, 
mechanical machinery, and pharmaceuticals registering some significant levels of OPT
- Dutch firms and although with lower absolute levels, Danish ones, undertake OPT 
almost exclusively in T&C
From the viewpoint o f host countries
Even though T&C comes systematically first in the product structure of all the CEECs, it 
is Poland which is definitely the most specialised in T&C: the OPT business in the Polish sector 
is indeed worth ECU 1.5 bn (which is 80% of all Polish OPT from the EU). In other terms, more 
than half of EU OPT in the sector goes to Poland (56% of EU OPT to CEECs in T&C is geared 
to Poland).
Table 7. OPT exports to the EU12 (1000 ECU), proportion in total OPT to the EU 12 (%), and 
proportion in total OPT exports from the CEEC4 to the EU12 (%).
Czech Republic
1995 « % EU
7T 900998 IOOuOO* 23%
T A C 378691 <2.03* 14%
elec. mach. 180238 20X0* 44%
mech. mach. 80102 LI9* 61%
■hoe* 37036 a n * 26%
can 32789 1 6 4 « 56%
fiin itm 21966 2 .«* 13%
IA S 21153 2.31* 64%
optical instr. 19655 l i t * 63%
plastic s/rubbei 18047 2.00* 38%
mamifacL mi» 16546 1.S4* 78%
printing 13200 1.47* 95%
base metal 13198 1.46* 94%
toy* 9B92 l.io* 68%
edible prep. 9788 1.09* 27%
glassware 8609096« 94%
1995 « % E U
TT 882079 loaoo* 23%
T A C 587969 6646* 22%
elec. mach. 136407 1346* 33%
shoca 61086 6.93« 43%
mcch. mach. 24826 241« 19%
plastics 20592 2.33* 43%
furniture 16071 1J2* 9%
leather 10351 ].|7* 27%
cart 5595 0 6 3 * 10%
IA S 2964 0 3 4 * ' 9%
clocks 2755 a.31* 32%
optical instr. 2393 0.27* 8%
pharmaceutics 2357 027* 85%
toys 1493 0.17* 10%
organic chcsnii 1329 a n * 73%
aluminium 1021 012* 49%
Poland
1995 « % E U
TT 1836823 IOOOO* 47%
T A C 1482639 «072« 56%
fum itro 12629$ 641« 74%
elec, roach. 72170 s.n * 18%
shoe« 40809 122« 28%
edible prepare 25752 L40* 72%
can 16090 o u * 27%
mech. mach. 13364 073« 10%
leathers 9774 0 3 3 « 26%
optica] instr. 7970 043« 26%
plastics 6378 033* 13%
IA S 6107 0 3 3 « 19%
mise, m m fac 4552 023« 21%
fiah/cnistaccai 3415 019* 100%
paper 2622 014« 43%
wood 2471 0 1 3 « 82%
Another interesting feature concerning the Polish OPT product structure has to do with 
the sector of furniture. As a matter of fact, it is one of the few sector which, after T&C, registers 
significant absolute levels (ECU 126 M); its importance stems also from the fact that the sector 
is almost the only destination of EU OPT (74% of all EU OPT to CEECs in furniture). The 
sector of edible preparations is (even more) marginal from the Polish viewpoint, but here again, 
it attracts the vast majority of EU OPT in the sector (72%).
The Czech structure is far more diversified with a lot of sectors concerned. This is 
because OPT in T&C represents a lower share compared to the other CEECs (only 42% of the 
OPT activities of Czech firms), and it is not particularly attractive to EU firms (only 14% of EU 
OPT in CEECs in the sector). On the face of it, the sector o f electrical machinery occupies quite 
an important second position with the highest absolute levels throughout the region (ECU 180 M 
i.e., 20% of Czech OPT). Indeed, around half of EU OPT in the sector goes to the Czech 
Republic. The Czech Republic is also an incomparably preferred destination of the OPT 
activities o f EU firms in the mechanical machinery sector (61% of EU OPT to CEECs in the 
sector, i.e., ECU 60 M). In general, it is worth noting that OPT in the Czech lands concern 
comparatively more ‘sophisticated" goods. Ranked by decreasing absolute levels, they are: cars 
(56% of EU OPT), iron and steel (64%), photography (63%), printing (95%), base metals, and 
glassware (both 94%).
Finally, Hungary occupies an intermediate position: T&C is more important than in the 
Czech case, but of course, less than in the Polish one (ECU 588 M). Electrical machinery, in 
second position attracts significant amounts of OPT from the EU, but less than the Czech
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Republic (ECU 136M). But it is nevertheless interesting to note two poles of relative 
specialisation: footwear (43% of EU OFT to CEECs in the sector, i.e.f ECU 61 M), and plastics 
(also 43%, i.e., ECU 20 M), and with lower absolute levels in pharmaceuticals and organic 
chemicals (85%, and 75% of EU OPT, respectively).
• Summing up, some salient points emerge:
- the systematic pre-eminence of T&C in the product structure of host countries is to be 
qualified: the sector is overwhelmingly dominant in Poland, but its relative importance is much 
less marked in the case of the Czech Republic. It occupies an intermediate position in Hungary
- EU OPT in furniture is almost exclusively geared to Poland (second sector far behind 
T&C in the Polish commodity structure)
- the Czech republic is a privileged destination for OFT in the sectors of electrical 
machinery, and mechanical machinery (the first with higher absolute levels, but a lower share of 
EU OPT in the sector; the second with lower absolute levels, but a higher share)
- apart from the classic OPT-oriented T&C and electrical machinery sectors, Hungary is 
specialised in footwear and plastics.
Proportion of OPT in total trade and evolution
It was noted that taken as a whole, the foreign trade of both Poland and Hungary is 
characterised by a higher dependence on OPT than that of the former Czechoslovakia. Table 8 
makes clear that this is very much the result of the weight of OPT in the two countries’ T&C 
sectors: OPT represents 81% of total trade in the Polish T&C sector and 75% in the Hungarian 
sector. In the Czech Republic, instead, trade performance in T&C is less ascribable to OPT 
("only" 51% of total trade is due to OPT).
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Table 8. Total exports, and OPT re-exports (1000 ECU); proportion of OPT in total exports to
the EU12(%).
F, Ctocbodorakia
T o t trade OPT OPT %
Total 10475296 1163720 11%
IAS 1445447 23798 2%
TA C 1130519 570958 5 1 «
elec, m ach 1016520 200645 2 0 *
roech. roach. 9577*9 92626 10«
cm 899955 37111 4 *
plaatica 6232*4 20377 3 *
furniture 470435 27927 6 *
glaaawroe 403854 8613 2 «
thoc* 212549 41691 3 0 «
b. metal 166912 13267 8 «
optical inatr. 111738 20860 19«
leather* 106179 18091 17 *
toy* 69735 11148 1 6 «
printing 59986 13492 2 2 «
miac. m anufac 40983 16585 4 0 «
edible prep. 32281 9788 3 0 «
Hungarl_________________
T o t trade OPT O P T *
T a ta l 6495043 882079 1 4 «
med). roach. 1160352 24826 2 «
elec. mach. 909449 136407 1 5 *
TA C 782319 387969 75%
i n n  A ateel 444897 2964 1 «
c a n 373733 5595 1 *
p la t tie* 342430 20592 6 *
ihoea 180229 61086 3 4 *
furniture 176137 16071 9 «
leather 75800 10351 1 4 *
pharmaceutic« 40367 1493 '  4%
optical inatr. 22996 23 J7 1 0 «
toy* 4309 33 1 «
clock* 3StO 2755 7 8 *
Pd and
T o t trade O P T O P T *
Tefal 11104380 1S36823 1 7 «
T A C 1829039 1482639 8 1 *
foraitera 873687 126295 14 *
c a n 813631 16090 2 «
elec, roach. 688363 72170 10«
m erit, mack. 465636 13364 3 *
edib le  prepare 210752 25732 12 «
■hoe* 126888 40809 3 2 «
optical iiMtr. 43866 7970 11*
In addition Table 8 makes clear several patterns of OPT dependence which are in 
general common to the countries under consideration, but with sometimes outstanding country- 
specific features.
For a start, there are sectors important for the general trade performance of the country 
which not only display significant absolute levels of OPT, but also relatively high rates of OPT 
proportions. In common, across the three countries is of course T&C. Far behind, electrical 
machinery characterise the product structure of both the former Czechoslovakia and Hungary (to 
a lower extent that of Poland). Finally, with lower absolute levels of OPT, but with quite 
impressive OPT proportions, the footwear industry.
In this first category, two sectors distinguish themselves: the mechanical machinery 
industry in the former Czechoslovakia, and the furniture sector in Poland. However, whereas the 
ex-Czechoslovakia is a dominant but not unique destination o f EU OPT in the sector of 
mechanical machinery (Hungary in particular is characterised by a significant amount of 
transaction), furniture is an almost complete exclusivity of Poland.
Then comes a second category of sectors much more diversified from country to country; 
they are in general more marginal in the overall product structure of the CEECs but attract 
relevant OPT activity both in absolute and relative terms. These sectors aie particularly 
numerous and diversified in the former Czechoslovakia: optical instruments, leather1” , toys, 
printing, miscellaneous manufactures ... arc all sectors registering between ECU 10 M and 20 M,
Wi It is actually Slovakia which is responsible for this figure: the OPT proportion in the Slovak sector 
amounts to 38%.
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i.e., between 15% to 40% of total trade. In Poland, electrical machineiy and edible preparations, 
and in Hungary (with lower absolute levels) furniture and leather are sectors in a similar 
position.
Finally, there is the case of sectors ranking high in the structure of the strongest exports 
to the EU12, but which register only a  marginal share of OPT. However, in absolute terms, the 
amounts of OPT involved are sometimes quite important: the automotive industry in both the 
former Czechoslovakia and Poland, plastics in both the former Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and 
the mechanical machinery industry in Poland and Hungary (and to an incomparably lower extent 
pharmaceuticals in Hungary: 10%).
Table 9. Growth of total exports to the EU 12 between 1991 and 1995 (%), OPT proportions in 
total exports in 1991 and 1995 (%), and growth of OPT proportions in total exports between 
1991 and 1995 (%).
CEECs’ sectoral distribution of OPT dependence (i.e., the proportion of OPT in total 
trade, by sector) sometimes displays significant changes from 1991 to 1995. A first approach to 
the evolution of the dependence of the four CEECs* foreign trade on OPT confirms the 
distinction between on the one hand Hungary, which OPT dependence decreases by 26%, and on 
the other hand the former Czechoslovakia where OPT proportion in total trade increases by 36% 
and 22%, respectively. As to the sectoral trend of OPT dependence, it is characterised by a clear 
divide between T&C which displays growing proportions of OPT in total trade, and almost all 
the other sectors which in general register diminishing dependence on OPT.19* 106
106 It is important to note that such opposite trends are -partly- ascribable to the nature of the pertaining 
trade measures and their respective liberalisation procedures: whereas in T&C the latter consists of an 
increases of specific OPT quota which translates into an increase of OPT trade, in the other sectors subject
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That said, there are numerous country- and sector-specific features. Similar trends across 
the 3 (4) countries concern for example the sectors of machineries. The sector displays the 
strongest falls is the mechanical machinery: -78% in Hungary, and -43% in the former 
Czechoslovakia (-66% in Poland, but the absolute levels are much less significant). It is worth 
noting how indeed, the rate of dependence in the Czechoslovak sector in 1991 was very 
significant (17%, compared to 10% in Hungary).
But decreases in the electrical machinery are no less significant: -44% in Hungary, and - 
13% in the former Czechoslovakia. Interestingly enough, in both countries, the sector used to be 
characterised by high and similar proportions of OPT (with a peak in 1992 of 34% in Hungary, 
and 36% in Czechoslovakia).
Finally, it is worth noting a general disengagement from OPT activities in the automotive 
industry, but as the result of quite differentiated trends across the 3 countries. Indeed, the 
Hungarian sector used to be significantly dependent on OPT for its foreign trade performances: 
no less than 26% of exports in 1991 were actually ascribable to OPT in 1991 (i.e., 14 M ECU) 
whereas in both Poland and Czechoslovakia OPT dependence never really went beyond the 
maximum levels registered in the early years of the transformation (approximately 10%, i.e., in 
the case of the former Czechoslovakia: around 50 M).
A sector marked by important country-specific features is the footwear industry: OPT 
dependence decreases in Hungary and in the former Czechoslovakia (-56%, and -26%, 
respectively), but it increases in Poland (+13%). Therefore, even though the resulting OPT 
shares in total trade in 1995 are comparable (more than 30% in Poland and Hungary, and 20% in 
the former Czechoslovakia), starting levels were very different Indeed, in 1991, no less than 
77% of total Hungarian exports of footwear were actually OPT re-exports (i.e., ECU 100 M, to 
be compared with approx. 20-30 M i.e., slightly less than 30% total trade in both Poland and the 
former Czechoslovakia).
Two additional features are of some interest. For a start, the Hungarian plastic sector, 
although it is concerned by quite marginal amounts of transactions (not more than 6% of total 
exports) is the only one which together with T&C registers an increase of OPT proportions. Also, 
the sector of base metals in the former Czechoslovakia is very specific in attracting OPT activity. 
What is more, the trend of the OPT share in the total exports of the sector is very uneven: from 
8% dependence in 1991 to 8% dependence in 1995... but with a peak of 40% in 1992!
Finally, furniture is a sector reducing its OPT dependence in general, but it is in the 
Polish sector that the trend is really significant (the rate is -31% between 1991 and 1995).
to decreasing tariffs, OPT trade tends to be statistically underrated as incentives to declare OPT as such 
diminish.
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•  Summing u p ...
-whereas the Polish and the Hungarian T&C sectors are significantly dependent on OFT 
the Czechoslovak sector is characterised by the lowest share
-OPT proportions in ‘important* sectors is often comparable: 14% in the polish furniture 
sector, 10% in the Czechoslovak sector of mechanical machinery, 15% and 20% in the 
Hungarian and Czechoslovak sectors of electrical machinery
-the same goes in the footwear sector more than 30% of OFT in total exports in Poland 
and Hungary, 20% in the former Czechoslovakia
-the automotive industry, plastics and mechanical machinery in general register marginal 
shares of OPT in total exports
-the proportion of OPT increases in the T&C sectors of the 3 countries, it decreases in all 
the other sectors of the 3 countries. Rare significant exceptions are optical instruments and 
miscellaneous manufactures in the former Czechoslovakia, plastics in Hungary, and footwear in 
Poland
-the path followed by the decreases of OPT proportions can be Quite different with 
distinct starting levels or peaks of OFT dependence: this is the case in the automotive industry, in 
the sector of footwear, and in base metals.
Contribution of OPT to CEECs trade performances
Table 10 ranks sectors according to their contribution to the growth of CEECs exports to 
the EU107: electrical and mechanical machineries in both the former Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary; T&C and the automotive industry in the three countries, but more markedly in Poland; 
irons and steel (I&S), especially in the former Czechoslovakia; and the furniture industry in 
Poland are all sectors o f particular importance for the overall trade performance of CEECs.
m The formula used is the following, for exports (X) in sectors i, between 1991 and 1995: 
(X i95-Xi91)/(tot95-tot91).
The main advantage of this indicator is that it corrects dynamic trends by the absolute levels concerned.
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Table 10. Sectors contribution to the total growth of total trade (TT), and OPT contribution to the 
evolution of sectors* total trade (OPT). In %, between 1991 and 1995.
Former Czechoslovakia
Items TT OPT
IAS 14% 2%
elec. mach. 13% 19%
notch. mach. 10% 6%
T&C 10% 66%
cars 9% 3%
plastics 6% 4%
furniture 5% 5%
wood art 3% 0%
glassw. 3% 3%
paper 3% 2%
b. metals 2% 8%
shoes 2% 16%
aluminium 2% -1%
other 2% -1%
optical instr. 1% 20%
Total 100% 13%
Hungary
Items TT OPT
mech. mach. 30% *1%
elec. mach. 24% 11%
cars 11% -3%
T&C 8% 86%
I&S 8% 1%
aluminium 7% 0%
plastics 5% 10%
furniture 2% 2%
shoes 2% -83%
optical instr. 2% -1%
wood 1% -1%
Total 100% 7%
Poland
Items TT OPT
T&C 20% 88%
cars 14% 1%
furniture 12% 11%
l&S 11% 0%
elec. mach. 11% 10%
wood art 7% 1%
mech. mach. 4% -5%
plastics 3% 2%
paper 3% 1%
copper 3% 0%
other 3% 0%
Total 100% 20%
It is no coincidence that most of the above sectors are themselves quite dependent on 
OPT for their dynamism. This is obviously the case of the T&C industry where OPT explains 
88%, 86%, and 66% of the exports* growth in Poland, Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia, 
respectively. It is also true, albeit with lower figures for electrical machineries in the former 
Czechoslovakia, and in Hungary (19% and 11%, respectively), and for furniture in Poland 
(11%). In addition, it is worth noting the significant contribution of OPT in the former 
Czechoslovakia’s footwear industry, even though the sector is not among the most dynamic in 
aggregate terms (16% of OPT contribution, and 2% to total trade). The same happens in the 
Hungarian plastics sector (10% of OPT contribution, and 5% to total trade). On the contrary, 
OPT contribution is very modest for the Czech mechanical machineries and the Czech and 
Polish car parts industry. It is frankly negligible in I&S.
In Table 11, yet another use of the ‘contribution’ indicator makes clear the fundamental 
role that OPT played in the reorientation of trade in certain sectors. The contribution of OPT in 
one sector to the growth of the aggregate figure of total trade10* (i.e., the exports of all sectors as 
opposed to the above contribution of OPT to the growth of one sector) lets appear very 10
101 The formula is, this time:
(OPTÌ95 - OPTÌ91) / (toti95 - toti91).
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significant figures. T&C is unsurprisingly at the very top of the ranking of the strongest 
contributions, but in quite different proportions over the 3 countries under scrutiny: In Poland, 
OPT in the sector explains \1%  of the growth of Polish total exports to the EU12 between 1991 
and 1995. The corresponding figure is also very relevant even though it is much lower in the 
cases of Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia: 1% in both cases.
Table 11. OPT contribution to total trade performance, and evolution o f OPT proportion in total 
trade with the EU12, 1991-1995 (%).
Former Czechoslovakia
Items Contrib. % evol.
Tot. trade 12.96% 36%
t&c 6.53% 61%
elec. mach. 2.59% -13%
mech. mach. 0.62% -43%
shoes 0.33% -26%
cars 0.29% -32%
furniture 0.29% -19%
optic, instr. 0.28% 51%
plastics 0.27% 146%
mi sc. manufi 0.24% 369%
I&S 0.23% 8%
leathers 0.19% 48%
b. metals 0.18% -4%
toys 0.16% 429%
printing 0.16% 122%
edible prep. 0.15% 2710%
glassware 0.10% 74%
Hungary
Items Contrib. %evol.
Tot. trade 7.41% -26%
t&c 6.80% 6%
elec. mach. 2.58% -44%
plastics 0.51% 99%
furniture 0.05% -29%
I&S 0.05% -3%
clocks 0.03% 27%
glassware -0.01% -99%
printing -0.02% -76%
edible -0.05% -63%
toys -0.08% -87%
mech. mach. -0.21% -78%
cars -0.31% -94%
leathers -0.34% -53%
shoes -1.41% -56%
Poland
Items Contrib. % evol.
Tot trade 20.40% 22%
t&c 17.29% 10%
furniture 1.29% -31%
elec. mach. 1.12% 0%
shoes 0.20% 13%
optic, instr. 0.15% 504%
cars 0.12% -78%
edible prep. 0.08% -5%
plastics 0.06% -10%
I&S 0.02% -43%
printing -0.0t% -89%
glassware -0.01% -68%
mech. mach. -0.19% -66%
The ranking of the other sectors confirms the country-specific features outlined above: 
the strong and similar contribution of OPT in the sector of electrical machinery in the former 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary (which explains more than 2.5% of the trade performances in the 
two countries between 1991 and 1995), the role of OPT in the sectors of furniture in Poland, 
plastics in Hungary, and mechanical machinery in the former Czechoslovakia.
What is more, Table 11 illustrates the general negative trend that OPT has undergone in 
Hungary: of particular interest is the strong negative contribution registered by OPT in the 
footwear sector, but also in the leather, the automotive, and the mechanical machinery 
industries... (etc).
The contrast with the trend characterising OPT in the former Czechoslovakia is clear, 
indeed almost no (or only very insignificant) negative OPT contributions takes place there. On 
the face of it, the Czechoslovak structure of OPT contribution turns out to be quite diversified 
with lower levels which nevertheless apply on a wide range of sectors (indeed there are OPT
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contributions of some relevance in sectors like optical instruments, base-metal, and printing ... 
which are not particularly ’OPT-prone’ in the other CEECs).
3. Mapping OPT relations between the EU12 and the CEEC4; synthesis
Figure 2 combines the above considerations concerning sectoral and geographical OPT 
patterns between the EU12 and CEEC4; it answers the question as to which country has which 
privileged partner, and what product structure characterises such bilateral flow.
Figure 2. OPT exports from the CEECs to the EU countries, bilateral flows, by sectors (M ECU), 
1995.

Overall, the product structure of the bilateral flows between CEECs, and their main EU 
partners varies to a large extent For example, German firms engage OPT with Polish partners 
primarily in the sectors of T&C and furniture. Germano-Czech OPT relations, instead, are 
comparatively more important in the sectors of electrical machinery, and, to a lower extent in the 
mechanical machinery. As to German OPT activities in Hungary, they used to be important in 
the mechanical and footwear industries. In 1995, besides T&C, they mainly take place in the 
sector of electrical machinery.
In addition, it is interesting to note the diversification of the German OPT activities in 
the former Czechoslovakia Besides the traditional sectors, German firms are active in the 
printing and leather industries, and although with much lower proportions of OPT in total trade, 
in the sectors of glassware, plastics and iron and steel.19*
It is also interesting to note the privileged OPT partnerships between firms in Hungary 
and in Italy. Apart from T&C, at least two Italo-Hungarian OPT networks are important: plastics 
and footwear.
Thus, OPT is an important factor accounting for the dynamism of CEECs trade to the EU 
which contributed to the process of trade reorientation in a  significant way. So much so that in 
certain sectors like T&C, CEECs* foreign trade has grown impressively dependent on OPT with 
the EU in general and Germany in particular.
This raises concern as to the prospects of OPT in CEECs: were it suddenly to stop on the 
grounds of unfavourable conditions like wage increases, would CEECs* foreign trade drop 
proportionately?
The above statistical analysis shows that in certain sectors (mechanical machinery, car 
parts ...), and in certain countries (especially Hungary), OPT decreases in the context of very 
dynamic trends of ‘direct’ trade. On the contrary, in T&C, OPT increases very fast in absolute, as 
well as in relative terms.
There are two difficulties with these results. First, such generalities at a fairly aggregate 
level hardly conceal any general and systematic pattern of evolution. What is more, the question 
is left open as to the exact meaning of such trends. For example is the decrease of OPT trade a 
sign that foreign partners ended their engagement, or is it that they upgraded their commitment 
with the result that OPT transactions are no longer counted as such? 109
109 Other sectors concerned which are not presented in the table are: base metal, optical instruments, toys 
and clocks.
Further considerations are needed to identify first the possible scenario characterising the 
evolution of OPT and their exact significance« and then the circumstances in which such scenario 
are most likely to occur. +
3 .2  The terms of the OPT (interdependence: a  qualitative assessment
Asking the question of the prospects of the OPT activities of EU firms in CEECs makes 
it necessary to go beyond the blunt statistical truth and to cany out a more qualitative assessment 
of the very nature of OPT partnerships between EU and CEECs firms. In a  nutshell, the question 
at stake is the following: are EU firms going to withdraw, and if yes, are local partners ready to 
take over OPT production on their own?
Ideally, a statistical analysis combined with evidence from fieldwork offer the means to 
determine the actual and the prospective evolutions of OPT relationships (See Annexes 2 and 3). 
Whereas the former determines which countries and sectors are characterised by which scenario, 
the latter identifies the profile of the firms involved in each of such scenario.
Before embarking in such analysis, however, it is worth further investigating the teal 
implications of OPT from the viewpoint of local firms. As a matter of fact, the above alternative 
takes a particular relevance in the face of the potential risks characterising OPT as a vehicle of 
integration. To the 'aggregate* dependence of CEECs trade on OPT highlighted by the above 
statistical section, corresponds indeed a ‘microeconomic* dependence of local firms on their 
foreign OPT partners. The latter might be decisive in determining the issue of the alternative 
between prolonged commitment / withdrawal. 7
7. Pros and cons at the firm -level
On the crude basis the above statistical evidence, one may conclude on the absolute 
beneficial effects of OPT. However, going beyond a mere trade approach and looking at the 
corporate network which gives rise to OPT trade flows yields a more mitigated assessment
In fact to the question of the terms under which OPT integrates CEECs production 
facilities, no simple and definitive answer is to be proposed. There is indeed a wide range of 
possible outcomes associated with OPT which entail quite differentiated local consequences at 
the level of the firm.
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At first sight, OPT appears to be an almost providential solution to many of the problems 
that faced CEECs at the dawn of their economic transformation process in 1991. In particular, 
OPT might have been decisive in promoting trade reorientation in certain sectors by filling often 
huge production capacities left with no raison d ’être by the sudden demise of the CMEA in 1991. 
In addition, OPT can be considered to be a solution to the shortage of good quality input 
necessary for successfully weathering international competition. It can be also argued that OPT 
is crucial as far as access to EU markets is concerned. First, OPT eases trade restrictions set up 
by the EU which would otherwise dissuade exports to the Community. Second, OPT offers a 
means for exporting abroad without having to fulfil often very demanding conditions in order to 
penetrate local distribution channels. Also, OPT is an ideal solution to the problem of 'adverse 
selection' that forces producers with no popular trademark to fix their prices lower than if their 
brand were renowned. Last but not least, OPT is a straightforward solution to solve the 
difficulties pertaining to the lack of managerial experience in the field o f international relations.
But the price to pay for the above advantages is quite dear in terms of independence. As 
a matter of fact, a local firm engaging in OPT activities has to sacrifice its market power to the 
benefit of its foreign partner as it becomes dependent on the latter, first, for inputs, and second, 
to market the output In addition, there is a series of mechanisms which actually deepens the 
state of dependence of the local firms, making it difficult for the latter to recover autonomy. For 
example the fact that goods produced under an OPT agreement are traded under the trademark of 
the EU partner prevents a local brand from gaining the recognition necessary for potential 
subsequent autonomous penetration of foreign markets. This is particularly pernicious as the 
ability of the local partner to take over production on his own in case of the withdrawal of the 
EU firm seriously put at risk.
Another drawback is that OPT concerns often very simple and labour-intensive 
transformation tasks and risks to neglect or even erode the potential technological capabilities of 
local partners, forcing the latter to specialise in labour intensive goods. What is more, it can be 
argued that the profitability conditions attached to OPT are likely to be unfavourable. For 
example, if the depreciation of machines used in the production process is not taken into account 
in the computation underlying an OPT contract, margins of profit decrease with time; the life 
span of the machinery then determines the end of the co-operation between the two partners ... 
and perhaps also the closing down of the local firm.110 Equally unfavourable can be the outcome 
in terms of development activities of the local OPT firm. Involving only primary tasks, an OPT 
co-operation agreement has necessarily a limited contribution in promoting the spill over of 
technology and know how that one can expect from close contacts between partner firms. 19
119 However, because of the ‘adverse selection1 phenomena, it can be argued that the profitability 
conditions of OPT, if compared to those attached to direct exports are not, after all. so unfavourable.
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Finally, at the macroeconomic level, the major criticism to be addressed to OPT is the 
consequence of local partners' dependence for input* if undertaken on a significant scale, OPT 
might cut the linkages between industries concerned by OPT and upstream sectors.
The state of dependence in which local partners are placed is particularly worrying in tte 
face of the extreme facility with which foreign partners can withdraw from their commitment 
Were dissuading factors to materialise, foreign partners would find almost no ‘exit* costs 
pertaining to their withdrawal. One of such factor is wage increases in the CEECs. For the 
moment, the advantage of CEECs in terms of labour costs are truly compelling.1" But as soon as 
conditions become less favourable, foreign partners would find it most convenient to terminate 
their OPT engagement As a matter of fact OPT contracts do not demand long-lasting 
commitments; they can last only the time of one order (say 3 months), and be renewed only 
conditional on further demand.
In Annex 1, the simplified budget sheet of an hypothetical Czech firm in the Textile and 
Clothing sector undertaking OPT with a German partner shows that indeed, room for manoeuvre 
for OPT to keep on being a profitable business are narrow in the face of likely wage increases.
Overall, to assess the pros and the cons of OPT as a vehicle of economic integration 
between the EU and CEECs, at least two series of answer are to be proposed, which differ 
according to temporal considerations.
Up to now, the negative aspects of OPT *ue to be mitigated on the basis of the question 
as to whether an alternative to OPT was within the reach of the concerned firms. In this respect, 
it is worth introducing the distinction between dependent and independent exports [Stop ford. 
Strange, 1991: 25]. If compared to independent exports, OPT is clearly characterised by more 
negative aspects; however, OPT becomes a second best if independent exports are difficult or 
impossible to achieve. Indeed, it might very well be that OPT represented for a majority of them 
almost a providential solution as of the demise of the CMEA in 1991.
But concerning the future, everything will depend on the prospect of OPT partnerships. 
In this respect, it is important to go beyond quantitative evidence to understand the real reach 
that OPT has in qualitative terms. If OPT partnerships art upgraded, OPT can be a first step in 
the formation of a more complex division of labour at the regional level. On the contrary, if 
foreign partners withdraw from their commitment, much depends on whether local firms can 
take over OPT production on their own, and thus pave the way foi indigenous autonomous 
development
1,1 On average, CEECs wages are 8 to 10 limes lower in CEECs. However, if productivity differentials are 
taken into consideration, the advantage is reduced.
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In a scenario most adverse for local firms, foreign EU partners undertake OPT activities 
in order to take advantage of local low labour costs on a very short term basis. Once wages reach 
unfavourable levels, they re-relocate their production elsewhere, possibly further East, whereas 
local partners are not necessarily in a position to take over OPT production on their own.
Alternatively, even if the search for better production costs is still a primary determinant 
of an OPT strategy devised by EU firms, the latter upgrade their commitment and enter into more 
equal and ‘two-ways’* 111 partnerships with local counterparts; because they find other motives to 
carry out co-operation with local firms, they become relatively insensitive to wage increases.
Yet another possibility is that local firms take advantage of a good bargaining position 
and profit from an OPT agreement to strengthen their ability to compete on the world markets. 
They then manage to progressively reduce their recourse to OPT, and eventually recover 
complete autonomy.
In the following an attempt is made to determine whether and where foreign firms 
actually withdraw from their commitment, and whether and where local partners are ready to 
take over OPT production on their own.
2. Evidence from  statistics: the identification o f *OPT networks*
It is the objective of the present section to use OPT statistics in order to provide a 
provisional answer concerning the qualitative evolution of OPT partnerships. But before 
embarking on the analysis of the prospective evolution o f OPT partnerships, it is necessary to 
adopt a pertinent unit of analysis enabling to capture the many possible variations. The notion of 
‘OPT production networks’, i.e., 'trinities* formed by the host country, the home country, and the 
sector concerned offers a useful solution at the ‘meso level*.
In the following figure, the most relevant OPT networks have been selected on the basis 
of a quantitative criteria.“1 Their main features are presented (see Annex 2 for the source).
1,1 Mytelka, 1995.
111 It is worth noting that there are OPT networks involving smaller amount of transaction but which can 
nevertheless be quite interesting with respect to the issue of the regional division of labour (e.g. between 
Italians and Hungarians in pharmaceutical products, but also more generally in sectors like toys, and 
clocks).
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figure 3. OPT exports, direct exports and total exports, by ‘OPT networks’, 1995 (1000 ECU).
Partners Sect. OPT Direct Total %
Germ-Pol t£c 1049215 156533 1205748 87%
Germ-CS t£c 456734 271091 727825 63%
Genn-H t£c 332844 92784 425628 78%
Nl-Pol t&c 155934 16755 172689 90%
It-H t&c 88811 34533 123344 72%
Fr-Pol t& c 71070 30668 101738 70%
Fr-H lAc 62222 14263 76485 81%
Germ-CS shoes 32222 85476 117698 27%
Genn-H shoes 40558 89167 129725 31%
Germ-Pol shoes 23358 50277 73635 32%
Fr-CS shoes 3639 16348 19987 18%
It-H shoes 17519 27702 45221 39%
Germ-CS elec 189006 637170 826176 23%
Germ-H elec 111554 487435 598989 19%
Germ-CS mech 88855 597816 686671 13%
Germ-H meeb 23270 585598 608868 4%
Germ-Pol mech 10039 243757 253796 4%
Germ-Pol fiimit 119463 627883 747346 16%
Germ-CS cars 32606 538540 571146 6%
Germ-Pol cars 14727 289863 304590 5%
Germ-H cars 3981 252185 256166 2%
Germ-CS (Asst 20169 376844 397013 5%
It-H plast 16493 81893 98386 17%
Nl-Pol edib 3319 24749 28068 12%
Germ-Pol edib 22391 121917 144308 16%
Germ-CS edib 9788 15920 25708 38%
Germ-CS IAS 21470 990944 1012414 2%
Gemm-CS print 13492 33954 47446 28%
Germ-CS tealba 14101 39804 53905 26%
Germ-CS glass* 8363 226310 234673 4%
Trajectories
The present section provides a provisional identification of the evolution of the above 
OPT networks. Although clearly imperfect, OPT trade statistics offer a first source of 
information for assessing the qualitative evolution undergone by OPT partnerships between EU 
and CEECs firms which make possible a classification of the latter.
It is proposed to concentrate on the respective evolutions of direct and OPT trade, i.e., in 
other terms, on the evolution of OPT proportions in total trade. Whether OPT proportion 
increases, and if it does so faster than direct trade makes possible some speculation on the 
possible prospect of OPT partnerships:
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-OPT growths which are stronger than the increases registered by direct trade (i.e., 
growing OPT proportions in total trade) correspond to the prolonged commitment of foreign 
partners on a strict OPT basis* i.e., without signs of actual upgrading.
-On the face of it, decreasing OPT proportions due either to growths o f direct trade 
which are stronger than that of OPT, or to decreasing absolute levels of OPT are signs of the 
transformation of the OPT partnerships:
-when OPT keeps on growing in the context of very dynamic direct trade, 
chances are that upgrading is taking place. As a matter of fact, foreign partners are obviously still 
present, and they probably want to participate to the distribution of the gains resulting from 
enhanced trade performances.
-when OPT decreases in the context of very dynamic direct trade, it possibly 
corresponds to a scenario where local producers take over the OPT production on their own, 
especially if OPT proportions are negligible in total trade.
-when OPT decreases in the context of rather depressed performances of direct 
trade, OPT is clearly a follower which does not help, nor hinder the indigenous trade 
performances.
1. Absolute increases o f OPT
1.1 The case of the T&C industry
All OPT networks in T&C fall into the category characterised by strong growth rates of 
OPT in the context of rather weak growth of direct trade (if not absolute decreases), with overall 
resulting satisfactory performances of total trade.
Proportions of OPT in total trade reach outstanding levels following continuingly 
increasing trends. Generally speaking, there are only mild signs of a deceleration of OPT growth. 
Sometimes, OPT literally takes over direct trade, i.e., that OPT dynamism more than 
compensates absolute decreases of direct trade.
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Table 12. OPT and direct trade (1000 ECU), and OPT proportion in total trade (%), by OPT
networks
91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 91 92 93 94 93 1991/1993
opt I dir op»|dir opi|<br « « * * * «I* 1 *  1
Germ-fW t<fcc 2 3 «  3 0 « 3 1 «  16 « 22% -1 3 « 12«  1 2 « « 4 * 81 * 8 3 « < 7 * 17 * 120* 6 8 * 111*
Germ-CS lAr 6 1 «  29% 3 6 «  >1« 4 2 *  6 * 8 *  1 2 « 4 0 « 45 * 3 7 * 6 4 * 6 3 * 2 8 3 * 3 2 * 143«
Germ-H (Ac 6 «  3 1 « 1 1 «  9 « 9 «  -1 9 * -1 *  -7 * 7 8 * 71 » 7 1 * 7 7 * 7 1 * 2 8 * 24 * 2 7 *
Nl-FU tAc 6 1 »  - 1 « 6 1 «  103* 1 7 * - 6 * 19 *  -4 0 * 7 4 *  8 3 *  7 9 * 8 2 * 9 0 * 2 6 3 * 13* 199*
It-H tjbc 9 2 «  2 3 « 4 7 *  -41% 2 7 *  3 1 « 1 4 *  3 « 39 « 5 0 *  7 1 * 7 0 * 7 2 * 3 0 9 * 3 « 123*
Pr-Pbl tAc 34 * 7 0 * 9 4 « 0 * 3 1 *
ft-H tAc 7 3 * 81 « 3 8 « 0 * 4 3 «
OPT proportions in total trade are about 80% sometimes even reaching 90% between the 
Netherlands and Poland. The proportion rates never go below 60% (in the Germano-Czech case).
One peculiarity concerns the relations between German and Hungarian partners which 
are marked, as of 1994, by a decrease of OPT in absolute terms, parallel to the negative evolution 
of direct trade. Overall, total Hungarian exports performances are particularly weak, especially if 
compared to those of the other CEECs.
One interpretation is that OPT increases strongly because restrictions measures on direct 
trade are binding constraints. Because they develop on a fairly competitive and healthy basis, 
local firms come against to trade protection measures still in place during the process of trade 
liberalisation under the form of quotas. Thus, if they want to access the EU markets, local 
producers have few other options than to integrate into a vertical production chains which 
extremes are controlled by a foreign OPT partner.
1.2 Other sectors characterised by flat evolutions of direct trade
Other OPT networks are characterised by similar growing evolutions of OPT in the 
context of weak increases of direct trade; but contrary to the T&C case, the resulting 
performances of total trade are rather poor. Indeed, even if growing, the eventual proportions of 
OPT in total trade are incomparably lower (approximately comprised between 10 and 30%).
Table 13. OPT and direct trade (1000 ECU), and OPT proportion in total trade (%), by OPT 
networks
91/92 92/93 93 /94 94/95 91 92 93 94 95 1991/1995
op tjd ir op tjd ir o p tjd ir op tjd ir % * « * « opt ! dir | total
Ic-H plast. 1 3 2 «  4 4 * - 3 *  -2 9 * - 8 «  6 « 6 5 «  4 3 * 8 * 1 3 « 1 7 * 1 5 « 1 7 * 2 4 4 * 5 5 * 7 1 *
G erm -Pol edib. 1 0 5 *  8 * 4 3 *  - 7 * 2 8 «  -9% - 1 *  3 9 * 6 * 1 1 « 1 3 * 2 0 * 16% 274% 2 7 * 4 2 «
G erm -C S edib. 1 4 0 *  -3 3 * 6 6 *  -4 0 * 3 2 2 *  2 5 * 9 4 *  4 6 « 1 * 5 * 1 2 * 3 2 * 3 8 « 3 1 6 3 « •2 7 * 1 6 «
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These networks are: Italo-Hungarian partnerships in plastics, and, in the sector of edible 
preparations, Germano-Polish and Germano-Czech partnerships. The Germano-Czech OPT 
relationships in the sector of edible preparations are characterised by dramatic absolute and 
relative increases. The eventual proportion of OPT in total Czech exports to Germany almost 
reaches 40%. Interestingly enough, Hungarian direct exports undergo an absolute decrease over 
the 1991-1995 period which is unique among the observed OPT trajectories.
In contrast to the T&C case, OFT is likely to increase strongly because of serious 
domestic problems harming the ability of local firms to compete on the world markets. Such 
problems can be situated either ‘upstream* the production .chain (e.g., no input available locally), 
or ‘downstream* (e.g., the difficulty of entering foreign markets because of a lack of managerial 
skills, or because of a 'bad image*). That OPT provides a straightforward solution to such 
problems makes the recourse to OPT particularly vital to certain local firms. But in contrast to 
the T&C case, foreign partners might not be interested in seizing such opportunities for quasi- 
integration, and OPT proportions remains much lower. Because of their rather weak bargaining 
position, local firms are thus likely to be integrated into vertical chains of EU OPT partners on a 
short term and footloose basis, i.e., “on the cheap**.114
1.3 Relative dynamism of direct trade
In a third category of OPT networks characterised by strong OPT increases, direct trade 
registers significant growth rates as well. As a result, total trade displays quite dynamic trends. 
However, the growth of direct trade notwithstanding, the major source of dynamism is still given 
by OPT. Indeed, OPT increases faster so that OPT proportions in total trade are continuingly 
growing. Different levels of OPT proportions (either significantly high, or extremely low) invite 
to distinguish between two cases.
1,4 In this case, in order to minimise the risks arising from the potential withdrawal of foreign partners, 
local firms might try to diversify their partners rather than to secure the commitment of one of them.
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Table 14. OFT and direct trade (1000 ECU), and OPT proportion in total trade (%), by OPT
networks
91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 91 92 93 94 93 1991/1995
o p tld r o p t|d ir optjd ir opifdir % % % % % opt | d r  1 lou l
Germ-CS lcatfa. 41%  73% 12% 6% 38%  14% 27%  4% 22% 19% 19% 22% 26% 176% 117% 130%
Gcrm-CS print. -7%  37% 34%  39% 73%  23% 91%  19% 21% 15% 13% 20% 28% 317% 180% -80%
I»-H fbotw. 643%  141% 431% -24% 48%  4% 1% 13% 2% 7% 34% 42% 39% 6004% 119% 249%
G erm -CS P i - t 208%  17% 19% 26% 41%  60% 39% 31% 2% 6% 3% 3% 3% 616% 207% 217%
Germ-CS U S 71%  62% •24%  13% 46%  44% 101% 28% 2% 2% 1% 1% 2% 282% 243% 244%
Germ -CS 100% 37% 84%  18% 90%  11% •51% 32% 2% 4% 6% 9% 4% 243% 137% 139%
There is a first series of sectors registering high OPT proportions. OPT partnerships 
between German and Czech firms in leather, and in the peculiar sector of the printing industry, 
as well as Italo-Hungarian OPT exchanges in footwear all belong to this category. These 
networks are characterised by significantly high proportions in total trade (between 25 and 40%).
On the contrary, in glassware, I&S and in plastic, Germano-Czech OPT partnerships 
remain very marginal: between 2 and 5% of OPT in total trade (especially in I&S where the 
amounts involved are quite high, but the proportions in total trade really negligible).
1.4 Strong growth of direct trade
An interesting category of OPT networks registers simultaneous growths of direct and 
OPT trade. The cumulating of dynamism arising from both sources yields outstanding growth 
rates of total trade, but contrary to the previous case, direct trade increases faster than OPT 
transactions, with a consequent decrease of OPT proportions in total trade.
Table 15. OPT and direct trade (1000 ECU), and OPT proportion in total trade (%), by OPT 
networks
91 /9 2 92/93 93 /94 94/95 91 9 2  93  94  95 1991/1995
n p t|d if op t]d ir op tld ir flptfdir % %  %  % % (4* dir to o l
G erm -C S 64 503%  54% 38%  -19% 34%  17% -44%  143% 18% 46%  39%  62%  27% 518% 255% 302%
G erm -P ol 94 19% 35% 42%  42% 22%  30% -7%  47% 26% 24%  24%  23%  16% 93% 266% 220%
G erm -C S 87 235%  51% -27%  -14% 15% 10% -19%  127% 8%  16%  14% 14% 6% 129% 225% 217%
G c rm P o l 87 106% 48% •35%  228% 109% 18% -47%  76% 26%  33%  9%  14% 5% 48% 906% 686%
G erm -C S 85 179% 77% 9 %  96% 24%  106% 49%  58% 37% 48%  34%  24%  23% 461% 1027% 816%
G erm -H 85 54%  14% 13% 62% 2%  70% 7% 40% 35% 42%  33%  23%  19% 90% 341% 254%
G erm -C S 84 -10% 54% 10% 33% 15% 55% 53%  40% 27% 18%  15% 12% 13% 75% 342% 269%
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This is so of many important OPT relationships involving German and Czech partners: in 
footwear, in the automotive industry, and in the sectors of electrical and mechanical machinery. 
German OPT in the Hungarian electrical machinery sector and Germano-Polish partnerships in 
the furniture and automotive industries also belong to this category. Even if they follow a 
decreasing trend, OPT proportions in the total trade of these OPT networks remain high (around 
20%).
In this category, the dynamism of direct trade is accompanied by still non negligible 
growth of OPT. Even if trade barriers are being dismantled, and even if the level of 
competitiveness is obviously not a problem, OPT keeps on growing. This is an obvious sign that 
foreign partners are still engaged into their partnerships. It is sensible to think that they want to 
profit from dynamic trade performance, and are thus getting more involved in their partnership, 
making it more ‘two-way’, more stable. This could very well correspond to an upgrading 
scenario.
2. OPT decreases
Another series of OPT networks is characterised by extremely dynamic evolutions of 
direct trade, and generally fastly decreasing OPT transactions. Interestingly enough, when OFT 
follows decreasing trends, it does so almost always in the context of quite dynamic trends of 
direct trade. This apparent ‘take-over’ scenario actually corresponds to two different cases 
depending on the level of OPT proportions in total trade.
2.1 high OPT proportions
When OPT proportions used to be very high, the decrease of OPT activity inevitably 
brought about negative consequences for total exports performances. But what is of particular 
interest is that decreases of OPT tend to be stronger precisely where OPT proportions used to be 
high. Thus, even extremely high growth rates of direct trade could not offset the decrease of OPT 
activity.
Table 16. OPT and direct trade (1000 ECU), and OPT proportion in total trade (%), by OPT
networks *.
91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 91 92 93 94  9$ 1991/1995
cp tjd ir o p t ld r o p t jd r c p t ld r % % %  % % <** 1 <*r | to td
G erm -H footw. 27%  *11% •19%  149% -10%  44% -52% 99% 17% 90% 75%  65% 31% -35%  533% 24%
G erm -P d footw. 44%  -24% 5%  -16% -22% 42% -16% 58% 40% 56% 61%  47% 32% 0%  44% 26%
Fr-CS footw.
-9%  32% 16% 62% -48%  57% -45% -2% 71% 63% 55%  28% 18% *70% 228% 17%
NI-PoI edib. 64%  46% -39%  -14% -19%  69% .74%  44% 66% 69% 61%  43% 12% •79% 206% 17%
This is the case of most of the OPT partnerships taking place in the footwear sector 
(between Germans on the one hand« and Polish and Hungarian firms on the other hand), but also 
of Franco-Czech partnerships in footwear, and of the OPT relations between Dutch and Polish 
firms in the sector of edible preparations.
In this case there is no renewed, let alone upgraded, commitment by foreign partners. As 
foreign partners withdraw from their commitment, local firms are in no position to effectively 
take over previous OPT activities on their own.
2.2 drastic reductions of OPT proportions
On the contrary, other OPT partnerships correspond more truly to a ‘take-over* scenario 
where absolute decreases of OPT give way to a symmetric increases of ‘independent* exports by 
local firms which account for generally very good performances of total trade.
Table 17. OPT and direct trade (1000 ECU), and OFT proportion in total trade (%), by OPT 
networks
91 /92 92/93 9 3 /9 4 94/95 91 9 2  93  94  9 5 1991/1995
o p t |d ir opt] d ir o p t |d ir o p tjd ir % %  % %  % op t d ir total
G e rm -H 87 37%  106% *61%  6% 14%  61% •54%  114% 30% 2 2 %  9%  7%  2% *72% 657% 441%
G erm -H 84 -43%  8% -29%  -2% 36%  45% 41%  102% 14% 8 %  6 %  5 %  4% •22% 206% 176%
G e rm -Ib l 84 -17%  -4%
-62%  8% -5 %  28% 73%  28% 12% 11%  4%  3%  4% -48% 71% 57%
Most notably, this ‘take over* scenario concerns almost exclusively OPT partnerships 
between German and Hungarian firms: in the automotive industry and in the sector of 
mechanical machinery (there is also, to a lesser extent the case of Germano-Polish partnerships 
in this latter sector even if direct trade does not show convincing signs of dynamism). Even if it 
starts from lower levels than the 1st sub-category, the reduction of OPT proportions is extremely 
important (e.g., from 30% to no more than 5%).
Direct trade is so dynamic as to compensate for a decrease o f OPT. Decreasing OPT 
figures correspond to the actual withdrawal of foreign OPT paitners (because trade barriers are 
being lifted, and because of wage increases). It is a ‘normal’, and ‘favourable’ outcome: local 
firms could take advantage of their partnerships to strengthen their competitivity, and made it 
possible to take over OPT production on their own in the best of the worlds... Alternatively, opt 
partners actually stayed and are still responsible for (part of) the dynamism of direct trade.
Stylised facts
The above patterns are further synthesised in order to pave the way for the subsequent 
identification of some of their explanatory factors.
Sector variations: T&C vs the other sectors
The above categorisation of OPT networks according to their evolution confirms a very 
strong sector-specific feature in the case of T&C. In each OPT networks, the trends registered 
suggest that foreign partners are still present in the OPT business with local firms, irrespective of 
the nationality of the firms concerned. On the face of it, the other sectors are characterised by 
very differentiated evolutions which depend on the partner countries.
Evidence o f up-grading in some OPT networks
The trajectories of German OPT networks in the Czech and Hungarian electrical 
machinery sectors are characterised by two traits: increasing OPT transactions, and an 
outstanding growth of direct -untied- exports (especially in the former Czechoslovakia, and to a 
lower extent in Hungary). As a result, OPT proportions in total exports to the HU decreased 
(faster in Hungary than in the former Czechoslovakia). However, OPT proportions register a 
respectable figure of approximately 20%.
German OPT in the Polish furniture and in the Czech mechanical machinery sectors 
developed in a similar context (see Table 15).
These trends are particularly striking because decreasing tariff are no longer an 
incentive. The fact that OPT transactions remain high while direct irade follows extremely 
dynamic trends is quite encouraging. Indeed, it means that foreign partners are, under one form 
or another still present and that their prolonged presence is not detrimental to the development of 
independent exports; possibly it even plays an active role in promoting local capabilities.
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The above tables highlight consistent patterns of country variations. In broad terms, 
German OPT activity in Hungary shows clear signs of decrease. By contrast, OPT networks 
involving firms from Germany and the former Czechoslovakia are characterised by a more 
resilient tendency to decrease, when they do not register frankly positive trends. What is more, as 
suggested above, they concern a wide array of sectors, and in a limited number of cases, the 
trajectories of German OPT networks in the former Czechoslovakia correspond to the 
consolidation of OPT partnerships.
The contrast between the trajectories of German OPT networks in Hungary and in the 
former Czechoslovakia is best exemplified in the footwear sector. Starting from an appallingly 
high level of 87% in 1991, the proportion of OPT in total Hungarian exports to the EU was 
dramatically reduced to slightly more than 30% in 1995. On the face of it, exports from the 
former Czechoslovakia consist of approximately the same proportion of OPT“ in 1995, but as 
the result of an opposite evolution (an increase of 518%).
Similarly, in the mechanical machinery and the automotive industry, German OPT 
networks almost disappear from Hungary, but they keep on playing a role of some importance in 
the former Czechoslovakia. Whereas in 1995, there is practically no sign of OPT activity left in 
the Hungarian sector o f mechanical machinery, the proportion of OPT in the exports to the EU of 
Hie Czechoslovak sector is still above 10%. In the automotive industry, even if OPT has never 
been truly important neither in the former Czechoslovakia nor in Hungary, it still represents a 
small share of the exports of the former country to the EU in 1995 (5% of total exports to the EU 
in 1995, with a peak in 1992 of 16%). In Hungary, instead, the industry developed from scratch 
without significant contribution of OPT.
The case of several Czech sectors which arc the only destination of German OPT activity 
is more marginal in quantitative absolute terms, but it nevertheless illustrates the strong 
proclivity of German OPT to engage in the former Czechoslovakia. In the leather and the 
printing industries, as well as in the sector of edible preparations, not only the proportion of 
German OPT in total exports to the EU is substantial, but also, it shows a marked propensity to 
increase."4 1
Country variations: Germano-Hungarian vs Germano-Czech OPT partnerships
11127% of exports to Germany and 20% of exports to the EU as a whole.
1,4 There is also a series of sectors which are strong poles of export dynamism and where Germans 
undertake some OPT. In these cases, OPT accounts for quite marginal shares, but the latter represent non
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Finally, the development of Italian OFT networks in Hungary is consistent with the 
German patterns. In sectors characterised by poor performances, like footwear and plastics, 
German firms, who tend to have longer-term time-horizon, withdraw to the benefit of the 
Italians. In fact, the conclusion of OPT agreements between Italians and Hungarians is a good 
match as the latter are interested in breaking free from OPT whereas the former are renowned for 
their footloose and predatory strategies.
Overall, Hungarians seem to do better without OPT, whereas the Czechs have more 
chance to make the most of their OPT partnerships with German firms. Indeed, the Hungarians 
are better at taking over OPT and recovering autonomy than their Czech counterparts. In the 
former Czechoslovakia, instead, the sectors of footwear and to an even higher extent, that of 
electrical machinery, are characterised by a combination of sound but contained OPT trends with 
extremely dynamic increases of direct trade. If anything, this shows that German firms stay 
committed to their local partners while promoting independent117 exports. In other words, German 
OPT with firms from the former Czechoslovakia in electrical machinery and in footwear are 
conducive to an apparent consolidation of local capabilities.
These national specificities are not systematically successful, however. The withdrawal 
of German OPT partners from the Hungarian footwear industry, for example, had devastating 
effects that strong increases of direct trade could not offset Conversely, the tendency of Czech 
firms to clutch at their German partners not necessarily secure the desired upgraded 
commitment of the latter. In the leather and printing industries, and especially in the sector of 
edible preparations, continuing OPT increases without significant growth of direct exports does 
not augur well of the future.
Direct trade dynamism
An interesting result is that OPT activity in the above OPT networks does not appear to 
be detrimental to the overall trade performances of local partners. If the evolutions undergone by 
direct trade are anything to go by, no destruction of local capabilities seem to result from OPT 
activities. There is, however, one exception which concerns the Germano-Czech partnerships in
negligible amounts of transaction in absolute terms, and they are marked by very dynamic growth rates. 
These sectors are: plastic, glassware, and iron and steel. Also possibly optical instruments and base metal. 
1,7 The appellation ‘independent' should not be misleading ... in fact ‘independent' (direct) exports can be 
attributable to the activities of local firms and/or FOFs. In turn, the latter case can correspond to exports 
undertaken by previous foreign OPT firms which are still present btTt have transformed and upgraded their 
engagement or by greenfield plants.
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the sector of edible preparations: direct trade fell dramatically while OPT trade increased 
strongly reaching outstanding proportions in total trade (around 40% in 1995).
Thus, OPT activities seem to go hand in hand with the strengthening of trade 
performances and a striking correlation appears between the dynamism of OPT and that of direct 
trade. Comparing OPT networks within a same category shows that OPT is all the more dynamic 
where direct trade registers the strongest growth rates (or vice versa, direct trade happens to be 
most dynamic where OPT is also dynamic).
The specific case o f the footwear sector
The footwear industry is an excellent illustration of how contrasted the evolutions of EU- 
CEECs OPT relations can be. Two OPT networks show signs of OPT specialisation: Germano- 
Czech and I talo-Hungarian partnerships. Instead, Germano-Hungarian and Fran co-Czech 
partnerships testify to the withdrawal of EU partners.
As seen above, German OPT relations with Hungarian partners are traditionally one of 
the major source of OPT in the sector. Total trade flows in footwear between the two countries 
are also the most developed. However, between 1991 and 1995, OPT decreased while direct 
trade increased significantly (+533%) so that the OPT proportion was brought to less than 31% 
of total trade.
Table 18. OPT in footwear in 1995 (in M ECU, and %), and 1991-1995 evolution (in %)
OPT absolute levels OPT proportion Direct trade Total trade
Germany-Poland 23 M (+0%) 32% (-21%) 50 M (+44%) 74 M (+26%)
Germany-F. CS 32 M (+518%) 27% (+54%) 85 M (+255%) 118 M (+302%)
Gcrmany-Hungary 41 M (-55%) 31% (-64%) 89 M (+533%) 130 M (+24%)
Italy-Poland 7 M (+7087%) 43% (+3273%) 10 M (+24%) 17 M (+113%)
Italy-Hungary 19 M (+6004%) 39% (+1650%) 28 M (+119%) 45 M (+249%)
Italy- F. CS 6 M (+167%) 25% (-33%) 17 M (+379%) 23 M (+299%)
France-Poland 0.1M (-93%) 7% (-91%) 2 M (+205%) 2 M (-29%)
France- F. CS 1 M (-89%) 7% (-91%) 19 M (+274%) 20 M (+17%)
France-Hungary 0.5 M (-95%) 30% (-66%) 1 M (+7%) 1.5 M (-85%)
Radically contrasted evolutions were registered in other cases. Most notably, Italian OPT 
in Hungary (and, with lower absolute levels involved, in Poland) increased strongly and much 
faster than direct trade, as well as „German OPT activities in the former CS. Whereas the former
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OPT bilateral relations are conspicuous for their dynamism, the latter have a strong quantitative 
significance. But in both cases, OPT in the sector is a new business (i.e., that it is characterised 
by relatively low starting levels in 1991), and in both cases, OPT came to account for an 
important proportion in total trade (especially in the bilateral relations between Italy and 
Hungary: almost 40%, compared to the 27% of the Germana-Czech partnerships). Overall, OPT 
contributed quite significantly to the growth of total trade in the sector. Thus, rather than 
upgrading or recovering autonomy, what is at stake is local partners* increased dependence on 
OPT.
It is interesting to note the perfectly symmetrical evolutions of German and Italian OPT 
patterns in Hungary and Poland, respectively: the former decrease in both countries, while the 
latter increase strongly. Overall, OPT in the Polish sector is ‘motor*, whereas direct trade takes 
over in Hungary.
Table 19. OPT with EU12 in footwear in 1995 (in M ECU, and %), and 1991-1995 evolution (in
%)
OPT absolute levels OPT proportion Direct trade Total trade
Poland 41 M(+31%) 32% (+13%) 86 M (+11%) 127 M (+16%)
F.CS 42 M (+103%) 20% (-26%) 171 M (+200%) 213 M (+174%) .
Hungary 61 M(-40%) 34% (-56%) 119 M (+294%) 180 M (+37%)
3. Evidence from  fieldwork
The objective of the present section is to try to lift the indeterminacy proper to a 
statistical analysis by focusing the analysis at the level of the firm. On the basis of the results of a 
fieldwork (see Annex 3), it categorises local firms according to the nature of the evolution of 
their OPT partnerships. The objective is to identify the respective firms’ profiles which are most 
conducive to either the upgrading or the take-over scenario.
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Four categories of local OPT firms
1. Whether big or specialised: healthy and dependent.
Examples of firms belonging to this first category are given by OP (Prostejov, Moravia), 
and Styl (Szombathely, Hungary), They are two big firms in the T&C sector (5000 and 2100 
employees, respectively), privatised in the immediate aftermath of the 'revolution', which 
produce mainly men's suits and women's ready to wear dresses. OPT proportion is high: 90% for 
Styl, 50% for OP (3/4 of its exports). Both firms have a privileged relation with one of their OPT 
partners: Hugo Boss for OP, and Baumler for Styl. The latter has invested in Styl and holds the 
majority of its shares. Confidence in the future is the main feature characterising the position of 
both management staffs; none of them stresses the necessity to reduce the share of OPT in their 
production. OP, however, is at least in principle, more inclined to develop its own exports. Styl is 
very positive about OPT and intends to keep up with this situation as they do not fear 
competition wherever it comes from (be it from Asia, Romania, or the former Soviet states). 
Interestingly enough, in both firms the average salary is slightly higher than the average of the 
sector; more to that, the average salary on the respective production lines of H. Boss and 
Baumler is higher than the average at the level of the firm taken as a whole. It worth noting that 
Styl as opposed to OP, was engaged in OPT with Baumler before the demise of the COMECON 
(in a approximately the same proportion: 85 vs. 15%). Instead, OP was entirely geared to Russia, 
and started OPT in 1989.
In the electrical machinery sector an example of firms undertaking this first type of OPT is 
given by CKD-Elektrotechnika (1000 employees). CKD-Elektrotechnika is mainly oriented to 
the local Czech market (90% of local sales, and 10% of exports1“); however, 40% of CKD- 
Elektrotechnika's exports are ascribable to one OPT agreement with a German partner (SFM, a 
producer of medical equipment). OPT activities are undertaken in a special workshop making 
needles. It is physically isolated from the rest of the divisions, and employs 100 workers: 100% 
of the input comes from their German partner, and 100% of the output is exported back to them. 
Although it would be incorrect to consider CKD-Elektrotechnika as a whole to be dependent on 
OPT, SFM is nevertheless in a position of full control of the activities undertaken within the 
workshop; in this sense, there is quasi-integration between SFM and one part of CKD- 
Elektrotechnika. An important premise for understanding the nature of the relations between the 
two partners, is that CKD-Elektrotechnika had to invest significantly in a climatisation system
"The proportion becomes 70% vs 30% if CKD's sales to Czech firms (such as Skoda) which are then 
exported by the latter are considered as (indirect) exports.
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(in order to sterilise the air) which is a condition sine-qua-non for undertaking the kind of tasks 
required by the OFT agreement Another interesting feature of the agreement has to do with the 
apparently very long term time horizon of the co-operation. Besides the fact that the Czech 
managing staff refers to a minimum period of 10 years, SFM has invested in a greenfield 
company established in the Czech Republic (SeFeMed) which deals exclusively with the OPT 
relations between CKD and SFM. In addition, the OPT contract contains certain guarantees for 
the Czech partner such as the obligation for SFM to notify 6 month before their intention to 
lower orders whenever they decide to do so, and to inform their Czech partner 5 years before 
they decide to stop the co-operation completely. Reciprocally, the contract contains a clause 
stipulating that wages should increase according to inflation (i.e., around 10% a year). Finally, it 
is worth noting that there is no chance for CKD to take over the production on its own as the 
distribution of the concerned products in Western Europe is completely controlled by a Belgian 
firm in a monopoly position. The managers added that they are very satisfied with the profit 
conditions (which are also stipulated in the contract).
Another case of long-lasting OPT relations, also in the electrical machinery sector, is 
given by the example of ABB Elektro-Praga. OPT with one partner which is also the main 
investor (ABB) forms a large part of ABB Elektro-Praga's exports; products concerned are wall
electric switches. What is particularly interesting in this case is that avoiding tariff duties was 
openly an important element in the decision to undertake OPT. Whereas it is agreed that wage 
rises can represent a real danger, it is to be stressed that ABB Elektro-Praga is investing in order 
to increase productivity faster than wages will rise. The future of the co-operation is rather 
dependent on prospects on the market for the concerned product 2
2. Striving fo r disentanglement
Timo, a Czech producer of underwear with 800 employees is an example of a firm 
belonging to a second category which managed successfully to take over production on its own. 
Split from Triola in 1992, one of the biggest T&C firm under communist times (20 000 
employees), it kept the OPT relation Triola was having with the German Felina. Decision was 
taken to rely on OPT for no more than 30% of total production. And so it was and the proportion 
decreased to 10-12%. The staff stresses how important OPT proved to be for getting to know the 
latest developments in fashion and getting acquainted with the most sophisticated techniques; but 
it was also extremely valuable for short term advantages: not having to pay for the material, and 
getting the proceeds immediately was very helpful. However, the profitability associated with 
independent exports is higher than with OPT.
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In the electrical sector, the Hungarian Finn Vilati occupies a somewhat controversial 
position: somewhere between the steady situation of the previous category, and the more risky 
status of the present one. The firm is a state-owned company with 480 employees producing 
process control systems, printed circuit boards, electrical and electronic equipment... Up to 90% 
of the total production is made for about 10 OFT partners; however, one of them (Brunswick 
Bowling) accounts for 50% of the total OPT contracts. The manager distinguishes between 3 
sorts of partners: 1) the long term ones, necessary to give a long term horizon to the Finn's 
strategy (in order to invest), account for 80% of the total number of partners; 2) the occasional 
partners represent around 20% of the total number, 3) the potential ones which are very 
important in order to keep contact with the demand, and to promote Vilati's capabilities. None of 
them however is going to acquire a share when the firm will be privatised. The main reason 
advanced for Vilati's dependence on OPT is the price of inputs. As a matter of fact, inputs have 
to be imported, meaning that foreign Finns are almost always in a more favourable position in 
this respect. Moreover, to the price of imported input must be added transport costs, and tariff 
duties. Finally, to undertake independent exports the firm would have to pay other tariff duties on 
the way to European markets (in conformity with the rules of origin legislation). Vilati has 
definitely not enough capital to advance in order to cover such expenses. As a result, the choice 
between independent exports and OPT does not really exist About the foreseeable future, a 
realistic position prevails: it would be good to increase the proportion of independent exports ... 
however, it is safer to focus on keeping up with the technological pace In order to keep on 
presenting an attractive profile for OPT partners.
Fekon, a  Hungarian state-owned clothing firm specialised in shirts (1200 employees) Is 
clearly in a much more uncertain position; it depends on OPT for 90% of its production with 12 
different partners. Although the staff is well aware of the necessity to take over the production on 
their own (they mention a time-horizon for OPT in the sector limited to 5 years), they admit that 
they are not in a position to do so at the moment What they long for is an injection of capital in 
order to make the necessary investments, and change their product line. Interestingly enough 
none of the actual OPT partners mentioned their intention to acquire a stake in Fekon when it 
will be privatised.
3. Starving fo r OPT
The state-owned enterprise Tos Hostivar, manufacturer of grinding machines, with 550 
employees"* stresses how valuable OPT is. OPT co-operation accounts for 30% of the total
“• A sharp reduction of the workforce: from 1250 in 1991, to 300 is due to take place.
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production (the other 70% are exported under their own brand). Tos have 5-6 partners. One of 
them, a German firm, has established a separate workshop in Tos's hall where German 
supervisors work hand in hand with Czech (or Ukrainian!) workers to produce post office 
printing machines. The Germans are settled for '10 years' according to Tos's manager, moreover, 
they will start to source locally. Tos is willing to increase OPT even if it is acknowledged that 
such form of co-operation in general has a lifetime of only 5 years. OPT is considered to be 
valuable in that it occupies production capacities, bring in more updated techniques, and makes 
market mechanisms familiar.
Two clearly negative experiences are illustrated by two firms based in Prague that used to 
export massively to the Soviet markets: Tesla Karlin (electrical equipment, 1000 employees) and 
CKD Tatra (heavy transport equipment, 1100 employees). The main matter for grievance 
concerns the end of the OPT co-operation that both firms had with a  foreign partner {Siemens 
and AEG Westinghouse. respectively). Siemens's engagement in an OPT co-operation with Tesla 
Karlin took place in a wider context co-operation between the two partners started with Tesla 
Karlin producing under Siemens's license. Subsequently, Siemens provided Tesla Karlin with a 
new machine in exchange for an OPT contract (for a value amounting to 15% of the total 
turnover of Tesla Karlin): it was probably a means for Siemens to test Tesla for potential future 
co-operation (thus leading to the first type of OPT relations). However, Siemens was not satisfied 
and decided to shorten the initial repayment schedule of 4 years down *o two years putting 
considerable pressure to bear upon their partner. No other co-operation was on the agenda. Tesla 
Karlin is now looking for other partners; they already had some sporadic OPT co-operations on a 
much lower scale (less than 1% of the turnover), but these were just temporary contacts; 
probably the foreigners had in mind to explore the Czech market rather than to do serious OPT. 
Similarly, it was the premature withdrawal of AEG Westinghouse that caused the disillusion of 
CKD Tatra about OPT. In theory, CKD Tatra does not undertake OPT as they source locally. 
However, they concluded such a contract as a first step towards more thorough co-operation with 
AEG Westinghouse; the formation of a Joint Venture was contemplated. The contract amounted 
to 100 millions Kcs, but the value of the OPT actually performed was only 70 to 80% of that 
sum. In mid-95 it was decided that the agreement would not be renewed; contracts were 
transferred to another firm of the same holding (CKD-Lokomotivka). Tatra maintains that they 
benefited from this co-operation in terms of training, and technological upgrading ... they would 
'desperately* look for other OPT partners, but they are very disappointed that there are so few of 
them.
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4. Careless
Pal (4000 employees), and Ateso (3100 employees)*are two Czech firms in the automobile 
industry which carry out some OPT on a marginal basis. The less involved is Ateso, which main 
raison d'être is to supply Skoda, and which buy locally 90% of its input However. Ateso does 
some OPT in one of its plant with its Joint Venture partner {Lucas). The products concerned are 
brake wheel cylinders. Pal is doing more OPT, but it is still a marginal activity (3% of the total 
output, and 15% of the exports). Its main activity also consists in supplying Skoda (85% of total 
production, the rest is exported). They would like to increase their level of OPT, and think that 
the time-horizon of such activities is of about 10 years:-indeed, what matters is not only the 
convenient wage level, it is also the low transport costs. Apparently both firms are satisfied with 
the profit margins associated with OFT.
Four types of OPT partnerships, and possible trajectories
The first case concerns local firms which are dependent on OPT to a high extent (going 
up to 90% of their total production), and which have one main partner, accounting for the vast 
majority of OPT contracts. The foreign partner is committed on a long term basis; if it persists, it 
can "invest" time and effort (even machines) in order to bring the level of quality up to his own 
standard. Thus, one positive feature (the long term commitment of the foreign partner) 
compensates for the negative effects (the dependence on OPT). Possibly, the relation can 
develop into foreign direct investment, and OPT and FDI can take place simultaneously. In this 
first category, OPT and FDI are therefore complementary. It is worth noting that in this first 
category trade restrictions (either quotas or tariff barriers) rendered the access to EU markets 
impossible without OPT. This situation is characteristic of OP and Styl, but also of CKD 
Elektrotechnika. Some hypotheses as to the foreseeable future of such firms can be formulated. 
A relatively safe bet is that foreign partners are not likely to withdraw suddenly on the mere basis 
of wage increases. As suggested, foreign partners can increase the stake they already have in 
these firms, and even invest capital. If they do not do so, local firms can anyway take advantage 
of their close OPT relationship, and "specialise" in the OPT business.
The second category of OPT relations concerns local firms that are significantly 
dependent on OPT, not with one main partner, but with several of them. Clearly, such firms are 
in a more uncertain situation. Although diversifying the number of partners might be a way to 
reduce the risk incurred in case one of them retracts, it is no answer to a collective withdrawal. 
The problem is that the very fact that partners are numerous would tend to indicate that the latter
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have short term views as they are not in a position to hold sway; chances for them to retreat 
collectively as soon as wage levels become dissuasive are therefore higher.
This is sharp contrast with the first category of OPT relations. Such situation corresponds 
to the case of 'smaller* firms in the T&C sector (Timo, and ONA). as well as firms in the 
machinery sector which have to face a restructuring process. Indeed, as opposed to the T&C 
industry, achieving the quality standard that would allow to compete on the world markets in the 
machinery sector, often requires deeper and more thorough transformation of the production 
facilities that were once sufficient for exporting to the East (Tos is a good example o f the huge 
effort to be undertaken in this respect). In these cases, the main objective of the foreign partners, 
which are most often medium-sized enterprises, is to take advantage o f low labour costs for the 
time being, without getting enmeshed in a more thorough co-operation110; OPT is for them an 
advantageous substitute for foreign direct investment
The question at stake for the local firms has therefore to do with their chance to take 
over production on their own. In this respect, there is no predictable issue: it is up to each 
individual firm to seize the opportunity given to them by their OPT co-operation i.e., getting in 
contact with know-how, new technologies ... while benefiting from a period of respite (e.g. 
Vuoso which is actually doing quite well in reducing its dependence on OPT, conversely Fekon, 
in the shirt sector, faces quite a difficult situation as it is highly dependent on quite volatile 
partners). One factor that may hamper the desired upgrading of the local firms' capabilities is the 
potentially bad conditions of profitability attached to OPT. If the OPT business does not give the 
means for investing, then the life-span of the local firm is limited to the duration of the co­
operation (which is very much the case of Fekon).
In the third category, firms are in worse position than the previous group, not so much as 
a result of OPT, but rather because of a lack of OPT. In their case, OPT does not account for a 
large proportion of their total production, even though it can contribute more than marginally to 
total income; the number of OPT partners is relatively small. A priori, they are the same firms 
than the candidates for the previous group, except that the extent of the problem they face is 
wider. For these firms, productivity consideration offset the gains from lower labour costs. In 
other terms, far from presenting a competitive advantage, they are characterised by some 
disadvantage so that even under the very favourable terms that OPT grants to potential foreign 
partners, the latter engage in OPT only very reluctantly. If by chance, local firms manage to get 
some contracts, it is for relatively small amount of money, and on a very short term basis. These 
finns cannot afford paying attention to the negative aspects of OPT, and look desperately for how 
to increase their contacts (two typical cases are given by CKE Tatra, and Tesla Karlin). 120
120It can be also the case that foreign firms engage in OPT on a short term basis in order to get acquainted 
with the local market and firms.
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Finally, the last group of firms displays only low levels of dependence on OPT for the 
simple reason that OPT is not of crucial importance for them. This is so, for example, because 
they gear the majority of their production to the local markets, or because local supply is very 
competitive. It is firms in this group that enjoys the best bargaining position vis-à-vis their 
foreign partners, they can potentially draw the benefits associated with OPT without incurring 
any risk. In the automobile sector, for example, local firms are very often suppliers of the Skoda 
plant of VW, dedicating the majority of their production capacities to this activity (e.g. Pal, and 
Ateso). However, equally often, the rest of the production is done on an OPT basis for clients 
abroad.
Overall, the result of the fieldwork shows that the outcome of an OPT partnership can be 
astonishingly varied depending on the sector, the respective nationality of the OPT partners, and 
other firm-level features like the possession of a competitive advantage or the size of the local 
firms. However, those local firms which are most likely to secure the relative long term 
commitment of their foreign partners tend to be big and mainly to belong to the T&C sector.
Let a rough conclusion be formulated under the form of what might, in a first approach, 
resemble a paradox: dependence on OPT may, under certain circumstances, be the best way for 
securing the positive aspects of OPT. In other terms, better to be highly dependent on a stable 
foreign partner, than to resort to OPT on a lower scale, but with very volatile partners. Overall, 
the OPT example shows how important it is to determine where and by whom bargaining power 
is exercised in the value added chain.111
4. Patterns and explanations
On the basis of the evidence made available by statistics and fielwork, it is possible 
propose some explanatory factors to account for the distinct patterns of OPT developing between 
the EU and CEECs.
m This result is particularly interesting in the light of development concerning the notion of ‘commodity 
chains’ (Gereffi, 1994). See Chapter 6.
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Evidence on durable and up-graded partnerships in the Textile and Gothing sector, and in some 
OPT networks.
The extremely dynamic and continuing increases of OPT absolute and relative levels in 
the T&C sector testify to the continuing presence of foreign partners and to their renewed 
commitment under the form of OPT partnerships. As suggested above, local firms make a strong 
use of the arrangement in order to avoid restrictive quota imposed on direct trade. Thus, the 
relative state of dependence on OPT in which local firms are placed if  they want to access the 
EU markets, enables foreign partners to extend control over the latter without necessarily 
disbursing capital.
In some circumstances, foreign partners take advantage of the arrangement in order to 
rationalise their strategies on the regional scale. OPT enables them to apply Just In Time and 
lean production methods. In these cases, they contribute to the strengthening of the technological 
capabilities of local firms in a substantial way.
The fieldwork study also showed that foreign partners falling into this category are often 
big firms which are committed to their local counterpart over a significant time-span. Such 
relationships involve a privileged couple, at the expense of a strategy o f diversification of foreign 
partners.
Overall, the convergence of interest between local and foreign firms spurs relatively 
durable and complex forms of co-operation between local and foreign firms. This result tends to 
belie a scenario of a wave of re-relocations to a second groups of countries on the fringe of the 
CEECs. In fact, even if such "re-relocations' take place, the present evidence shows that they are 
more than compensated by increased OPT commitments of EU firms in the 1st-wave o f CEECs 
countries.
Also, fieldwork suggested several cases of durable partnerships in the electrical 
machinery sector between German firms on the one hand, and Czech and Hungarian partners on 
the other hand. This feature was confirmed by statistical evidence, even if in a different fashion 
than in the T&C case. This is all the more interesting if account is taken of the significant 
German direct investments precisely in these sectors.
These evidences tend to speak in favour of the prolonged and upgraded commitment of 
foreign partners. In fact most likely, these OPT networks correspond at the same time to another 
category of OPT, that of cross-border transactions engaged by German SMEs on the basis of 
motives such as labour costs and proximity (see below).
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Cross-border co-operation between German and Czech partners
A plausible explanation for the opposite trends characterising certain German OPT 
networks in Hungary and in the former Czechoslovakia is that they are ascribable to the 
strategies of smaller Arms which do not necessarily aim at a  rationalisation of their activities on 
the regional scale, but simply at taking advantage of favourable costs. With the main objective of 
easing the constraint represented by high domestic labour costs, German firms thus take 
advantage of the arrangement to relocate part of their production to their immediate neighbours. 
They use OPT as a strategy of crisis management and fallback on production in their immediate 
spatial proximity.
They first went to Hungary where the process of liberalisation started earlier. When the 
former Czechoslovakia opened up its markets as well, they reoriented their activities away from 
Hungary to the Czech Republic, which is much closer than Hungary, and which industrial 
traditions present a  serious advantage compared to Poland.
Geographical and cultural proximity appears to play a crucial role. Reduced transport 
costs, shorter delays, and the possibility to supervise the development of OPT co-operation in 
location are important factors accounting for the diversification and the dynamism of German 
OPT activities in the former Czechoslovakia.
The commencement of the opening up process is also an important factor. It is indeed 
striking to note that the sharpest decreases of German OPT were registered in Hungary in sectors 
already significantly dependent on OPT in 1991. The very same sectors in the former 
Czechosloavkia were at that time only marginally touched, but they subsequently followed a 
strong catching up process. The example of the footwear sector is a straightforward example.
Possibly, the chronological starting point of OPT relations is also a factor influencing the 
time-horizon of German partners. Those who started their operations under Communist times 
were acting in a environment particularly uncertain and were thus likely to be initially driven by 
relatively short-term strategic considerations. For this reason, Hungary tended to attract 
comparatively more of such ‘volatile* OPT partners. In the Czech Republic, instead, more 
committed latecomers could contemplate longer-term strategies already at the start of OPT 
partnerships. For this reason, the OPT strategies of German SMEs in the former Czechoslovakia, 
even though they are very akin to ‘workbench’ activities, are not necessarily characterised by 
short-term time-horizon.
Finally, besides proximity and the chronological date of the commencement of OPT 
partnerships, the industrial structures inherited from the past, and the present performances of the 
sectors concerned are also intervening variables. In this respect, Polish and Hungarian Firms have 
some disadvantages compared to their Czech counterparts. In Hungary, for example, the national
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debt burden and the government strategy aiming at full repayment has been an additional 
constraint making more difficult the restructuring and modernisation of local firms necessary to 
secure the prolonged commitment of their foreign partners^ What is more, Polish and Hungarian 
firms do not benefit from an industrial history and reputation to the same extent as Czech firms.
Thus, rather ironically, the ‘re-relocation’ of German OPT activities is not so much 
geared further East, where wage increases are lagging; they rather follow an ‘inbound* wave, 
away from Hungary back to the Czech Republic.
It is also very important to note that the withdrawal o f German OPT partners from their 
engagement in Hungary gives apparently way to a ‘take-over’ scenario as testified by the very 
dynamic trends of direct trade. Fieldwork also made dear a  higher awareness of Hungarian firms 
as to the many drawbacks of the arrangement, and their higher degree of preparation in the case 
of their partners* withdrawal.
All in all, OPT did not appear to be detrimental to local capabilities. In the former 
Czechoslovakia, OPT tends to give way to the consolidation of partnerships between local and 
foreign firms. In Hungary, instead, local firms are relatively successful at taking over OFT 
activities on an independent basis.
3 .3  Conclusion
There are some general traits characterising the very differentiated trajectories followed 
by OPT networks. Most importantly, OPT does not seem to be detrimental to the trade 
performance of single OPT networks. In most cases, either because total trade is inflated by very 
dynamic OPT evolutions, or because direct trade takes over OPT trade, the general performances 
are often quite impressive precisely in the sectors concerned by OPT. Overall, OPT played a 
primary role in the reorientation of CEEC trade to Western markets.
But it is the extreme diversification of the OPT patterns developing in East-West 
relations which is most striking. These different patterns follow different evolutions with very 
distinct qualitative contributions to the terms of the regional economic integration. In a few 
cases, OPT seems to be the basis for further sounder co-operation between local and foreign 
firms. This is mainly so in textile and clothing where Western firms appear to rationalise their 
strategies at the regional scale on the basis of OPT partnerships. A consolidation of OPT 
partnerships is also possible in some other cases: mainly in the sector of electrical and 
mechanical machinery between German and Czech partners, possibly furniture in Poland.
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Otherwise, in other sectors, the potentials for the establishment of a regional division of 
labour on the basis of OPT are not really grasped by Western firms. Only German firms, possibly 
small and medium sized enterprises hit by high domestic labour costs, appear to take advantage 
of the arrangement They use OPT to cany out ‘workbench* activities mainly in the former 
Czechoslovakia, and at the expense of an earlier engagement in Hungary.
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Annex 1 B udget sheet o f  a  Czech O PT firm  in  th e  Textile a n d  C lo th ing  sector 
Table I. Monthly, in Kcs, 1994.
A. Fixed costs
-rent (180 sq m) 30000
-office 6000
-heating/electricity 7 000
-provision for depreciation: 
♦electric system 
♦machines
5000
5000
-miscellaneous 3 000
Total 56000
B. Management costs
-manager 20 000
-executive assistant 15 000
-accountant 15 000
-secretary 6 000
-taxes etc 1000
-cleaning 6000
Total 63 700
C. Workforce
-14 dressmakers (x4000) 56 000
-4 skilled" (x 6000) 24 000
-1 foreman 10000
-1 instructor 10000
-social/health care (35%) 35 000
Total 135 000
D. TOTAL 254 000
One can assume that running a medium size business in the Czech clothing industry involves an overall 
monthly cost of approximately 254,000 Kcs [Table 1]. The working potential of 18 dressmakers is 198,720 
min/months132. If they were paid 21 Pfennigs/min the potential revenue of the Czech OPT firm would be 41731 DM, 
i.e., 713,186 Kcs123. It means that the Czech OPT firm would enjoy a gross profit of 180% ... This is not, however, 
the real outcome of the business. Czech physical productivity lags behind EU standards by approximately 50 to 
60%. If one considers that Czech productivity is half the German level, the potential revenues shrink to 356,593 
Kcs, and the gross profit rate to approximately 40%. Now, if a risk factor is taken into account (absenteeism, 
rejected quality etc), as well as extra costs such as deposits of VAT and tariffs, the potential revenues have to be 
discounted by a factor greater than one (e.g., 1.2). The expected profit rate would then decrease to 17% (the 
expected gross revenues decrease to 297,161 Kcs). This demonstrates that OPT operations still present some 
potentialities in terms of profit for Czech firms, even if the margin is narrow.124
‘T.e., 18 x 23 x 8 x 60. There are 23 working days a month, and 8 hours a day.
‘“With an exchange rate of 17.09 Kcs/DM.
“This is particularly true if one takes into account the actual average levels of profitability of the Czech 
clothing industry measured as gross profits relative to full cost (see Benacek, Mejstrik, 1994):
1990 1991 1992
Clothing ind. 12,1% 9,9% 7,9%
1 1 1
Let us consider what might be the wage increase which would wipe out the expected profit to zero in the 
above illustratory example.125 The average wage (including taxes and insurance) per person was 7920 Kc&ftnooth fin 
Fig. 1, the sum of section B and C is 198,000 Kcs).126 The zero profit hypothecs is valid if the wage bill rises to 
241,161 Kcs. Total costs would then amount to 297,161Kcs (including fixed costs for an amount of 56,000 Kcs). 
This would be the effect of a 21.79b wage inflation, provided that productivity is constant.
Such an increase of the wage level is possible, if not likely, in the Czech T&C sector. Indeed, in 
the past two years, wages have been rising fast in the manufacturing sector (in 1992-1993, the increase rate 
was 49%). Moreover, there is a gap between wages in manufacturing and clothing industries that cannot be 
but somehow filled (the latter were by 31.5% lower than the former at the end of 1993). Two factors could 
offset its detrimental effects on the OFT business: the future of OPT is strictly conditioned either by rises 
in productivity or by increased revenues per minute (this latter factor depending on the competition from 
other East European countries).
l,IFor the purpose of simplicity, the present analysis takes place in a static framework. It should however 
be kept in mind that what actually matters is not the absolute wage differential, but the relative wage 
differential.
‘»In the last quarter of 1993, the actual average wages in the textile sector was 6143 Kc/month and 5954 
Kc/month in the clothing sector (see Benacek, Mejstrik, 1994).
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Annex 2 Trajectories o f bilateral OPT relations between 1991 and 1995, by sector
Te
x
til
e 
an
d 
Cl
ot
hi
ng
Fo
ot
w
ea
r
EU
12
-
OP
T A
bso
lut
e 
lev
el 
in 
19
95
:41
 
M 
+ 
31 
% 
91
/95
-
OP
T d
epe
nd
en
ce
 
in 
199
5: 
32
 
%
+ 
13
% 
91
/95
-
OP
T a
bs
olu
te 
lev
el 
in 
199
5: 
42
 
M 
+ 
10
3 %
 
91
/95
-
OP
T d
epe
nd
en
ce
 
in 
199
5: 
20
 
%
-
 
26
 
% 
91
/95
-
OP
T a
bs
olu
te 
lev
el 
in 
19
95
:61
 
M
-
 
40
 
% 
91
/95
-
OP
T d
epe
nd
en
ce
 
in 
199
5: 
34
 
%
-
 
56
 
% 
91
/95
-
OP
T a
ba
 
lev
el 
(19
95
): 1
44 
M 
-
 
6 %
 
91
/95
-
OP
T d
epe
nd
en
ce
 
(19
95
):28
% 
-
43
%
 
91
/95
De
nm
ar
k
-
OP
T A
bso
lute
 
lev
el 
in 
199
5: 
9 M
-
OP
T d
epe
nd
en
ce
 
in 
19
95:
 
92
%
-
OP
T a
ba
olu
te 
lev
el 
in 
199
1: 
3 M
-
OP
T a
b*.
 
lev
el 
in 
199
5:
10 
M
Fr
an
ce
0 S #  §S n ifl 
 ^ n Oi OiS — «
•s V -s J
1 -3 8
|  ,B I  -S
* „ "3 ji H ^ H œ S n i  +
9___9_____ -O
FT
 
ab
so
lut
e l
ev
el 
in 
199
5: 
4 M
 
-
70
%
-
OP
T d
epe
nd
en
ce
 
in 
19
95
:18
 
%
-
 
74
 
% 
91
/95
-
OP
T a
bso
lut
e 
lev
el 
in 
19
95
:0.
5 M
 
-
 
95
 
% 
91
/95
-
OP
T d
epe
nd
en
ce
 
n
 19
95:
 
31
% 
-
66
%
 
91
/95
a i .Ü vi
g g
3 3
o TS > > Ji M
£ B 
a a
1 1
£ fc
9 9
Ita
ly
-
OP
T a
bs
olu
te 
lev
el 
in 
199
5: 
7 M
 
+ 
70
87
% 
91
/95
-
OP
T d
epe
nd
en
ce
 
in 
199
5: 
43
 
% 
+3
27
3%
 
91
/95
-
OP
T a
bs
olu
te 
lev
el 
in 
199
5: 
6 M
 
+ 
16
7%
 
91
/95
■
OP
T d
epe
nd
en
ce
 
in 
19
95
:10
 
%
-
 
74
 
% 
91
/95
I  «
« «
*  i
-B
•s « s a 6 S 8 S
3 5 1 1
m i
r r
2  5
a r
« VI
g g
3 3
Jà j*
1 §
1 1  
£ £9 9 _____
Ne
th
er
lan
ds
-
OP
T 
ab
so
lut
e 
lev
el 
in 
199
5: 
1 
M
-
55
 
% 
91
/95
-
OP
T d
epe
nd
en
ce
 
in 
199
5: 
22
 
% 
-
 
49
 
91
/95
-
OP
T 
ab
so
lut
e 
lev
el 
in 
199
5: 
1 
M ¡-O
PT
 
ab
so
lut
e l
ev
el 
in 
199
1: 
3.5
 
M
-
OP
T a
bs
olu
te 
lev
el 
in 
199
5: 
2.2
 
M
Ge
rm
an
y
-
 
OP
T a
bso
lut
e le
ve
l in
 
199
5: 
23
 
M
0%
 
91
/95
-
 
op
t d
epe
nd
en
ce
 
in 
199
5: 
32
 
%
-
21
 
% 
91
/95
-
OP
T a
bs
olu
te 
lev
el 
in 
199
5: 
32
 
M 
+ 
51
8%
 
91
/95
-
OP
T d
epe
nd
en
ce
 
in 
19
95
:27
 
%
+ 
54
% 
91
/95
-
OP
T a
bso
lut
e 
lev
el 
in 
199
5: 
41 
M 
-
 
55
 
% 
91
/95
-
OP
T d
epe
nd
en
ce
 
in 
199
5: 
31
% 
-
64
%
 
91
/95
-
OP
T a
bso
lut
e 
lev
el 
in 
199
1: 
11
9 M
 
-
OP
T a
bso
lut
e 
lev
el 
in 
199
5: 
96
 
M
-o
£
u
E
§■W>
Tf-
oLJ
O 8 co §
&________ _ & - U ___ 12 ______ U ______ 1
Furniture
Germany Netherlands EU12
Poland • OPT absolute level h  1995: 119 M 
+ 93%  91/95
- opt dependence in 1995: 16 %
- 41 % 91/95
-OPT absolute level h  1995: 2.4 M
-OPT absolute level m 1995: 126 M 
♦  99%91/95
•OPT dependence in 1995:14%
-31 %91/9S
Former
CS
-OPT absolute level in 1995: 28 M 
+ 199 % 91/95
•OPT dependence n  1995: 8 %
- 27 % 91/95-
-OPT absolute level in 1995: 28 M
Hungary -OPT absolute level in 1995:16 M 
+14% 91/95
-OPT dependence in 1995:12 % 
-21 % 91/95-
•OFT absolu* level n  1995: 16 M
CEHC4 -OFT absolute level in 1991: 85 M 
-OPT absolute level in 1995: 163 M
-OPT absolute level in 1991: -  
-OPT absolute level « 1995: 2.4 M
-OPTabs. level (1995): 170 M 
+ 95 % 91/95
•OPT dependence (1995): 11% 
-30%  91/95
Mechanical machinery
Germany Italy EU12
Poland - OPT absolute level in 1995: 10 M
20 M in 1991. Le.. - 48 % 91/95
- opt dependence in 1995: 4 %
-67% 91/95
-OPT absolute level in 1995: 1.4M 
+ 2651 % 91/95 
-OPT dependence in 1995: 3 %
-OPT sbsohae level m 1995:13 M 
• 41 % 91/95
-OPT dependence in 1995: 3% 
-66% 91/95
Former
CS
-OPT absolute level in 1995: 89 M 
+ 75 % 91/95
-OPT dependence in 1995:13 % 
-53% 91/95
-OPT absolute level in 1995: 2.6M 
+2597 % 91/95 
-OPT dependence in 1995: 4% 
+1273 % 91/95
-OPT absolute level in 1995: 93 M 
+ 76% 91/95
-OPT dependence in 1995:10% 
-43% 91/95
Hungary -OPT absolute level in 1995: 23 M 
- 22 % 91/95
-OPT dependence in 1995:4 % 
-72% 91/95
-OPT absolute level in 1995:1.1M 
+ 138% 91/95
-OPT dependence in 1995: 3%
+ 48 % 91/95
-OPT absolute level m 1995: 23 M 
-19% 91/95
-OPT dependence in 1995: 2%
- 78 % 91/95
CEEC4 -OPT absolute level in 1991: 100 M 
-OPT absolute level in 1995:122 M
-OPT absolute level in 1991: 0.6 M 
-OPT absolute level in 1995: 5 M
■OPTabs. fcvel(1995): 131 M 
+ 23 % 91/95
-OPT dependence (1995):5% 
-58% 91/95
\
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Automotive Industry
Germany EU12
Poland - OPT absolute level in 1995:13 M 
+ 48 % 91/95
• q* dependence to 1995:5 % 
-81% 91/95
-OPT absolute level in 1995:16 M
Former
CS
-OPT abaohite level in 1995:33 M 
+129% 91/95
•OPT dependence in 1995: 6 % 
-28% 91/95*
•OPT abaohite level n 1995: 37 M
Hungary -OPT abaolule level in 1995:4 M •• 
-72% 91/95
•OPT dependence in 1995:2 %
• 95 % 91/95
-OPT absolute level in 1995: Sj6 M
CEEC4 -OPT abaohite level in 1991:38 M 
•OPT absolute level in 1995:51 M
-OPTabs. level (1995): 59 M 
+ 37%
-OPT dependence (1995): 3% 
- 69 % 91/95
Plastics
EU 12
•OPT abaohite level in 1995:5 M
•OPT absolute level in 1995:20 M 
+-586 % 91/95
-OPT dependence in 1995:3 %
+ 146% 91/95
-OPT absolute level in 1995:16 M 
+ 244 % 91/95
•OPT dependence in 1995:17 %
+ 102 % 91/95 •
-OPT absolute level in 1995:21 M
•OPT absolute level in 1991:5 M 
-OPT absolute level in 1995: 17 M
-OPT aba. level (1995): 47 M 
+ 278 % 91/95
-OPT dep. (95): 4%,+72 % (95/91)
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Leathers
Germany France EU12
Poland - OPT absolute level m 1995:7 M
-11 % 91/95
- opt dependence in 1995:11 %
-51 % 91/95
-OPT absolute level in 1995:1.7 M 
4  410 % 91/95
-OPT dependence in 1995: 24 %
4 319%
7
Former
CS
•OPT absolute level in 1995:14 M 
4176% 91/95
-OPT dependence n 1995:26 % 
420 % 91/95
•OPT absolute level in 1995:18 M 
4 208 % 91/95
-OPT dependence in 1995:17 %
4 48 % 9W5
Hungary •OPT absolute level in 1995:8 M 
-23 % 91/95
OPT dependence in 1995: 22 % 
-34% 91/95
-OPT absolute level in 1995:1 M •OPTabsohac leveln 1995:10M 
• 48% 91/95
-OPT dependence in 1995:14%
- 53 % 91/95
CEEC4 OPT absolute level in 1991:24 M 
-OFT absolute level in 1995:29 M
-OPT absolute level in 1991:2 M 
-OPT absolute level in 1995:3.5 M
-OPT abs. level (1995): 38 M 
47%91/95
•OPT dep. (1995): 13% (-29% 91/95)
Edible Preparations
Germany Netherlands EU12
Poland • OPT absolute level in 1995: 22 M
4 274 % 91/95
• opt dependence in 1995:16 %
4 164% 91/95-
-OPT absolute level in 1995: 3 M 
-79%  91/95
-OPT dependence in 1995: % 
- 8 2 %  91/95
-OPT absolu« level in 1995:26 M 
4 17% 91/95
-OPT dependence in 1995:12%
- 5 % 91/95
Former
CS
-OPT absolute level in 1995: 10 M 
4 3163% 91/95
-OPT dependence in 1995: 38 %
4 2724 % 91/95-
-OPT absolute level in 1995: 10 M
CEEC4 -OPT absolute level in 1991: 8 M 
-OPT absolute level in 1995: 33 M
-OPT absolute level in 1991:16 M 
-OPT absolute level in 1995:3 M
-OPT abs. level (1995): 36 M 
4 50 % 91/95
-OPT dependence (1995): 10% 
4 59% 91/95
Iron & Steel
Germany France EU12
Poland - OPT absolute level in 1995: 5 M 
1 % 91/95
• opt dependence in 1995: 1 %
•OFT absolute level in 1995: -  5 M
Former
CS
-OPT absolute level in 1995: 21 M 
4 282 % 91/95
•OPT dependence n 1995: 2 %
-OPT absolute level m 1995: 2 M 
• 28%
-OPT dependence in 1995: 3 %
- 54 % 91/95
-OPT absolute level in 1995: 24 M
Hungary -OPT absolute level in 1995: 1 M 
-24% 91/95
-OPT absolute level in 1995; 3 M
CEEC4 -OPT absolute level in 1991: 11 M 
-OPT absolute level in 1995; 28 M
-OPT absolute level in 1991: 3.4 M 
-OPT absolute level in 1995: 2.3 M
-OPT abs. level (1995): 33 M 
4 111 %91/95
-OPT dependence (1995):1% 
(4 5 % )
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Printing
Germany EU12
Former
CS
-OPT absolute level in 1995: 13 M 
+ 317% 91/95
-OPT dependence in 1995: 28 %
+ 35% 91/95
-OPT absolute level in 1995: 13 M
CEEC4 -OPT absolute level in 1991:5 M 
-OPT absolute level in 1995: 13 M
•OPT aba. level (1995): 14 M 
+ 197 % 91/95
-OPT dependence (1995):16% 
+ 78% 91/95
Glassware
EU12
-OFT absolute level m 1992:9 M
-OPT aba. level (1995): 9 M 
+ 138% 91/95
-OPT dep. (1995): 1% (+41% 
91/95)
Annex 3 Panel of OPT firms interviewed in the Czech Republic and Hungary
Finns Size OPT proportion Goods
OP Prostejov 
(Prague)
6000 employees 3/4 of exports; 50% 
production.
men trousers,
jackets; women tailleurs,
skirts
Timo (Prague) 800 employees 10*12% production woman underwear, bras
ONA (Prostejov) 175 employees 1/12 production. men suits, coats
Fekon (Budapest) 1200 employees. 90% production blouses, men shirts
Elit (Budapest) 1200 employees. 70% production mainly men suits
Styl (Szombathely) 2100 employees. 90% production (wo)men jackets
CKD-EIektrotechni- 
ka (Prague)
1000 employees, 100 in 
workshop
100% medical needles
ABB Elektro Praga 
(Prague)
1130 employees. high? elec switches (wall)
Ateso (Prague) 3180 employees. very marginal car assembly
PAL (Prague) 4000 employees. 3% lot output assembly of motor
Choteborske Stro- 
jimy
5000 employees 5% metal drum for medical 
machines
CKD-Tatra (Prague) 1128 employees 3-5% total production parts for car underframe
Tesla Karlin (Prague) 1050 employees. 15% turn over man distribution, frame
TOS Hostivar 
(Prague)
550 employees. 30% grinding machines
Vilati (Budapest) 480 employees. 95% production dectr(on)ic comp.
VUOSO (Prague) 29-20 employees. 10-20% tot prod measuring system
SVUS a.s. 200 employees 90% medical drug
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Chapter 4. The Determinants of OPT between the EV and CEECs
The empirical evidence gathered in the previous Chapter paves the way for the 
systematisation and formalisation of the determinants of OFT ‘trajectories*. In the face o f the 
importance o f  the stake attached to the evolution o f OPT relations between the EU and CEECs, 
two questions need to be answered in order to identify the contribution o f  OPT to the patterns of 
economic interdependence between the EU and CEECs:
-on which factors depend the respective probabilities that EU firms terminate 
their OPT engagement in CEECs, or on the contrary that they upgrade their commitment? 
and,
-in w hich circumstances are local firms best prepared to face the strategic 
decision o f their foreign partners (i.e., taking over OPT production on their own... o r closing 
down)?
Two theoretical backgrounds have something to say on these issues: International Trade 
and International Production theories (hereafter IT and IP). W hether the former provide an 
answer as to w hy  OPT develops in CEECs, the latter are in principle ap t a t answering how  O PT 
is chosen by EU  firms to extend their activities to CEECs. However, the ‘division o f  labour* 
between these two bodies o f  theories is questionable, especially in the case o f OPT where the 
trade and the production dimensions o f this type o f m arket linkage are indivisible. The 
combination o f  IT  and IP  theories is therefore necessary.
But even com bined, the contribution o f  IT and IP  is lim ited to account for the 
development o f  OPT between the EU and CEECs, and to give a  clue as to its prospective 
evolution. As a  m atter o f  fact, there is a  series o f  factors which the previous empirical Chapters 
show to be decisive in accounting for OPT trajectories and which IP  and IT theories fail to 
acknowledge. Two o f  them  figure pre-eminently among the determ inants o f OPT: the nature o f 
the trade restriction enforced in the concerned sector, and the size o f  the partners party to an 
O PT agreem ent An alternative ad-hoc explanatory scheme is proposed to  make sense o f  them.
4 .1  On the lim ited  ap p ro p ria ten ess  o f  In te rn a tio n a l T rade theories
To see w hat International Trade theories have to say about the above OPT story, the 
present section will proceed in the following way. First contending approaches will be assessed 
w ith respect to their appropriateness in the specific case o f O PT trade between the EU and 
CEECs. Then, the lessons drawn from their predictions will be addressed.
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Market mechanisms are what economic theories of international trade are about 
Different approaches differ according to the type of mechanisms they identify. Handbooks 
traditionally distinguish between four main theoretical frameworks'27; three of them (the 
Ricardian theory, the Heckscher-Ohlin model, and the specific factor model) belong to the neo­
classical paradigm, and are the objects of long-established traditions of research. A fourth current 
emerged more recently, and is compounded of heterogeneous contributions; the common point of 
this latter strand of researches is that they all depart from the assumption of perfect 
competition.11* Finally, mention should be made of the neotechnology approaches to international 
trade; they consist o f two different versions, the technology gap model (Posner, 1961), and the 
product cycle model (Vernon, 1966). These latter approaches are more like empirical 
generalisations of the world economy than properly predictive theories [Harris, 1992:30].
Overall, in the present state of knowledge, two broad sets of determinants are considered 
to give rise to trade flows: comparative advantages and economies of scale. The question arises 
as to which of these market mechanisms underpin OPT trade between CEECs and Western 
Europe. Clearly, the question comprises two dimensions; the selection between contending 
models of international trade has to be done on the basis of their respective pertinence, first, 
concerning the particular case of CEECs* foreign trade, and second, taking into consideration the 
specific features of OPT.
7. The explanatory power o f International Trade theories: generalities.
The basic opposition between comparative advantages and economies of scale as a 
source of trade flows rests on the fundamental antagonism concerning the issue as to whether it 
is differences or, on the contrary, similarities between economies that cause trade. The 
proponents of the first view consider international differences in factor costs to be a crucial 
determinant of trade; comparative advantages materialise because of either technological 
differences, or distinct factor endowments (hence the two versions of the "factor cost" theory, the 
Ricardian model and the Heckscher-OIhin theorem). As to the second paradigm, it developed 
more recently, in response to empirical evidence showing the intensity of trade between
m See Learner, in Greenaway, and Winters, (1994:68).
m Two main sets of research programmes that deal with imperfect competition can be distinguished: the 
current concerned with strategic trade behaviours (so-called strategic trade theories), and that addressing 
the phenomena of intra-industry trade. A seminal work taking account of imperfect competition is 
Krugman (1979). Models that pioneered tackling product differentiation as an explanation for intra­
industry trade are: Dixit, and Stigliu (1977), Lancaster (1979). As to strategic trade theories, one of the 
first model was proposed by Brander and Spencer in 1984.
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industrialised countries, despite their being characterised by similar factor endowments. Intra­
industry trade, caused by economies of scale, and product differentiation, was identified as the 
explanation of such an anomaly in regard to traditional theories 
[Greenaway, 1987:29].
A steady flow of research feeds the debate over the respective suitability of these various 
theoretical models for accounting for actual flows. Although it is characterised by serious 
shortcomings, the Heckscher-Ohlin model (HO) has been, and is still "regarded as one of the 
triumph of economic thought (...)" [Balance, 1988: 6]. From an epistemological viewpoint, it is 
indeed interesting to note the long-lasting supremacy of the neo-classical school of international 
trade. The model resisted several assaults, whether under the form of internal critique (the 
’Leontief Paradox*19), or resulting from external challenge (the acknowledged existence of intra­
industry trade1*). It is not until the end of the 70s that the fame of the HO model started to be 
eroded; alternative paradigms could finally be taken seriously, and the so-called "new theories" 
of international trade take off.* 131 *3 In the meantime, the neotechnological approaches to 
international trade, because they lack sound theoretical underpinnings, they are easily dismissed; 
but they had the merit of drawing attention to more 'data-oriented* considerations.
Models of international trade have all, to different extent, undergone several empirical 
testing. The HO model is probably one of the preferred candidate with resulting conclusions 
inevitably contradicting each others. One of the most definitive study on the matter is given in 
the in-depth study of E. Learner, published in 1984.152 On the basis of a rigorous theoretical 
formulation of the theorem1”, he applied the proposition to the trade flows of around 60 countries 
between 1958 and 1975. Eleven sources of comparative advantage were tested (ranging from
mLeontief found that the factor content of US exports in 1947 was more labour-intensive relative to capital 
than US imports (Leontief, 1954). Referring to skilled labour is the most common way to overcome the 
'difficulty'. Learner (1980) notes that Leontief misapplied the factor content version of the HO theorem in 
that he kept separate the computation of the factor content of exports and imports (in Greenaway, Winters, 
1994: 74).
■* It is, indeed, interesting to note that intra-industry trade is not necessarily a recent phenomena. On the 
basis of French trade data going back the 19th century, Messeriin and Becuwe conclude that intra-industry 
trade 'tends to be a rather permanent feature of trade flows between industrialised countries' (Messeriin, 
Becuwe, 1986: 196). However, intra-industry trade was "discovered** in 1975 in a seminal book by Grubel 
and Lloyd.
131 Adopting lakatosian conceptual tools, Macgovem (1994) offers an explanation that goes as follows: 
there had been early attempts to account for imperfect competition (by Joan Robinson, or Chamberlin as 
soon ns 1933); however, they were doomed to fail as they were introduced in a so-called "progressive" 
phase of the neo-classical research programme (roughly corresponding to Samuelson's influence). Instead, 
the "degenerative" phase o f the research programme favoured creative shifts, and greater attention paid to 
empirical evidence. Macgovem explains in this way how the model of Lovasy (1941) was only taken over 
by Krugman and Lancaster in 1979, and 1980 respectively.
131 Another ambitious survey was undertaken by the UNIDO in 1986. Here again, the findings confirm the 
overall philosophy of the notion of comparative advantage applied to international trade flows.
I33namely, the 'factor-content' version of the theorem, whose precursor was Vanek in 1968.
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natural resources, unskilled labour, research and development, to physical capital). Overall, he 
finds that,
•/
"the main current of international trade is well understood in terms of the abundance of a
remarkably limited list of resources" [Learner, 1984: 16].
Empirically testing models that deal with trade Hows under imperfect competition is 
particularly delicate a task. There is, indeed, a specific difficulty in testing intra-industry trade 
models due to the often casual relation between theory and data [Learner, 1994: 84], It is, 
therefore, probably too early for an appraisal of their adequacy in describing actual trade flows.
In the debate over the respective merit of the various theories of international trade, 
using empirical testing to claim the superiority of a model over the others once for all is, at best, 
vain. Learner, for example, insists that rather than testing, and asking whether a theory is 'true', it 
is the accuracy and the usefulness of a model that should be assessed [Learner, 1994: 66]. Titus, 
rather than purporting the universal validity of a model, one should focus on how best to combine 
the different explanatory frameworks, choosing them according to the empirical case under 
scrutiny [Greenaway, and Milner, 1987: 27]. Interestingly enough, Greenaway (1991: 157) 
evokes a 'paradigm specialisation' by country, thereby the HO model, as well as the Ricardian 
model are -implicitly or not- considered to be particularly appropriate for explaining the foreign 
trade of developing countries, whereas models assuming imperfect competition are reserved for 
the developed market economies.
2, International trade theories in the case o f CEECs'foreign trade
In the name of this division of labour between theories, the HO theorem seems to be 
particularly pertinent in the case of Central and Eastern European foreign trade. In HO terms, 
trade occurs because of differences of factor endowments; it is therefore between economies 
which are most dissimilar that HO trade is most likely to occur11*. The argument can be applied to 
East-West relations, as the period of centralised allocation that CEECs underwent stamped their 134*
134 Learner distinguishes 3 different types of tests: 1) the factor content studies to which the famous 
Leontief paradox belongs, 2) studies regressing the trade data of a country on the characteristics of the 
trade commodities (cross-section regression), and 3) tests implicitly inferring factors' intensity from the 
relation between trade and factor endowment in a cross-country analysis, the latter being adopted by 
Learner.
,35In strict theoretical terms, however, countries should not be too dissimilar for trade to take place between 
them: their factor endowment should lie in the same 'cone of diversification'.
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production structure, as well as their level of development, rendering them significantly different 
from their immediate western neighbours.
But this is not sufficient for ruling out economies-of-scale approaches. Indeed, several 
studies have emphasised the growing role of intra-industry trade also in South-South, and even 
North-South trade.13* Whereas intra-industry trade between developed economies mainly occurs 
in differentiated products, intra-industry trade between developing countries and developed 
economies is attributable to the shipping of intermediate products participating in the 
internationalisation of production; this latter type of trade clearly corresponds to the OFT 
features.
Thus a 'paradigm specialisation' is at best insufficient for choosing the relevant theory in 
the case of CEECs trade. Other discriminating considerations need to be added.
Another criteria for appraising which theoretical framework best suits the case of 
CEECs* foreign trade, has to do with the fact that CEECs participate in a regional integration 
process. Indeed, it is often presumed that preferential, as opposed to multilateral, trade 
liberalisation is more likely to bring about intra-industry specialisation rather than inter-industry 
reallocation. The case for a  causal relation between intra-industry trade and the liberalisation of 
trade in a regional context mainly rests on empirical findings, starting with the example of the 
European integration and its subsequent outburst of -unforeseen- intra-industry trade [Grubel, 
Lloyd, 1975; 133]. These findings were confirmed empirically in the case of other regional 
arrangements [Greenaway, 19S9: 31]. On the basis of Latin American trade data, Balassa 
(1979b), for example, was able to generalise the proposition of a positive relation between intra­
industry trade and regional liberalisation of trade in the case of developing countries; moreover, 
he fully acknowledged and investigated the possibility of intra-industry trade between developed 
and developing countries, which gives rise to horizontal,, as well as vertical specialisation1*1. 
However, following such empirical explorations, no real formal explanation was provided.
More recently, the validity of the relation tended to be qualified, if not questioned. 
Milner (1990), for example, gives only mild evidence of the impact of regional trade 
liberalisation on the development of intra-industry trade: it might very well be that trade 
liberalisation gives simultaneously rise to inter- and intra-industry specialisation. Greenaway 
(1989: 32) agrees that discriminatory trade liberalisation does not per se stimulates the growth of 
intra-industry trade. He rather puts the stress on the characteristics of *pre-union market 
structures' (overlapping demands) as well as features usually associated with regional integration, *37
13*See for example, Balassa, (1979), and Greenaway, (1991:166).
l37Intra-industry horizontal specialisation corresponds to the shipping of similar goods, but which are of 
distinct quality. Vertical specialisation involves the international exchange of goods in the view of 
processing them, and corresponds therefore to OPT.
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such as the free movement of production factors and capital (fostering intra-finn trade whether 
horizontally or vertically1", and recorded as intra-industry trade).
Overall, it seems sensible to acknowledge a correlation between regional integration and 
intra-industry trade. A direct causal relation might be usefully softened by time considerations; in 
the long run, intra-industry trade follows from the process of regional integration and is rather to 
be considered as a  criteria for evaluating how deep integration really is.“* In the case of Central 
and Eastern European countries, one might argue that, intra-industry trade theories will provide a 
pertinent framework for analysis as time passes by, and the structure of the respective economies 
converge. For the moment, traditional tools prove to be more adequate. Thus a widely 
acknowledged conclusion is that if a theoretical model is to be chosen among the IT paradigm for 
accounting for CEECs* foreign trade with the EU, then it is the HO model which is the most 
suitable one.
3. International trade theories in the case o f OPT trade
The question is now to determine whether the HO model is also the most appropriate 
model to be used in the specific case of OFT trade. An important feature of OFT which rises 
some controversy in this respect is that it is quite akin to intra-industry trade. First, as a most 
direct evidence, OPT brings about a two-way trade which is most often classified within the 
same category of the Combined Nomenclature at 2-digit level. Moreover, OFT corresponds 
clearly to a sub-category of Intra-Industry Trade (hereafter IIT) as identified ty  those very 
scholars who pioneered the study of IIT. Grubel and Lloyd (1975: 114-8), for example, mention 
the case of the processing activities of multinational enterprises (goods are sent abroad to 
undergo processing before being imported back) as a source of IIT. Such processing activities are 
considered by other early scholars of IIT as a fully-fledged category classified in the typology of 
the different types of IIT. Gray (1973) describes it as belonging to category HC \  i.e., IIT in 
components, whereas Helleiner (1973) provides number of examples of commodities involved in 
assembly activities abroad as an illustration of the rise of IIT. Finally, Willmore (1979) 
distinguishes between 3 distinct kinds of heterogeneous goods that give rise to IIT specialisation: 
goods produced with the same machines and skills, but belonging to different and narrow ranges 
of product lines, goods with different factor input requirements, and differentiated goods *15
'"Pomfret (1986) argues that vertical intra-firm trade is the principal explanation of recorded intra-industry 
trade. Quoted in Greenaway (1989:34).
15*The extent of intra-industry trade can also be considered to be an indicator of the level of development of 
a country. Balassa and Bauwens, for example, established the existence of a positive correlation between 
the level of income of a country, and the proportion of intra-industry trade in its total foreign trade. 
(Balassa, Bauwens, 1988).
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exchanged between monopolistic competitors; the second category corresponding to processing 
activities.
Interestingly enough, mention is often made of the specific custom regime contained in 
the US Tariff Schedule under which import duties are levied only on the value added abroad.* 1* 
The above-mentioned studies use the trade data resulting horn this specific custom treatment as 
evidence of intra-firm trade (this is almost taken for granted in Gray, 1973, Helleiner, 1973; 
Grubel and Lloyd, 1975; and Helleiner, 1981). Helleiner (1973)W1 for example uses the above- 
mentioned American customs figures as evidence of the extending reach of US multinational 
firms' activities. Balassa, on the contrary, notes that vertical (as well as horizontal) specialisation 
is not necessarily of an intra-firm nature. He goes even further, and actually stresses the 
declining importance of US multinationals for organising the vertical integration of production 
processes on an international scale; in turn, the symmetric increasing role of contractual 
agreements shows the growing independence of US partners abroad1* [Balassa, 1979b: 261-65].
In general, it appears that scholars concerned with IIT paid particular attention to the 
American counterpart of OPT in the 60s and 70s. What is of interest here, is whether this kind of 
IIT is considered to require departure, or even refutation of traditional theories of international 
trade. The answer is more or less unanimous, and well summarised in Grubel and Lloyd (1975): 
the development of processing activities invites traditional theories to take account of 2 factors 
previously ignored, namely the role of transport costs, and that of information in determining 
trade patterns. For the rest, however,
"international assembly and finishing, which give rise to intra-industry trade because they 
involve the import and export of goods which often are reported in the same statistical 
category, are consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin model since they represent the 
exploitation of comparative advantage in the production of certain services." [Grubel, 
Lloyd, 1975:118].
Various studies have indeed endeavoured to establish the validity o f the HO model in the 
case of trade in intermediate goods. Jones (1980), for example, tackles the case of production 
with a footloose factor which is exchanged on international markets. In doing so, he stresses the 
importance of absolute, alongside comparative advantages in determining production patterns. 
However, he is mainly concerned with the conditions to attract the footloose factor, whereas the
'* Items 806.30 and 807.00 of the old US Tariff Schedule. See Pan I.
Ml Quoted in Balassa, (1979b).
1‘° Interestingly enough, Balassa considers that this process is hindered in Europe, due to the more 
restrictive character of the trade legislation pertaining to international processing activities.
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output is simply considered to be geared to the national market10 Two other models (Sanyal, 
1980; and Dixit and Grossman, \9S2)* 144 use the notion of comparative advantage to answer the 
question as to which "middle-products” a country does import and which it does export in a 
vertical production structure with many stages. Caves and Jones (1993: 165) further warrant that 
"the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem proves valuable for explaining which production processes have 
gravitated to the Newly Industrialising Countries". Overall, in strict theoretical terms, the 
introduction of intermediate goods does not alter the conclusions of the HO theorem.
4. On the prospect o f OPT in CEECsfrom the viewpoint o f International Trade theories
Among many potential candidate theories of International Trade, the notion of 
comparative advantage, and its formalisation in the Heckscher-Ohlin model seem to be the most 
pertinent paradigm in the case of OPT between the EU and CEECs. This is because of the 
differences in the level of development of the two areas under scrutiny, and because of the OPT 
contribution to the progressive liberalisation of exchanges between these two areas. Put simply, 
the HO theory affirms that a country enjoys a comparative advantage in (and therefore will 
export) the good whose production is relatively intensive in the factor with which that country is 
relatively well endowed [Jones, 1979: 5], Thus, one might expect that the trade specialisation 
(and division of labour) resulting from OPT will take place along the lines of comparative 
advantages.
The argument put forward by an HO approach to OPT develops in a straightforward 
manner. As CEECs are characterised by a comparative advantage based on cheap labour as 
suggested by the empirical analysis of CEECs’ comparative advantages of Chapter 2, CEECs’ 
exports consist logically of labour-intensive goods. This is indeed in perfect harmony with OPT 
patterns of trade which fit particularly well in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. A rough analysis of 
Czech OPT trade shows that indeed the relation between the three variables considered by the 
HO theorem (factor abundance, factor intensity, and trade) complies with the predictions of the 
model. Indeed, being in their vast majority labour-intensive, the products concerned by OPT 
operations are of an "heckscher-ohlinian" nature, i.e., based on cheap labour which is the 
comparative advantage currently characterising CEECs economies. It is therefore natural that 
these OPT goods lie in the specialisation area of the CEECs economies, which, on the basis of
l4i In Sanyal and Jones (1982), an extended version of the model is proposed that splits goods into two 
different sets: the input and the output tiers; but here again, outputs are not supposed to be re-exported.
144 Quoted in Jones and Neary (1982: 36).
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the wage differential with their trade partners, can be considered to be relatively well endowed 
with labour.
The case of OPT trade in the Textile and Clothing industry is particularly interesting in 
that it can be easily kept track of the path followed by the- goods involved in OPT transactions. 
The pattern is clean from any of the EU member states, imports for OPT are generally much 
higher in the textile sector than in the clothing sector. On the contrary, exports after OPT are 
massively concentrated in the clothing sector, with a stronger polarisation between textile and 
clothing. German firms, for example, export temporarily man-made staple fibres (heading 55 of 
the Combined Nomenclature), cotton (52), wool (51), man-made filaments (54)... and import 
back almost exclusively articles of apparels not knitted or crocheted (heading 62 of the CN). The 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory is particularly adequate to account for such a pattern as the textile 
industry is commonly more capital-intensive than the clothing industry.141 *It makes sense, 
therefore, that EU members who are more competitive in the capital and technology-intensive 
textile goods export the latter and re-import back labour-intensive apparels.
Hence the fundamental conclusion achieved by the application of the HO theory to the 
OPT case: if OPT trade takes place along the lines of a comparative advantage based on labour, 
then as wages increase ... OPT trade is to decrease.
5. Limitations
Such a conclusion is far too simplistic to account for quite a complex reality. In fact, it 
needs to be qualified, modified, adapted ... and eventually; perhaps, even rejected.
Theoretical Critical Assessment
The HO approach is first characterised by serious shortcomings which are of a very 
theoretical nature. Hence a critique of the model from ‘within*, convincingly put forward by 
alternative IT approaches. Two of them are of particular relevance in the case of the issues at 
stake in OPT trade.
141 In the industrialised countries' clothing industries, labour costs account for 35-40% of total costs
compared to 12-16% in the textile industries. See Graziani, (1994:12).
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a) the static bias of the Heckscher-Ohlin model
One serious shortcoming of the HO model for the present purpose, is that comparative 
advantage is a static notion: the HO model claims to explain trade patterns at a point in time, not 
to predict future trends. In this respect, it is interesting, in passing to note the irony of the above* 
mentioned paradigm specialisation thereby the very static HO is reserved to developing 
countries. Overall there is only little possibility to remedy the situation if one is to stick to an 
approach in strict IT terms.
There are of course alternative models which attempt to tackle time issues, but they have 
only little relevance in the case of OPT. For example, the popular Product Cycle model’s primary 
objective is to account for innovation, by predicting trade patterns without resorting to the notion 
of comparative advantage [Vernon, 1966]'". New products are first launched on domestic 
markets (usually characterised by strong demand, and high wage levels), irrespective of 
questions of cost; they then mature and start to be exported as demand arises also abroad; finally, 
their production process become standardised, and can be relocated where labour costs are more 
favourable. Apart from the paucity of empirical evidence validating such a model1", the problem 
as far as OPT is concerned, is that the latter does not account for trade in intermediary products. 
Its inadequacy in dealing with OPT is therefore straightforward.
Thus, the only (compromise) solution consists in adopting the HO model as a starting 
point, and complementing it with dynamic considerations. Future trends are indeed commonly 
merely inferred from current comparative ad"*ntages, even if this is clearly an usurpation of the 
theory.“* Theoretically sounder, Balassa (1979) proposed the ’’stage-approach" to comparative 
advantage. He relates changes in comparative advantage to changes in factor endowments, and 
considers that the structure of exports changes in line with the accumulation of physical and 
human capital. Eventually, comparative advantages move along a scale going from the most 
labour-intensive products to the most capital-intensive goods. In simple terms, the question is 
therefore to determine whether the referred economies arc characterised by hidden or latent 
assets, like a skilled workforce for example. The Asian Newly Industrialised Countries (and 
Japan at an earlier stage) are often considered to be cases in point in this respect, as comparative 
advantages shifted away from unskilled labour intensive products to more capital and technology 14
144 The two approaches, HO and PCM, can nevertheless be combined.
147 See on the matter Vernon, (1979).
lm Tuong and Yeats (1980: 526), for example, use a historical analysis to justify the extrapolation of the 
future trade patterns of Developing countries from their actual endowment in labour. They computed the 
labour intensities of the best performing exports of a sample of Developing countries, and found that 
"labour intensity provide (...) a very useful guide to products in which the LDCs make their best 
performance". On the basis of another series of computation determining that labour-intensive products 
have become even more so over the interval 1965-1976, they conclude that labour intensity is indeed a 
good indicator of future trends.
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intensive goods.14* As far as OPT is concerned, the lessons to be drawn horn such theoretical 
developments are clean will the factor endowment of the CEECs economies upgrade, yielding a 
lower labour content of trade; and if yes, with what impact on OPT trade?
b) the complexity of patterns of comparative advantages in presence of intermediate
goods
Even more challenging is the treatment made by HO of trade in intermediate goods. 
Indeed, the formalisation of semi-finished goods into the model present above is itself rather 
delicate. What is more, none of the mentioned attempts strictly correspond to the OPT features. 
Their shortcoming is that they adopt a view in which products undergo a continuum of 
processing stages. The circularity proper to OPT trade is therefore not taken into consideration. 
However intuitive or formally justified, the extension of the HO model to intermediate goods w ill 
be taken for granted. On the face of it, it seems more sensible to state that countries "specialise in 
a particular stage of internationalised production process which corresponds, in terms of factor 
intensity, to their relative factor endowment" [Nagarajan, 1995].
Taking account of the importance of intermediate goods in international trade flows 
entails consequences that, actually, go beyond the question of their difficult formalisation within 
the HO model. In the words of Ballance,
"patterns of trade and product specialisation entail much more than the processing of 
indigenous raw materials into final goods which are either consumed at home or 
exported. Instead, they are highly interdependent processes whereby some countries 
produce and export raw materials to others, which process the materials into 
intermediate products for export to third countries for yet further processing. The degree 
of interdependence, the number of processing stages, and the international location of 
these stages will vary among industries” [Ballance, 1988: 16]1J*.
International vertical chains of production processes can indeed, overlap, in association 
with intricate patterns of comparative advantages. As a result, the simple predictions of the HO 
model, for which two trading partners are defined by well-determined comparative advantages, 
are obscured. Even more importantly, Ballance's apparently innocent remark suggests that 
countries do not specialise so much in products, but rather in stages of production. Lassudrie- 
Duchene (1982), for example, corroborates this view; his starting point is the notion of *0
,4* There is however contradicting empirical evidence. In Ballance, Ansari, and Singer (1982), for example, 
countries were classified into 4 groups according to their level of development Indicators of their 
comparative advantage were then compared, but no sequential pattern could be detected. Quoted in 
Ballance (1988:19).
li0 Emphasis added.
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"International Division of the Production Process", whereas the notion of comparative advantage 
comes only second, as an explanatory factor for the location of the different stages.
If one goes to the bottom of this stream of reasoning, it appears that the markets of two 
trading partners are maybe not the only relevant units of analysis for capturing international trade 
flows in intermediate goods. In fact, the organisation of the production process differs according 
to the industry considered. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that the division of the 
production process is organised within the network of firms participating to the 
internationalisation o f production. This implies that comparative advantages are not the only 
determinants of trade patterns; firms' internalisation strategies, as well as industry characteristics, 
are also important factors. In other terms, the point is reached where theories of International 
Production, dealing with organisational factors as well as market forces, have to take over a 
trade-centred analysis.“'
Inadequacy in the case of OPT
If it is defensible to believe that OPT trade takes place along the lines of CEECs* 
comparative advantages. Such a view nevertheless bypasses two fundamental features of OPT, 
its 'quasi intra-firm1 nature, and the fact that it owes its existence to the presence of trade 
barriers.
It would be indeed quite naive to believe that it is comparative advantages 'per se’ which 
are the determinants of OPT. In fact, out of a peculiar irony, OPT trade takes place along the 
lines of comparative advantages... because this is where trade protection is. In other terms, OPT 
trade develops where policy makers think CEECs’ comparative advantages lie. That OPT trade 
develops effectively along the lines of comparative advantages as defined by neo-liberal IT 
theories simply shows that policy-makers have a good command of their IT textbook.
More generally, the OPT example shows that the mode and the speed of trade 
liberalisation have a direct influence on the patterns of trade specialisation. Rather than ‘taking 
place along the lines of CEECs comparative advantages’ as intended in a conventional IT 
perspective, OPT trade is determined by the structure of trade protection still in place between 
the EU and CEECs. Of course, the fundamental rationale of OPT trade is to take advantage of 
low labour costs, but OPT primarily develops where there are trade barriers dissuading local 
producers to penetrate Community markets on their own, while motivating EU firms to take 
advantage of the beneficial treatment reserved to them.
1,1 in the International Production terminology, the internalisation advantage is to be combined with the 
locational advantage. The OLI paradigm developed by Dunning (1979) is addressed in the following 
section.
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This is in sharp contrast with the view defended by Milner« according to whom 'man* 
made' factors i.e., the form of trade liberalisation, does not significantly bear upon trade patterns 
in the long run [Milner, 1988]. We are in fact closer to the view defended by Bonus and Tyson 
according to which comparative advantages are ‘created’, even though it does not pinpoint the 
process of trade liberalisation as an instrument to create such comparative advantages [Krugman, 
1986].
In short the correspondence between OPT trade, CEECs* comparative advantages, and 
trade barriers is no coincidence.
This brings us to a second drawback of an IT approach arising from its neglect of 
corporate variables. It is one thing to determine potential poles around which CEECs foreign 
trade in general and OPT trade in particular is likely to develop; but the question of the actual 
beneficiaries of such potentials requires a separate answer, if not an alternative approach. Indeed, 
adopting markets as a relevant unit of analysis is not apt at answering the how and the ‘cui bono* 
questions of OPT. Even if it is at arm’s length, the fact that OPT transactions take place within a 
networks of firms linked by an agreement is crucial in this respect As a matter of fact it is clear 
that CEECs* comparative advantages are exploited through OPT by foreign partners and at the 
expense of local firms’ independent exports.
The present study thus complements the view of those who maintain that the Community 
deliberately erected trade barriers where CEECs have a comparative advantage. Indeed, EU 
policy-makers also use trade liberalisation through a discriminatory handling of the removal of 
trade barriers of which OPT is nothing but an example. The process of trade liberalisation 
depicted in Chapter 2, is thus an important factor determining where and how (by whom) 
potential CEECs assets can be exploited. In this respect, the OPT legislative features appear to 
be a powerful factor favouring Western firms at the expense of local producers* independent 
exports.
Overall, the fact that OPT trade takes place within a network o f firms is very likely to 
blur the seemingly irreducible conclusion according to which wage increases will be fatal to OPT 
trade. In a formal way, actually, the statistical evidence presented in Chapter 3 gives credit to 
such a conclusion: OPT trade, as a rule of thumbs is indeed decreasing. But it was argued that 
decreasing OPT trends conceal a fundamental indeterminacy: do they correspond to the 
withdrawal of foreign partners, or on the contrary to the upgrading of OPT agreements into more 
durable and equal partnerships? It is important to distinguish between the two cases as indeed, 
the consequences in terms of local development and for the regional division of labour are 
completely different In other terms, acknowledging the fact that OPT is the product of firms 
decision rather than mere transactions taking place between markets characterised by different
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factor endowments is likely to make more complex the actual determinants of OPT and its likely 
consequences.
»
In conclusion, the fundamental shortcoming of the notion of comparative advantages 
(and of IT approaches in general) for accounting for OPT is that the it fails to acknowledge the 
connection between firms’ international production activities and international trade flows. This 
is quite a serious drawback in a world economy where a growing proportion of international 
trade is due to firms’ international production activities.'* We would thus give credit to the first 
part of Learner’s prediction according to whom
"the biggest story of the next decade will be the economic integration of the high-wage 
industrialized countries with the low-wage developing countries, and Heckscher-Ohlin is 
the model of choice" [CEPR, 1994: 34]153
... and dismiss the rest
4.2 On the partial relevance of International Production theories
The conclusion achieved by an approach in IT terms is that it is necessary to bring into 
the picture the network of firms within which OPT takes place: OPT is indeed a matter of firms' 
decision. Although highly diversified. International Production theories ask the question as to 
how (and to a lesser extent where and when"*) national firms decide to go abroad. It is thus 
natural to turn to them to see what they have to say on the specific OPT strategy. It might be, 
however, that rather than providing with a complete, and ready-made explanatory pattern for 
OPT, the exercise will display some of the weaknesses of IP theories. *134
ia Hence the fundamental bias of most of the studies addressing the development of CEECs foreign trade, 
which fail to distinguish between ‘normal’ flows and temporary OPT exchanges.
333 See also Alasdair Smith in Greenaway and Winters (1994: 43).
1,4 This is valid for the so-called neo-technological theories of the 60s, of which Vernon's product cycle 
theory is an outstanding example.
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ƒ. Earlier theoretical developments and the study of internalisation
International Production theories form a disparate set of various theoretical 
contributions. Perhaps as a reflection of the complexity of the object they describe, they are 
highly diversified and sometimes hardly complementary. Different strands correspond to the 
different theoretical backgrounds they come from. For example, internalisation theories draw on 
the traditional theory of the firm based on the Coasian distinction between Ann and market 
Alternatively, the school initiated by S. Hymer and his seminal dissertation owes much of its 
substance to Industrial Organisation concepts.
Dunning's merit consists in bringing together the various contributions in an 
appropriately named 'eclectic' framework for analysis'”. Briefly summarised, the argument goes 
as follows: a firm invests abroad when it has an 'ownership' advantage at its disposal that it can 
internalise [Dunning, 1979]. Ownership advantages can be of various sorts: deriving from the 
privileged possession of an income-generating asset; enjoyed by a branch firm as compared to a 
greenfield plant; resulting from geographical diversification’”. As to internalisation advantages, 
they arise either from risk, from the ability of firms to exploit economies of scale, or, 
alternatively, from the existence of a benefit associated with the transaction which cannot be 
taken into account in an externalised form [Dunning, 1988].1” The ownership and internalisation 
advantages CO' and 'O  answer the how’ question of international production theories, i.e., which 
is the best route for servicing foreign markets. Finally, locational advantages CL1), explain where 
international production activities will take place, i.e., where firm-, and country-specific 
advantages match. This latter series is in common with (if not directly taken over from) 
international trade theories; the only difference is that, when combined with the two other 
determinants of international production, they allow for introducing government intervention, as 
well as the existence of intermediate goods (...).
Applying the eclectic theory in the case of non-equity forms of international production 
requires first, to understand the rationale underlying the internalisation decision then, the reasons 
why firms did not actually resort to internalisation. There are two distinct sets of factors bringing 
about internalisation. Buckley and Casson, who were the first to make an explicit association 
between the notion of internalisation and that of market imperfections in an international context, 13
133 One of the first formulation of the 'eclectic' paradigm is in Dunning, (1979).
In Dunning, (1976), quoted in Dunning (1988).
I5T More detailed reasons to internalise are given in Dunning's 1979 paper. There are 6 of them: to reduce 
transaction costs, avoid paying the selling firm price; to gain advantage over a competitor, to exploit or 
protect against government intervention; to protect specific property rights: to make a better use of 
capacities or overheads. It is worth noting that according to Dunning, the propensity to internalise varies 
with the concerned industries, and the country of origin.
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adopt a Coasian approach: there are imperfections on markets of intermediate products resulting 
from transaction costs which explain why firms resort to vertical international integration 
[Buckley» Casson, 1976] 15‘. Instead, Hymer's interpretation of internalisation has more to do with 
market power than with intrinsic market inefficiency: by internalising, certain (big) firms are in a 
position to raise barriers to entry on the markets, thus generating a rent1* This second approach 
is more appropriate to address the horizontal dimension of international integration.1“ Beyond 
this distinction, determinants of internalisation have broadly to do with market failure s.,4lThe 
choice of the most appropriate vehicle for international production (foreign direct investment or 
licensing) is mainly made on the basis of firm-specific assets: internalisation is not necessary 
when these latter are "easily identified and vested in exclusive and freely transferable property 
rights" [Buckley, Casson, 1985: 52].'® Other related factors are relevant, such as the degree of 
standardisation of the concerned products, and the extent of the segmentation of the markets for 
goods and factors [Rugman].,M A last important factor favouring non-equity forms of 
international production, consists of obstacles to internalisation erected by government policy 
[Oman, 1984].
Overall, in the eclectic paradigm, the account of non-equity forms of international 
production, is relatively neglected. The reason is ultimately ascribable to the conditions under 
which IP theories were bom. As a matter of fact, the raison d’être of IP theories is the refutation 
of the basic assumption of IT theories, i.e., the immobility of production factors: as opposed (in 
addition) to a world where only goods are mobile, the IP paradigm is interested in the possibility 
of capital transfers. Removing the unrealistic assumption of capital immobility is indeed a 
necessary step toward a more faithful account of the world economy1*4; the problem is that almost 
by reaction, international production activities tackled by IP theories thus tend to become
lJI Interestingly enough, they also mention the cost associated with internalisation.
'* See Dunning and Rugman (1985), as well asTecce (1985).
140 See also Caves, (1971).
141 In a refined version of the eclectic theory, Dunning brings the 2 categories of ownership advantages 
together and identifies asset advantages (Oa) and transaction advantages (Ot); whereas asset advantages 
are likely to form a structural and country-specific category, the latter is more firm-specific. See Dunning 
(1983), quoted in Dunning (1988).
lo This approach is in contrast to the earlier theories of 'internationalisation' which rather adopt a stage 
approach to the various modalities of foreign involvement: because going abroad is considered to be risky 
in itself, a firm will start to explore foreign markets through the less demanding form of involvement, 
namely licensing. It will subsequently increase the degree of its commitment, and eventually end up 
investing capital. See the description of Pcrlmutter's views in Rugman, (1980).
Wï In addition, financial tools can be adopted. See, for example, Hirsch (1976) who weight the different 
possibilities on the basis of their respective *nct present value'. As to Contractor (1984), he considers the 
'appropriability' of the margins extractable form the various forms of international production, and 
ponders their respective risk-adjusted 'net present values’.
'“ Mundell (1957)
136
synonymous with integration.1“ Hence the opposition between international trade theories 
dealing with market transactions, and international production theories in charge of transactions 
talcing place within firms.
The result is that intermediate forms of international production hardly fit in such a rigid 
division of labour between IT and IP. As illustrated by the above analysis, the only way to 
address non-equity co-operation is in second-best terms: being internalised transactions optimal 
forms of international production, incomplete integration might nevertheless be justified when 
the former are not necessary or difficult to achieve.1** But as a  rule o f thumbs, it is considered 
that a higher degree of control results from integration, which in turn brings about higher returns 
[Anderson and Gatignon, 1986]'". What is more, the mere opposition licensing / investing1** is 
obviously insufficient to account for the variety of international production forms [Stopford, 
Strange, 1991: 67]. This shortcoming is itself related to the failure of the theory to acknowledge 
distinct objectives of international production.1**
2. Approaches to non-equity forms o f international production activities
In response to converging empirical evidence, renewed attempts to address the question 
of co-operative ventures considered the latter to form a fully-fledged category between market 
and hierarchy. Two empirical developments in the world economy eroded the centrality of the 
notion of internalisation1*4, putting increasing strain on traditional 2nd best approaches.
145 Tellingly, Dunning defines international production as the production which is "financed by foreign 
direct investment and undertaken by multinational enterprises" (Dunning, 1988:1).
1M In the IP literature, licensing is considered to be almost always more expensive than internalisation: 
because of the danger of knowledge dissipation, and because of the difficulty of the two partners to agree 
on a price. This is so also because of the important 'policing' costs associated with the enforcement of 
contracts (see Buckley, Casson, 1985: S3). As to Contractor, he identifies 4 categories of costs higher 
when licensing: sunk research costs, general administration cost, marketisation costs, and opportunity 
costs (1984).
ttT Interestingly enough, Anderson and Gatignon evoke briefly the possibility that control can be secured by 
other means than integration (Anderson, Gatignon, 1986).
'** Three ways of "servicing foreign markets" are taken into consideration in the early IP literature: FDI, 
licensing, and exports.
144 One attempt to connect the analysis of how firms go abroad to the question of why they do so is 
provided by Dunning's typology of the different objectives pursued by firms embarking on international 
production which has been widely taken over in the rest of the literature: firms that go abroad may be 
resources seeking, market seeking, or efficiency seeking (see Dunning, 1979 and 1988). The problem is 
that Dunning does not go into the details as to how the weight of the 3 OU determinants varies according 
to the different motives for international production. These latter are clearly not the main concern of the 
theory. See Section 3.
170See Michalet's arguments on the development of a contractual phase in the process of globalisation 
(Michalet, 1991).
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First, the recognition in the 1970s of so-called "New Forms of Investment" (NFIs)'”. 
These consist of Joint Ventures, licensing agreements, management contracts, franchising, 
turnkey agreement, ’product-in-hand' contracts, production-sharing and risk-service contracts, 
and last but not least, international sub-contracting [Oman, 1988: 8 3 4 ] There is something 
'new* about this first wave, but what exactly, is not completely clear. Oman evokes the sudden 
growing importance of co-operative ventures in the relatively un traditional setting formed by the 
developing countries [Oman, 1988: 384J. In this view, what Germidis call ’non-investment'1” 
responds to the complementary objectives of the host states and the investing firms: to secure 
technology and access to markets while preserving sovereignty on the one hand, and to min imise 
risks taken in an uncertain environment on the other hand."4
A second wave of contractual agreements was identified In the 80s as the development 
of "co-operative ventures" [Contractor, Lorange, 1988] or "cross-border non-equity collaborative 
venture". As opposed to the NFI of the 70s, this second wave is more clearly innovative. To the 
list of forms previously identified, are added alliances between multinationals that pool resource 
in areas such as R&D ... m. The setting for this development, this time, is the developed 
economies of the Northern hemisphere. Such new types of co-operation agreements tend to occur 
between firms of similar production profile and size, which are, so to speak, on a more equal 
footing; they often take place in order to rationalise the activities of firms that go global 
[Contractor, Lorange, 1988:?]. Of course, the development of strategic alliances and to a lesser 
extent, of contractual agreements remains marginal if compared, for example, to the 
unprecedented series of mergers and acquisitions that took place at the same time. The rationale 
put forward for explaining why firms resort increasingly to externalised forms of international 
production has shifted away from a 2nd-best logic to arguments departing more openly from 
'mainstream* International Production theories.
Such 'waves' of co-operative ventures and their analysis are not properly speaking a 
great novelty. At the end of the 50s, Houssiaux already addressed Sub-Contracting in a very 
similar way [Houssiaux, 1957].17 *74 *17Later followed by Bloism, he considered that Sub-Contracting 
is akin to the 'vertical quasi-integration' of the firms party to such an agreement: while bypassing 
integration, it substitutes for markets achieving an intermediary position [op. c it: 221]. In this 
view, Sub-Contracting is
171 See Oman, 1984, and 1988; Chapter I in Rugman, 1982; and Chapter III in Buckley, Casson (1985).
171 Build Operate Transfer (BOT) should be added to the list.
175 See Germidis (1980:37)
174 For an empirical illustration of this point in the case of German investing firms, see Poliak in Oman, 
(1984: 264-268).
171 Michalet, and Delapierre (1989: 2) distinguish between alliances and association agreements. The latter 
roughly correspond to the above-described NFIs, and bring about the organisation of MNF under the form 
of a network of contractual relations.
174 The analysis was restricted to the national setting, though.
177 See Blois, (1972).
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"a device for economic integration, not within a firm, but within the group made of a big 
firm and its sub-contractors" [Houssiaux, 1957: 222], *
An interesting feature of approaches aiming at a first-best account of co-operative 
venture is their emphasis on the mutations at stake in the world economy. One important 
mutation has to do with changes in the modalities of international competition which is 
becoming 'global1 [Stopford, Strange, 1991: 65)m. Implications are unnumbered and not yet 
appropriately grasped in an all-encompassing framework for analysis11*; however, it is generally 
agreed that what is at stake is the old fordist model. These mutations translate at different levels: 
into new organisation of the production process110, new assets at the basis of firms' competitive 
advantages'*1, and whether cause or consequence, new conditions of demand1**... last but not 
least, the new conditions of competition bring about inevitable consequences on the modalities 
thereby firms relate to each other in the words of Contractor and Lorange, a firm is now to be 
viewed as
"... a coalition of interlocked quasi-arm's-length relationships" [Contractor, Lorange,
1988: 5]
Overall, these trends invite to reconsider the traditional primacy of the notion of 
internalisation [Delapierre, Michalet, 1989]: new patterns in the conditions of international 
competition call for more flexibility and adaptability rendering co-operative agreements 
particularly attractive. These changes require
"a general view of international competition to account for the various forms of
international economic relations as different modalities for organising production on a
world-wide scale" [Ravix, Charbit, Romani, 1989: 381.
However, nothing can be said beyond general considerations about the appropriateness 
of non-equity agreements for acquiring flexibility; in particular, concerning the determinants of 17
171 Stopford and Strange propose to define global competition as 'the outcome of how individual firms have 
reacted over time to the changing balance of opportunity and threat* at work in the world economy (1991: 
65).
m An interesting attempt is given in Ruigrok and van Tulder (1995).
With the development of just-in-time and ... methods of production which correspond to new priorities 
such as flexibility. See Altersohn (1992:102).
1,1 Technology, and beyond knowledge, is becoming an increasingly important factor determining the terms 
of the competition between firms. See Stopford, and Strange (1991: 34, and 71).
111 More changing and even unstable, see Oman (1988: 387).
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such forms of international production. A good question in this respect is how far non-equity 
forms of international production can be treated together.'0 In other terms* the doubt as to 
whether co-operative ventures really form an homogeneous category questions the validity of the 
double reference to market and integration [Michalet, Delapierre, 1989: 27].,M For example. 
Contractor and Lorange, who pioneered the study of co-operative ventures as a fully-fledged 
category, provide a good example of how difficult it is to use the intermediary position between 
market and hierarchy as a sufficiently discriminative criteria: they start by defining a spectrum of 
possibilities that goes from 'spot transactions* to *complete merger' (1988:5), then evoke the 'two 
extremes of full integration and purely contractual relationships' (1988: 16).
The main shortcoming of a view resting on the prominence of the commonalties of non­
equity agreements (their rejection of complete internalisation) over their differences, is that it 
neglects the rationale of such forms of international production. In a sense, focusing on the 
specific traits of co-operative ventures in order to rectify the drawback characterising earlier IP 
theories (their excessive focus on internalisation) brings about a very similar bias. In both cases, 
the underlying problem is that weighting the comparative merits of different forms of 
international production does not take into account the different objectives of international 
production. This approach would do if the question at stake is **which is the best route for 
servicing foreign markets" but not if it is "how best to combine different vehicles of international 
production for simultaneously achieving a wide range of different objectives". On the face of the 
multiplication of variables, what is at stake is therefore the possibility of a' comprehensive and 
exhaustive theory of International Production.
3. The study o f the relocation o f international production activities
Several approaches are mainly concerned by the objective pursued by a firm when it 
undertakes international production activities. This perspective enables to tackle new trends at 
work in the world economy which are exemplified by OPT. From a situation where the search for
w  "Alliances" and co-operation agreements are most often studied together, but however implicitly 
neglected, their distinctive features often appear clearly in such studies: whereas alliances are concluded 
between firms that keep their separate identity, agreements have to do with the reorganisation of MNEs 
into "multinational network firms" (Delapierre, Michalet. 1989: 28). Michalet (1988: 272) distinguishes 
between co-operative ventures by ordering them on a spectrum of possibilities that goes from market 
transactions to complete organisation.
1M See also Rullière and Tone who argue in favour of a distinction between horizontal and vertical types of 
co-operative ventures. There are converging opinions which consider the hybrid position between market 
and hierarchy to be a valid criteria in the case of vertical arrangement alone, whereas horizontal co­
operative ventures would be governed by a logic on their own: see the above paper by Rullière and Torre, 
as well as Delapierre (1991:146),
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markets was the dominant rationale for going abroad, current developments rather correspond to 
the necessity of finding advantageous production sites. In Michalet's terminology, the tendency to 
shift from filliale-relais to filliale-atelier drives the current globalisation of production activities 
[Michalet, 19761.
Some studies choose to address the specific question of the relocation of economic 
activity abroad. They put forward a definition which indeed corresponds to the OPT case: in its 
largest interpretation, there is international relocation when a production unit closes in country 
A, and reopens in country B.‘" As a direct consequence, trade flows take place between A and B.
The problem with the debate over relocation is that it is dominated by the question of 
how restricted the definition of relocation should be. Does it have to encompass total relocation 
(with the transfer of all the economic activity, and the complete shutting down of the concerned 
plants in the country o f origin) or merely partial relocation (with the relocation o f only some 
segments of the whole production process; i.e., in Lassudrie-Duch6ne's terms, the International 
Division of the Production Process [Lassudrie-Duchlne, 1982])? Similarly, does relocation refer 
to a symmetric process (thereby the loss of economic activity in A equally amounts the gain in 
B), or can the notion be extended to cases when there is an overall increase of economic activity? 
Finally, relocation might, but need not, entail capital flows: is it necessary to give consideration 
only to situations involving international transfers of capital, leaving aside the case of 
international sub-contracting? Such controversies hardly conceal the objective of achieving a 
definition of relocation making the assessment of its effect on home countries' main economic 
indicators (in particular, unemployment) as comfortable as possible. In short, what is at stake in 
these taxonomic issues is how best to study the impact of relocation on domestic employment"*
Because of this bias, the study of relocation presents only poor analytical validity for 
addressing OPT. Their explicit objective notwithstanding, such studies are nevertheless 
interesting in that they adopt a perspective unveiling the inseparable nature of the relocation of 
international production activities and of its related trade flows: if firms go abroad aiming at 
better production locations, international production activities necessarily entail one trade flows 
('re-imports') if  not two (preliminary exports).
Efforts made to address sub-contracting activities in an international setting is also of 
interest for understanding OPT. According to a minimal definition of International Sub­
contracting (ISC), a foreign firm gives the injunction to a local firms to perform certain tasks 
according to a blue print provided by the former [Germidis, 1980]: what (implicitly) 
differentiates ISC from licensing is that the output is not geared to local markets, but is instead
,,s See Sachwald (1995), or Lahille (1995: 3). Mouhoud (1993) even defines "re-relocation", when 
relocations are transferred back in the country of origin.
"* See for example the research undertaken by Alasdair Smith.
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re-imported; OPT would be a specific case of ISC in that the foreign partner also provides the 
inputs. Although theoretical developments on ISC are scarce« and what is more« again 
overwhelmingly limited to considerations dealing with taxonomic issues™« they all resort« to 
some extent« to the double reference of international production and its related international trade 
flows. Watanabe, for example, is one of the first to propose a rigorous typology of ISC 
[Watanabe, 1972]. He crosses two criteria: the first one allows to distinguish between the case 
when the foreign partner's activity is limited to market the products which undergo processing 
(commercial sub-contracting), and the case when foreign partners also participate in the 
production process (industrial sub-contracting); a second criteria discriminates between 
transactions taking place among agents of different nationality within the same country (inward 
sub-contracting), or transactions giving rise to international trade flows (outward sub­
contracting). Four categories are thus defined. The main problem in Watanabe's view, is that the 
2 logics of international production and international trade risk to be held distinct (commercial 
"or" industrial sub-contracting); on the face of it, its main advantage is that it holds a view in 
which firms are the instigators of ISC, whether in the context of the internationalisation of their 
production process, or whether ISC simply gives rise to international trade flows.
Michalet proposes a different typology which places the emphasis on the nature of the 
relations between the contracting partners [Michalet, 1980]. In type "A", ISC takes place 
between two independent firms located in two countries at different levels of development Type 
"B" refers to transactions taking place between a MNCs' affiliate and a local firms, whereas type 
"C" concerns the relations between two affiliates of MNCs in a same country. Finally, type "DM 
of ISC is ascribable to the relations between the mother company of a MNC and its affiliate(s). 
To justify this latter category, Michalet argues that sub-contracting brings about a sort of 
economic dependence, whether the concerned firms are autonomous from a legal viewpoint or 
not There is thus no point in limiting ISC to legally independent firms. In this view, as opposed 
to the national case where sub-contracting relations occurs between legally distinct firms, for 
international sub-contracting to take place, it is enough that the concerned firms be located in 
different countries or at least, be of different nationality [Hanaut, 1988: 326], An additional 
argument is that if relations between parent companies and affiliates are not considered when 
addressing international sub-contracting, then the extent of the latter is significantly reduced ... 
This last argument is not of great analytical help. As to the former, it is highly controversial, but 
it has the immense merit of insisting that, while entailing international trade flows, ISC brings
m Number of them are drawn from typologies established in a national context. See, for example, the 
distinction between sub-contracting of speciality, and of capacity. A third category is sometimes identified 
as 'economic sub-contracting’ which peculiarity is to take advantage of low costs [Michalet, 1980], These 
types of criteria quickly appear to be limited as they often (or even systematically) overlap with one 
another.
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about "economic dependence" proper to international production activity, whether through 
contractual or ownership links.
However deprived from explanatory power, these typologies (in particular Michalet's) 
make two essential points. First, relocation is simultaneously ascribable to the two logics of 
international production and of international trade. Second, IP-related trade flows can be of an 
intra-firm nature or they can take place at arms' length; the issue is after all of secondary 
importance since what really matters is that in both cases they occur within Arms' network, and 
as a result of firms' initiative.
Their respective weaknesses notwithstanding, both series of studies on relocation and on 
International Sub-Contracting are interesting because of the underlying assumption they make on 
the objective that firms pursue when they go abroad. What is at stake is indeed the exploitation 
of local assets, i.e., without euphemism, of cheap labour...
4. Appropriateness and limitation
Intrinsic weaknesses
Thanks to IP theories, firms are no longer 'black boxes'; they are finally considered to be 
fully-fledged actors in the determination of international economic exchanges. The problem is 
that however deserving the attempt to address a higher degree of complexity, IP theories might 
not be entirely successful in tackling the difficulty. It is as though, in contrast to IT approaches, 
by allowing for complexity, IP theories loose in predictive ability.
Their main difficulty is that while they present a wide range of potential explanations for 
the way firms go abroad (thus answering the ‘how* question of International Production), the 
treatment of the reason ’why* firms go abroad tends to be relegated into secondary 
considerations. Closely related to the 'where* issue, the ‘why’ question is indeed better grasped 
by IT theories.
Hence the necessity to combine IT and IP theories which suggests itself. Attempts have 
been of course proposed, starting with the most well-known eclectic theory. But several 
examples show how difficult it is to achieve a definitive stance in this respect Lassudrie- 
Duchéne's framework for analysing the "International Division o f the Production Process" 
(IDPP) is one of such attempt [Lassudrie Duchéne, 1982]. It addresses IDPP as a category per se, 
thus taking into consideration the distinct objective of international production aiming at 
production sites [op. cit.: 45]. Three modalities for carrying out the segmentation of the
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production process are identified: association between firms (i.e., co-operative agreements), 
integration, and "impartition” on the market mode (firms relate to one another through market 
transactions) (...). The choice between these three categories is thus ascribable to an IP analysis. 
However, perhaps too hastily, ISC is classified within the latter category. Indeed, Lassudrie- 
Duchtae himself admits that the frontiers between these different categories of IDPP are blurred 
[op. cit: 55]. But the most disappointing feature is that after having stressed the IP logic of 
IDPP, Lassudrie-DuchSne comes to the conclusion that IDPP is
"an ordinary expression of the international division of labor and of international
specialisation" [Lassudrie Duchfine, 1982:45],
thus resorting to an analysis in pure IT terms. It is indeed quite common to privilege one 
dimension at the expense of the other. An additional example is given by Gennidls who, at the 
end of the 70s, considers that ISC is a good way for developing countries to specialize along the 
lines of their comparative advantages [Germidis, 1980: 10], A slightly different shortcoming is 
illustrated by one study on ISC within the European Community done for the European 
Commission [Ravix, et al., 1989]. In its theoretical part, the report is well aware of the double 
dimension of ISC; but instead of searching for how best to combine an IP and an IT approach, 
both frameworks are rejected. On the one hand, the authors insist that ISC is distinct from 
integration, and refuses on this basis Michalefs category "D"; their argument is that the two 
logics are "completely opposed" as ISC is undertaken at market prices, whereas integration 
involves transfer prices. On the other hand, ISC is to be distinguished from banal relations of 
suppliers since the respective transactions involve goods In the latter case, and tasks or 
production operations in the former. Eventually, Ravix proposes to use Lassudrie-Duchfne's 
framework of analysis as an alternative paradigm without much enthusiasm; he ends up 
acknowledging his actual failure in identifying a relevant explanatory pattern for ISC [op.cit: 
38].
In the case of OPT
First, it should be stressed that the above shortcoming characterising IP theories in 
genera] have a specific salience in the case of OPT. gives rise to flows of international trade, 
while owing its existences to firms’ strategies of relocation.
The insight gained from an approach to OPT in IP terms are connected to the fact that 
OPT is the result of firms* decision.
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First, by answering the ‘how’ question of firms’ foreign involvement« IP theories allow 
to determine the reason why firms go abroad using OPT rather than any other vehicle for 
organising international production. In other terms, IP theories are useful to identify the reason 
why OPT transactions do not happen on internal, but on external markets1", i.e., why 
internalisation does not occur. Another way to express the same idea, the contribution of IP to 
the understanding of OPT consists in addressing the question of the relations existing between 
firms party to an OPT agreement in general, and the specific issue of the control that one firm 
may extend over its partner in particular why an OPT foreign partner does not need to extend 
control over its partner, i.e., why does he not engage capital?
There are several possible answers.
Recent developments would point at new features characterising the world economy 
such as the definition of new modality of international competition requiring an adaptation of the 
old way of organising production. In short, OPT would respond to the necessity o f acquiring 
more flexibility, or of reaping economic opportunities on a global scale.
Indeed, although of a traditional form, OPT responds to constraints imposed by the 
development of new methods of production, and new patterns o f demand. Several studies 
highlight the transformation of the traditional sub-contracting relation, in both the national and 
international settings: from dependence to partnership189, sub-contracting is more and more 
characterised by a "two-way" relationship [Mytelka, 1995]. Certain OPT agreements illustrate 
this point as they eventually culminate in the formation of a Joint Ventures between the foreign 
and the local partner. This approach solves thus what is an anomaly in the view of more 
traditional patterns of analysis.
The problem with these arguments is that they do not properly speaking identify the 
determinants of the OPT choice; they simply describe the advantages characterising OPT in a 
given context
There are (complementary) explanations put forward by older version of IP theories 
which are more ambitious. In very ‘eclectic’ terms, for example, OPT firms do not undertake 
internalisation because there is no "appropriability of proprietary assets".'" In other terms, there 
would be no transfer to operate because products concerned have no high content of firm- 
specific advantages. Fair enough, the statistical evidence presented in Chapter 3 confirms that 
the products involved in OPT transactions tend to be highly standardised, and, as a rule of 
thumbs, with a  rather poor content of technological assets.
The terminology is used in Casson (1976)
m See for example Baudry (1994, and 1993: 51). Altersohn, among others, relates the development of 
more equal partnership between contracting and sub-contracting firms to the characteristics of a post- 
taylorian economy (see Altersohn, 1992:95).
'* See Contractor, (1984).
145
A first immediate drawback proper to this line of argumentation is that any possibility of 
evolution tends to be ruled out* either an OPT partnership keeps on being based on the exchange 
of very rudimentary products in the absence of firm-specific assets, or it terminates as such. On 
the face of it, the results of the fieldwork presented in the previous Chapter showed that in a 
number of cases, there is a real possibility for upgrading banal OFT partnerships into more 
balanced and stable co-operations; indeed, it was argued that OPT and FDI can occur 
simultaneously.
But the problem with such IP explanations is beyond the appropriateness of the answers 
given to the internalisation question; it has very much to do with the fact that they simply explain 
.. what is not! Indeed, the empirical fieldwork made clear that, in sharp contrast with the above 
argument, to OPT can be associated quite extended degree of control even in the absence of 
capital involvement In other terms, the risk of IP theories is that they fail to acknowledge other 
means of extending control than internalisation and capital involvement There are, of course, 
notable exceptions. Oman (1988: 391), for example, notes that it is not the equity that makes the 
investment and that vice versa, it is possible to have an equity involvement without the usual 
consequences associated with FDI: for example, control can be acquired through the use of 
bargaining power (see Root 1988), or by the enforcement of contracts (see Buckley, Casson, 
1985).1,1
The fundamental point illustrated by OPT is that yet another means for acquiring control, 
consists of 'exogenous* institutional factors, in general, and trade restrictions in particular. Indeed 
the above empirical evidence made clear that the latter render the arrangement particularly 
compelling, yielding a degree of integration which can compare with full internalisation: they 
create an ideal situation where foreign contracting firms find themselves In a very strong 
bargaining position. Being these advantages the products of the OPT arrangement provided for 
by the EU legislation, it turns out that, in the last resort, it is an institutional design that actually 
brings about the effects normally associated with internalisation. In short, institutional factors 
substitute for internalisation. As opposed to the eclectic framework, this view can account for 
two peculiarities of OPT: it gives sometimes way to eventual capital participation, and it might 
concern goods ranking relatively high in terms of value-added.
141 The literature on International Sub-Contracting activities present also some interest in this respect. As a 
matter of fact, it is considered that, while materialising through international trade flows, ISC nevertheless 
brings about "economic dependence”, whether through contractual or ownership links.
146
4 .3  Towards a system a ti sa tí on of the determinants of OPT
1. The need fo r  an ad-hoc explanatory patterns
In the following, an attempt is made to piece together the different insight gained 
subsequently from statistical and fieldwork evidence, and from relevant theoretical contributions. 
The objective is to answer the question of the prospective trajectories that OPT networks will 
follow, and their eventual contribution to the regional patterns of economic interdependence.
International Trade and International Production theories are only partially useful to 
assess and combine the market and institutional determinants forming the framework of 
constraint and opportunity identified in Part I.
Through a critical assessment of IT, it was made clear that ‘comparative advantages* 
based on the availability of cheap and skilled labour are determinants of OPT insofar they are 
identified as such by policy makers who erect trade protection discriminating against local 
producers. That said, it is indisputable that cheap labour costs are essential m the decision to 
undertake and carry out OPT in CEECs.
As to the review of IP theories, it made possible to pinpoint the fundamental issue at 
stake in the OPT development, i.e., the question of the control extended on local firms. However, 
it was shown that IP theories seriously underrate the extent of the control extended by foreign 
firms on their local partners in the case of OPT.
The fundamental problem with such general determinants is that even if they are 
partially pertinent, they do not account for the actual variety of OPT patterns: they hardly explain 
country-variations, and they do not account for sector-specific features. In the following, an 
explanatory framework is proposed to determine the circumstances in which OPT gives way to 
the rationalisation of the strategies of foreign partners on the regional scale, and those in which 
OPT rather correspond to cross-border co-operations. This is done by piecing together the 
findings based on statistical data and fieldwork evidence.
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Sector-specific determinants: the structure of trade protection
A primary factor accounting for the peculiar patterns of OPT in T&C is the structure of 
trade protection. As a matter of fact, OPT in T&C is likely to increase strongly because 
restriction measures on direct trade are binding constraints (Chapter 2). Having become fairly 
efficient and competitive, local firms which have often important production capacities inherited 
from Communist times, quickly fill up the quantitative protection measures still in place during 
the process of trade liberalisation. Thus, if they want to enter the EU markets, local producers 
have few other options than to engage into OPT partnerships with EU firms, a door purposely 
and acrimoniously left open to them. They can thus benefit from preferential market access under 
the form of additional ‘specific* OPT quota.
In the other sectors, instead, the structure of trade protection is much less of an incentive 
to undertake OPT. As a matter of fact, these sectors are subject to a system of tariff protection, 
which is, as a general rule, less constraining and less irreducible than protection through 
quantitative protection: whereas there is no -legal- way to overcome a filled quota, there is 
always the possibility to pay a tariff in full. What is more the latter are rapidly decreasing in the 
context of trade liberalisation, whereas Chapter 2 shows a relative resilience of quotas pertaining 
to normal trade. As time goes, it thus proves to be more and more rational to pay a small tariff 
rather than to face relatively cumbersome administrative tasks.
One factor making the arrangement more attractive in the specific case of CEECs, 
however, is that the latter were granted a particularly preferential treatment under the form of a 
complete tariff cut on OPT transactions (as against a reduction in the case of other countries).
The following diagram summarises the respective*incentive to undertake OPT depending 
on whether the good concerned is subject to quantitative or tariff protection. In Figure 1, at t-O, 
the gains obtained by undertaking economic OPT in sectors subject to quota, and that obtained 
by undertaking tariff OPT are ab, and a'b\ respectively. There is no reason, a priori, to think that 
one is superior to the other. But at times goes, as tariffs are being progressively lifted, the gain 
pertaining to the tariff regime decrease from a’b' to a"b". Eventually, whereas the structure of 
trade protection discriminate in favour of OPT until the very end when quotas are suppressed, 
incentives to undertake tariff OPT diminish over time.
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Figure 1. The liberalisation of direct and OPT trade in sectors subject to quota; and the 
liberalisation of direct and OPT trade in sectors subject to tariffs.
.Quota
Tariff
P ro tec t
Finn-specific determinants: size and competitive advantage
The fieldwork analysis listed numerous firm-level variables playing an important role in 
the structuration of OPT patterns between the EU and CEECs. One of these, the relative size of 
firms party to an OPT agreement appeared to be very important in determining the possibility for 
securing the long term commitment of foreign partners. As a matter of fact the cases 
corresponding to the possible consolidation of OPT were almost always involving big firms with 
important production capacities.
The number of partners is also a variable of importance. Diversifying the number of 
partners was shown to be a strategy which was not always successful. On the face of it, securing 
tiie commitment of one partner often yielded the upgrading of an O Pi’ partnership.
Interestingly enough, the criteria of the number of partners appeared to be linked to the 
size of the local OPT partners. Smaller firms tended to have several partners, while their bigger 
counteiparts were usually in a privileged partnership with fewer (if not one) foreign firms.
¡Jfoffnrmf
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Finally, concerning the other firm-specific determinants of OPT, it is in their nature to 
vary from firm to firm. They fall into the category of the competitive advantage: possessing such 
an advantage is an important factor deciding upon the faith of an OPT partnership once wage 
differentials cease to be a driving motive for undertaking OPT.
Country-specific determinants: proximity and the starting point of the liberalisation process
Considerations pertaining to the proximity of the partner countries proved to be 
significant factors shaping OPT patterns. The geographical and cultural closeness of German and 
Czech partners is without contest an important factor explaining the quantitatively important and 
qualitatively diversified German OPT engagement in the former Czechoslovakia. The fieldwork 
found several examples where German were physically present on the production site.
Another variable is the chronological starting point of the liberalisation process. This 
factor favoured early German OPT activities in Hungary which opened its markets earlier. It is a 
factor which is also likely to have influenced the time horizon of the OPT strategy adopted. As a 
matter of fact, foreign OPT partners which started their operations under Communist times were 
likely to be initially driven by relatively short-term strategic considerations.
Finally, the industrial structure and the performance of the sectors concerned are also 
intervening variables. The good reputation of the Czech industry has certainly played a relevant 
role in this respect 2
2. Synthesis: seizing the potentials fo r  vertical quasi integration vs recovering independence
If pieced together, the above factors provide a framework for analysing the determinants 
of the trajectories of OPT networks.
Vertical quasi-integration
The sector-specific feature characterising OPT in T&C is due to the bindingness of 
quantitative restrictions which makes the recourse to the arrangement imperative. From the 
viewpoint of foreign partners, local firms’ dependence on OPT places the former in an 
interesting position of power. The unparalleled merit of OPT in this respect is that it makes 
possible control without capital engagement This is an important trait distinguishing OPT from
150
other more traditional forms of contractual agreements which allow to extend a minor degree of 
control.
Binding trade protection measures favour the vertical ‘quasi-integration’1" of firms party 
to an OFT agreement in such a way that foreign firms can extend control over their local partners 
without engaging capital. In other terms, trade restrictions measures substitute for internalisation. 
Thus, such a vertical quasi-integration is a sort of ideal medium teim between normal 
subcontracting and foreign direct investment, that combines at the same time the advantages of 
the two formula (the flexibility of entry and exit, and the control over the partner, respectively) 
while attenuating their inconvenient (the uncontrolled spill over of knowledge, and the financial 
cost, respectively).
Interestingly enough, these mechanisms are effective mainly with respect to the size of 
the firms party to an OPT agreement As a matter of fact, big firms with important production 
capacities are the first to come against to binding quotas. They are therefore more likely 
candidates for vertical quasi-integration and for the eventual consolidation of OFT partnerships 
than their smaller counterparts.
Thus, the criteria of firm size reinforces the distinct attractiveness and effectiveness of 
tariff and economic OFT: resorting to OFT is all the more imperative for big firms in sectors 
subject to quota. On the contrary, small firms are less likely to be constrained by quantitative 
restrictions, and their decision to engage ir ' 'F T  less 'dependent'.1”
It is also important to stress that vertical quasi-integration takes place only if local firms 
endeavour to secure the commitment of one privileged foreign firm (rather than to try to diversify 
partners), and if the latter occupies the major part of the local firms’ production capacity. Such a 
dependence on OFT at the micro level is reflected in aggregate terms by the very high 
proportions of OFT in total trade.
Eventually, as trade barriers are being lifted, traditional means to extend control are 
likely to be adopted. Overall, the structure of trade protection together with firm-level variables 
like the size o f firms party to an OPT agreement, account for the development, on the basis of 
OPT, of more durable forms of a vertical division of labour at the regional scale in the sector of 
textile and clothing.
In The term was first coined in (Houssiaux, 1957) to denote sub-contracting activities in a national context. 
Subsequent theoretical developments were carried out in (Horst, 1972).
m  Unless the small firm produces items that are constrained, because, for example, a big firms already fills 
up the available authorised quantities.
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Cross-border co-operation
In other sectors where trade restrictions are not such a factor rendering the arrangement 
particularly decisive for accessing EU markets, the potentials for quasi-vertical integration are 
lower. Thus, the mechanisms of OPT are less effective in fostering the vertical division of labour 
at the regional scale.
If factors favouring the quasi-vertical integration of firms party to an OPT agreement are 
less effective, this is not to say, however, that they are entirely negligible. Here again, much 
depends on the size of the firms concerned, and durable partnerships are more likely to develop 
on the basis of OPT between big firms. As a matter of fact, a big firm has more means to 
actualise the potentials for quasi-integration, be it only because it is capable to order bigger 
quantities, and, in this way, to fill the production capacities of its local partner more thoroughly. 
To some extent, this implies that the local partner is also more likely to be big, and thus able to 
comply with the demand. As a matter of fact, OPT goods are mostly labour-intensive and 
associated with standardised production processes. Chances are that foreign partners will want to 
take advantage of economies of scale, and thus look for big local partners.m In this respect, firms 
from CEECs arc indeed quite interesting as they often have inherited huge production capacities 
from Communist times.1*5
To compensate for the lower effectiveness of trade restrictions in securing vertical quasi­
integration, however, additional conditions must be fulfilled. Being in possess of a competitive 
advantage under the form of a particular infrastructure or a specific skill acquires a decisive 
relevance in this respect
By contrast, smaller firms are more likely to use OPT as a carrier for their workbench 
activities in neighbouring countries. In this case, country-specific factors like proximity and 
industrial performances are of crucial determinant of OPT patterns. Interestingly enough, in this 
case, proximity might be -for some time- enough to off-set increasingly unfavourable wage 
conditions. In this view, foreign partners are likely to stick to their engagement provided that the 
advantage of distance compensates for increasing wage levels.
This result thus contrasts with traditional views on ‘workbench’ activities considered to 
be relatively footloose: if SMEs do not have a regional outlook and devise their strategy on a 
strict bilateral basis, this is not to say that they do not have a relatively long-term time horizon.
194 This is of significance as far as the contribution of OPT to the foreign involvement of Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprises is concerned: it shows that SMEs are likely to be marginal in OPT operations, 
and not only because they tend to be characterised in general by lower degree of involvement abroad.
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It is also in contradiction with the hypothesis of successive waves of 're-relocation* in 
countries further East where wages are still lower.
Overall, in the sectors where trade restrictions do not warranty an almost automatic 
upgraded commitment of foreign partners, OPT corresponds both to the régionalisation of big 
films* strategy, and to the cross-border activities of SMEs. Size and competitive advantage 
appear to be decisive criteria in the development of upgraded partnerships on the basis of 
previous OPT relations, whereas country-specific variables weigh comparatively more in the 
case of OPT activities of SMEs.
3. Empirical validation
The results of the fieldwork presented in Chapter 3 show that there are two escape routes 
available to local firms which have come to be significantly dependent on foreign partners: to 
take-over OPT production on their own, or to induce foreign partners to upgrade their 
engagement It was found that the two possibilities have different chances to be successful 
depending on the host country and the sector concerned. In textile and clothing, what is at stake 
is to secure the prolonged commitment of foreign partners. In the other sectors, Hungarians are 
better at taking over production on their own whereas the Czechs rely on upgraded OPT 
partnerships.
A few features highlighted in the fieldwork study might help illustrate the general 
explanatory pattern of such stylised facts.
The former Czechoslovakia vs Hungary
Recovering autonomy was the less frequent scenario among the firms visited in the 
Czech Republic. Only one firm in the textile and clothing sector, TIMO, managed to disentangle 
from OPT by taking over production on its own. On the face of it, ONA, a small firm also in the 
T&C sector is a contrasting example which is more representative of the general trend at stake 
in the OPT business in the Czech Republic. Because of the reduction of OPT, the firm had to 
reorient its sales to the less demanding local markets which is rather a forced outcome than a 
deliberate policy.
A striking point is that almost all the firms interviewed in the Czech Republic were 
contemplating the possibility of increasing their OPT contacts with foreign partners. If OPT 
partners and proportion were actually decreasing, it was always considered to be an undesirable 
state of affair. One such examples is given by VUOSO; it illustrates how resorting to OPT is
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made almost compulsory by the extreme difficulty to undertake independent exports. VUOSO's 
experience is the most positive. It shows that even though having recourse to OPT was a highly 
constrained choice, the firms managed to ascertain some* kind of bargaining power thanks to a 
competitive advantage based on the use of research-intensive resources. It is also an illustration 
of how a competitive advantage might represent an asset playing in favour of smaller firms 
which substitutes for production capacities (see below).
It is also interesting to note that the OPT networks identified as potential candidates for 
emerging Cross-National Production Networks develop in sectors relatively ‘new* in terms of 
both the orientation of their sales to Western markets and their initial dependence on OPT. The 
Czech industries of electrical machinery and footwear used to give rise to relatively marginal 
amounts of total and OPT exports to the EU in 1991.
On the contrary, in Hungary, sectors already significantly dependent on OPT in 1991 are 
generally marked by strong decrease of OPT without sign that foreign partners had upgraded 
their commitment The crucial question, in these cases, is whether independent exports can take 
over OPT trade.
Firm size
In the T&C sector, OP-Prostejov and Styl are two straightforward examples of the 
importance of the size variable. In the case of OP, the size of the firms appeared to matter, not 
in the absolute, but indeed in connection to the size of the firm: because its immense production 
capacities are easily constrained by the trade barriers imposed by the Community, OP clearly 
depends on OPT if it wants to survive as such. Hence the potential for vertical quasi-integration 
reaped by its main partner, Hugo Boss. On the face of it, smaller firms which are less likely to be 
constrained by quantitative restrictions, appeared to be less 'dependent' on a stable partnership 
with foreign firms."4
Competitive advantage
The fieldwork also illustrates how local firms presenting some attractive assets beside 
their advantage in terms of labour costs were in a more favourable position to secure long-term 
relationships with a foreign partner. Such 'assets’ are o f different natures. In first place, local
m  Unless the small firm produces items that are constrained, because, for example, a big firms already fills 
up the available authorised quantities. Conversely, when the preferential trade treatment attached to OPT 
consists of a partial or a total relief of tariff duties, OPT is probably more valuable for small firms: 
affording to pay tariffs is more difficult for them as they are likely to be poorer in capital than bigger 
firms.
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partners should possess a competitive advantage like specific skills, the ability to master complex 
tasks, the possession of the required machinery, or a particular infrastructure or investment On 
this point, the outcome is shaped on a firm-tofirm basis: Vuoso’s competitive edge in a specific 
technique, and CKD’s infrastructure are two illustrations.
Number of partners
The interviews showed that the foreign firms which were the more incline to upgrade 
their commitment were systematically the unique partner of a local firm: a high proportion of 
OFT in total production with one foreign partner was almost always associated with declared 
long term partnerships. On the contrary, when local firms had various partners, each of them 
occupying only a marginal proportion of the local firm's total production capacities, the latter 
tended to be less committed and thus more sensitive to wage increases.
The case of CKD-Elektrotechnika is the most telling illustration of how an OPT 
partnership can be so stable as to compare with foreign direct investment It shows that for quasi* 
integration to take place, and thus for long-term partnerships to be secured, only one foreign 
partner must occupy the majority -if not the totality- of the local firms' production capacities. On 
the contrary, the example of Vilati, the Budapest-based electronic firm illustrates how local firms 
engaged with several partners, have a more precarious existence; it is an example of how local 
firms might "specialise" durably into OPT activities, on a basis which is, actually, quite fragile.
Of particular interest is the classification of its partners by Vilati into 3 categories: 1) 
stable partners which are necessary to give a long term horizon to the firm's strategy, and thus for 
it to invest; ideally, they should account for 80% of the total number of partners; 2) the 
occasional partners (around 20% of the total number); 3) the potential ones. These latter are very 
important for Vilati to keep up with the nature of the demand addressed to sub-contractors; it is 
also the only way for Vilati, which has almost no product under its own trademark, to promote its 
capabilities. The first group consists of big foreign firms, whereas small firms have more chance 
to resort occasionally on OPT, and thus to belong to the second group. As to the very big firms, 
they rather invest in a greenfield plant, as they have at their disposal the necessary capital.1*1 It 
means that partners of the first group are not necessarily prone to invest in the local firm: they 
are just big enough to have market shares.
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4.4 Conclusion
The present Chapter shows the relative inadequacy of both International Trade and 
International Production theories in accounting for OPT. Because OPT gives rise to flows of 
international trade, while owing its existence to firms' strategies of relocation, it was expected 
that a combination of IT and IP theories would have provided satisfactory insight on this specific 
type of market linkage. In fact, the drawbacks of one approach are hardly corrected by the 
contribution of the other, and the contributions themselves are often not in line with the available 
empirical evidence.
Hence, the Chapter proposes an alternative ad-hoc explanation of the trends followed by 
OPT trade observed in the statistical analysis, and of the features characterising OPT 
partnerships identified by the results of a fieldwork and presented in Chapter 3. It assessed the 
respective weight of institutional variables, country-specific variables and fum-level factors as 
determinants of the terms under which OPT contributes to the patterns of economic 
interdependence between the EU and CEECs.
In general, the OPT case illustrates that the very process of trade liberalisation is 
potentially one powerful instrument shaping the patterns of trade and production specialisation. 
Its form (the specific measures, like OPT, lifting trade barriers), and its pace (the length o f the 
transition period during which trade obstacles are still enforced) have an impact which impinges 
durably on the division of regional labour.
In the specific case of OPT in T&C, the structure of trade protection (quantitative 
restrictions) is an important determinant of the dynamics of OPT trade. It accounts for the 
distinct evolutions undergone by the T&C sector, and the other sectors subject to tariff 
protection, respectively. Thus, the structure and the nature (the bindingness) of trade restrictions 
favour the vertical 'quasi-integration* of firms party to an OPT agreement where local producers 
present the most serious competitive threat In turn such vertical quasi-integration possibly paves 
the way for the establishment o f a more durable vertical division of labour at the regional scale. 
Indeed, the potential for quasi-integration is an incentive important enough to induce foreign 
firms to undertake OPT on bases which are sounder, less volatile than if low wages were the only 
motive for undertaking OPT.
In the other sectors, insight gained by an analysis centred on the firms and the partner 
countries explains why OPT has lower probability to spur relatively durable and complex forms 
of co-operation between local and foreign firms. In this case, the use that SMEs make of the 
arrangement to organise their ‘workbench* activities is determined by factors characterising host 
countries like proximity and openness.
Overall, the wide range of OPT determinants accounts for the highly variegated patterns 
of OPT between the EU and the CEECs identified in the previous Chapter.
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I ll/ Globalisation, Europeanisation and the governance of the economy
On the basis of the two previous sections which aimed at dissecting the ‘mechanics* of 
the OPT arrangement the present part attempts to infer the general significance of the very 
specific« and indeed tiny OPT story. What are the general issues at stake in the above analysis of 
the ways in which OPT patterns have been developing between the EU and the CEECs?
The starting point of the analysis is the observation that OPT is a contrivance adopted by 
national policy-makers in order to make possible the relocation of production by home firms in 
sectors where protectionist measures would in principle be an obstacle to such a strategy. In 
other terms« OPT is originally conceived as a national response to the globalisation of production 
activity in certain sectors.
Devising an OPT policy at the national level came to involve the mechanisms of the 
European integration process. On the one hand« diverging national OPT regimes had to be 
harmonised thus paving the way for the deepening of the Community competence. On the other 
hand« the OPT arrangement is part of the current process of trade liberalisation between the EU 
and the CEECs« expected to culminate in the enlargement of the Community. Hence, the OPT 
case is at the nexus of the deepening and the widening dimensions of the European integration 
process.
The main argument on which the present section rests is that the OPT story testifies to 
the reason why and the way in which the European integration process develops. It is proposed in 
the following to make the most of the fact that OPT is useful for understanding how 
‘Europeanisation* and globalisation interact
Chapter 5 is intended to make clear the conditions under which the European integration 
process might indeed provide an effective response to globalisation. The recourse to various 
theoretical backgrounds on regional integration in general« and on European integration in 
particular suggests that the process is flawed by several apparent shortcomings. In the conclusion 
Chapter« a key for interpreting such ambiguities is given. The OPT story actually tells about the 
establishment a European system of governance of the economy that traditional views on the 
political control of economic activity fail to acknowledge as such.
Overall, the OPT story illustrates how globalisation affects the use of traditional tools of 
policy-making, and, beyond whole conceptions of governance of the economy. It exemplifies the 
way in which (and the scale at which) the political control of economic behaviour is redefined 
under the pressure of the globalisation of firms strategies.
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Chapters. Deepening and widening: the European answers to globalisation
The study of the contribution of OFT to the European integration process is interesting 
for addressing the topical issue of the relations between ‘Europeanisation’ and ‘globalisation*. 
Indeed, it was shown in Chapter 1 that OPT measures were adopted first by national authorities, 
and then at the Community level under the pressure of business strategies of firms reorganising 
their production activities beyond national frontiers: ‘gate keepers' [Strange, 1991] thus 
redefined classic trade protectionist measures making it possible for firms to take advantage of 
‘global’ opportunities while keeping the process under close (political) monitoring. The fact that 
such a process involved not only the national level of action, but also the European integration 
mechanisms means that, whether directly or indirectly, ‘Europeanisation* develops in connection 
with ‘globalisation*. The present Chapter further investigates the nature of the response to 
globalisation adopted at the European level.
Interestingly enough, it appears that the OPT story actually makes sense with respect to 
both the widening and the deepening dimensions of the European integration process. On the one 
hand, OFT is an example of the difficulty to effectively transfer competence from the national to 
the supranational level; on the other hand, it illustrates the terms under which economic 
interdependence between CEECs and EU countries is currently taking place. Hence, the OPT 
contribution helps understand under which conditions the framework of opportunity and 
constraint within which firms take their decision is ‘europeanised’, and with what consequences 
on the actual organisation of economic activity. In very short it makes clear which authority, 
whether political or economic, takes what measures and decisions, and with what effects on the 
patterns of East-West economic interdependence.
In this first approach, how OPT is enmeshed in the mechanisms of the Community’s 
widening and deepening processes will be analysed separately. But the final Chapter will show 
how these two developments illustrate the mechanisms of a sui-generis system of governance of 
the wider European market economy.
5. I. OPT and Deepening: the Europeanisation o f the framework of constraint and 
opportunity
As shown in the first part, the adoption of OPT measures interfered with the Community 
institutions and arrangements. In the Textile and Clothing sector, where national governments 
have traditional prerogatives in the provision of quantitative restrictions, the necessity to
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harmonise diverging national regimes potentially strengthened the competence of the 
Commission. However, the definition of a common position on OPT proved to be extremely 
difficult In the other sectors subject to a system of trade protection already agreed at the 
Community level (the Common External Tariff), the centralisation of competence at the 
European level was in principle already a reality.
In fact, no effective centralisation of competence at the Community level occurred, 
either because the potentials were not seized (in T& Q or because the Commission did not use 
the competence it was endowed with (in the other sectors). Thus, even if it was its natural 
development, the OPT policy did not give way to the deepening of the European integration 
process. Overall, what is at stake in the whole endeavour is the effective ‘Europeanisation’ of the 
framework of constraint and opportunity within which European firms adopt their OPT 
strategies.
In this section, it is proposed to fully draw the implication of the OPT story for 
understanding why the European integration process could have deepened as a result o f the OPT 
policy, but actually did no. Indeed, the evidence in Chapter 1 is particularly illuminating as far as 
the driving force, the mechanisms ... and the main obstacles encountered on the course of the 
process are concerned.
The OFT contribution concerns at least three issues:
-the reason triggering the European integration process
-the mechanisms thereby the process develops (the '*typen of policy-making to which 
OPT legislation-making is ascribable)
-and the eventual outcome achieved.
1. Launching the policy-making process
The above empirical account is telling as far as the factors triggering the whole process 
of OPT legislation-making in T&C are concerned. This is useful to disentangle between 
contrasting approaches to European integration. Two paradigms claim some pertinence in this 
respect In very rough terms, whereas a neo-functionalist interpretation would put forward the 
notion of "spill-over” for explaining the extension of Community competence, and therefore the 
definition of new supranational policies at the expense of national policy-making,”* neo-realism
The founding reference is Ernst B. Haas’s Beyond the Nation-State (1964).
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believes that the involvement of the supranational level of decision is always done in hannony 
with the interests of member states, if not at the very instigation of the latter.'**
What the above example tends to show is that the intense legislative activity at the 
European level is mostly ascribable to the necessity of harmonising diverging national regimes. It 
is the existence of a Common trade-policy, and the objective of the Single European Act which 
made the Commission's endeavour inevitable. This very much recalls the nature of the 
integrative mode highlighted by the neo-functionalist school. In this interpretation. Community 
institutions and arrangements already in place give inevitably way to the further strengthening of 
competence at the supranational level in related area. Thus, the advance of integration in the 
field of trade policy as embodied in the provision of a Common External Tariff and the 
implementation of the Single European Act, spilled over to the connected area of the adoption of 
specific quantitative restrictions.
Several arguments actually mitigate such a 'pure* neo-functionalist approach. For a start, 
it is worth noting that the very origin of the OPT story at the European level has to do with the 
adoption by national authorities of incompatible and competing policy stances on how to 
challenge international competition, with a resulting strong risk of competition between the 
different OPT regimes*“ at work throughout the EU countries. One possible interpretation is that 
certain member states favoured the adoption of the Community harmonisation policy in order to 
reduce the threat of being taken over by the Germans in the promotion of industrial 
competitiveness (and the subsidisation of job exports). They thus accepted the erosion of their 
competence with the objective of turning the Community arrangement into an instrument for 
keeping under control the policy orientations of their German partners. Thus, an 
intergovemmentalist flavour complements the above straight neo-functionalist interpretation: in 
the last resort harmonisation was rendered necessary by factors making sense at the national 
level, and if the process could actually take place, it is because member states were willing to 
accept i t
However, this is not to say that the process was deliberately triggered at the instigation 
of member states; the initiative of the process is indeed a point of contention where the neo* 
functionalist approach can still claim some superiority. If member states tried to turn the process 
in their favour (see below), they did not necessarily and deliberately triggered it. For instance, in 
the previous empirical account, it is difficult to envision why the British government, one of the 
early most virulent opponent to the arrangement, would have gone spontaneously to Brussels in 
order to recover an hypothetical loss of competence in economic matters at the national level. On
■** For the ’scanning* of the neo-realist approach, see Marks et al. (1996: 3).
300 The notion of "regime competition" is at best controversial if anything because of the indeterminacy of 
the significance of the term. See Strange (1994).
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the face of it, it seems indeed credible to contend that, confronted with the necessity of 
harmonisation as imposed by the Community, the British government, and the other most hostile 
actors to the OFT liberal leaning, did their best to render the process compatible with their own 
policy priorities.
In this view, it is therefore once harmonisation took place that member states went to 
Brussels with the intention of using the European forum for dealing with the risk of regime 
competition. Recourse to the European level is thus not the result of the initial deliberate intent 
of member states. The intergovemmentalist and the neo-functionalist explanatory patterns should 
be carefully handled and combined.
2. Developing the process
The story of the way the process, once triggered, actually develops is another one. What 
is at stake is a move towards the potential centralisation of competence from member states to 
the Community level. As described, the way this result is obtained is through harmonisation Le., 
the definition of policy guidelines precise enough to be applied uniformly throughout Member 
states. Thus, willy-nilly the process is supposed to bring about the transfer of competence from 
the national to the supranational level.
National vs. supranational extension of competence
The empirical part shows that member states actually managed to preserve most of their 
prerogatives in plain contradiction with the predictions of a neo-functionalist approach. Hence 
for some reason, at some point, a very initial neo-functionalist starting point notwithstanding, the 
process turned out to develop in conformity with the interests of member states.
The 'technical' reason accounting for such an outcome is depicted in the description of 
the legislation-making procedures in Chapter 1: the politics o f 'deliberate vagueness' consists in 
maintaining (if not favouring) the unintelligibility of certain provisions in order to make the 
harmonisation endeavour of the Commission inefficient
Theoretical approaches to the European integration process might prove of some help to 
go beyond the mechanics of such an outcome, to its actual meaning. The way the OPT story 
develops gives credit to both the interdependence and the intergovemmentalist schools which 
consider that the European integration process eventually profits member states. But the above 
empirical approach shows that none of them offers a truly satisfactory account of the reality.
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According to the proponents of the interdependence school for example, the way 
national authorities take advantage of the European integration process has a price in terms of the 
preservation of their competence: they actually irredeemably loose certain of their prerogatives 
that they recapture, under an altered form, only at a second best supranational level. On the face 
of it, in the intergovemmentalist model, the national level of action is indeed, in the last resort, 
considered to be adequate: going at the supranational level is instrumental in serving national 
authorities' interests. In other terms, according to the intergovemmentalist analysis, the national 
level of action is eventually strengthened, whereas the interdependence paradigm pinpoints the 
effectiveness of the centralisation of competence, even if this results from the express objective 
of member states.
On this simple basis, one would conclude that the intergovemmentalist account fares 
better than the interdependence explanation. Indeed, the latter is characterised by a double 
shortcoming*1: not only there is not much competence extended at the supranational level... but 
there is not much prerogatives lost at the national one either. Instead, the intergovemmentalist is 
closer to the point concerning the final outcome, i.e., the strengthening of the national level at 
the expense of the Community development However, even the intergovemmentalist approach Is 
imperfect First us previously suggested, soliciting the Community level of action does not result 
from member states autonomous initiative: they do not appear to go voluntarily on the 
Community arena to recapture what they have hypothetically lost at the national level. What is 
more, nothing much happens in effective *"Tns at the Community level Whether pulled 
unintentionally or whether they are consenting, member states do not properly speaking use the 
mechanisms of the European integration in their favour they just block their development at an 
early stage.
The overall lesson to draw from the above analysis concerns the partial irrelevance of the 
theories of European integration. Each of them contains a parcel of pertinence, each of them 
consists of a large part inadequate for depicting the OPT story. The interdependence explanation 
is the most easily discarded; its pertinence in the case of OPT consists (only) in accounting for an 
ideal state of affair, that would have occurred, were the process have developed as expected. 
Indeed centralisation of competence at the European level is one solution to growing economic 
interdependence.
The most serious candidates are thus the neo-functionalist and the intergovemmentalist 
models. However, none of them provide a complete set of explanations. This is an invitation to 
pick up and combine the most pertinent parts of each approach. But it is to be done carefully, as 
the two paradigms are indeed in principle incompatible. One way to distinguish between them is 10
101 The interdependence interpretation which would rather corresponds to an hypothetical state o f affair 
(see below).
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to refer to the direction of the process of competence devolution. In the words of Hollingsworth, 
an intergovemmentalist process corresponds to ‘the upward delegation* of competence from the 
national to the supranational level Thus in a dialectical vein, sovereignty is sacrificed in order to 
be restored. On the contrary, still according to Hollingsworth's viewpoint, the neo-functionalist 
interpretation illustrates the ‘downward authoritative modification of national regimes by 
international regimes' with harmonisation1*1 the instrument for implementing mandated 
convergence [Hollingsworth etal. 1994:292].
The OPT example shows that there is a strong premise ascribable to the latter logic, but 
that the actual outcome is in fact in conformity with the former approach: factors initiating the 
OPT policy-making process at the Community level are fairly identified by a neo-functionalist 
approach, but intergoveramentalism rightly predicts the way in which the process eventually 
benefits the national level of action. What happens in between ... is better grasped by a sui- 
generis interpretation of the OFT case.
The question of the 'type' of Community policy-making
Despite the above difficulty to ascribe OPT policy-making at the European level to one 
unique theoretical framework of interpretation, some analyses have attempted to characterise the 
‘type* of policy-making in T&C thus assuming de facto that a transfer of competence actually 
took place. Specific traits which are the most referred to are: corporatism and interventionism 
[Farrands, in Wallace and al. 1983: 314...]. The example of OPT somewhat tempers this view. It 
was indeed shown that representation through European Confederations despite the traditional 
strong bargaining clout of COM1TEXTIL was in this case particularly ineffective. On the face of 
it, firms had to rely on their government to be represented. In some (exceptional) cases, however, 
big firms chose the Brussels route and brought pressure to bear directly on the Commission 
without any intermediation. In this respect, the role played by the Commission is crucial. Indeed, 
it is considered that in T&C in general, and in the specific case o f OPT,
“policy-making is overwhelmingly intergovernmental (...) yet the Commission's 
interventions are substantial" [Ibid: 315].
m  What might seem inappropriate in this dichotomy applied to the OFT case is that harmonisation is 
considered to be at work only in the second mode of competence shifting. On the face of it, the proponents 
of the first view could very well integrate the notion into their explanatory pattern as well by arguing that 
harmonisation comes only second after the decision of member states to resort to the supranational level.
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In fact, the empirical evidence of Chapter 1 shows that even though the Commission is, 
in the last resort responsible for the legislative endeavour carried out at the European level, it
does not act autonomously.
What is more, in the face of the missed centralisation of competence at the European 
level, it seems relatively vain to try to quality what is only a ‘virtual’ process. This has a first 
implication as far as the use of concepts traditionally applied in the case of domestic politics 
[Hix, 1994]. In this context it is indeed no use to ask whether EU policy-making is rather 
pluralist or, on the contrary, whether it responds to mechanisms proper to a neo-corporatist 
model. An additional reason why it does not really make sense to try to specify one type of 
policy-making to characterise the whole set of policies engaged at the Community level Is that 
indeed, the answer varies to a high extent from policy area to policy arca.“* Overall, in the OPT 
case, the failed centralisation of competence, and the still prevalent influence of member states 
in the policy-making process invites to use concepts proper to the theory of International 
Relations or even more convincingly sui-generis analyses.
In this respect. Greenwood's "disaggregated approach to the study of interest 
intermediation" seems particularly adequate for tackling the difficulty [Greenwood, et al. 1992: 
18]. It is also very much in line with notions developed recently like ‘multi-level policy- 
making’10*, or ‘multi-level system of governance’ [Marks, 1993]. It similarly fits with 
Greenwood’s injunction to distinguish between a series of ‘policy communities’*1 at the 
European level [Greenwood, Ronit, 1994: 35]. Finally, Streeck (1991), talks of ‘disjointed 
pluralism’, and ‘competitive federalism’ which does not apply to the European policy-making 
style in general but rather denotes various possible types at the Community level.
An integrative mode at stake: harmonisation
The above OPT story is useful to draw some insight on one way the European integration 
deepens i.e., on one of its 'integrative mode': harmonisation.
According to a traditional distinction ‘negative integration* takes place under the form of 
deregulation, defined as *10
101 To use the pertinent formula pul forward by Lowi, ‘policy makes politics’.
1W Puchala, quoted in Wallace (1983: 406).
101 Heritier uses a similar notion using another terminology: policy networks. See Heritier (1993). See also 
Peterson (1995), and Scharpf (1993) quoted in Risse-Kappen (1996).
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“the emergence of interdependencies in the process of economic integration without 
‘spillover* into simultaneous growth of regulatory institutions capable of controlling 
them” [Streeck, 1991: 135],
whereas *positive integration' amounts to the establishment of regulatory regimes at the 
supranational level pre-empting national legislations. This distinction corresponds roughly to the 
opposition between harmonisation and mutual recognition as two different integrative modes. At 
first sight, OFT is an illustration of the former. However, because of the very ineffectiveness of 
the regulation eventually adopted, there is no supranational implementation of regulatory 
capacity ... and the national regimes are not effectively pre-empted. In short, OFT validates the 
outcome achieved through a process of negative integration while being clearly ascribable to a 
logic proper to the positive mode.
Interestingly enough, Majone ascribes to 3 possible causes to ‘over-regulation* which are 
to be mitigated on the basis of the OPT empirical evidence: the paucity of financial means of the 
Community budget**, the willingness of the Commission to assert its power, and the preference 
of MNCs to act within an harmonised environment throughout Europe [Majone, 1990]. As 
argued, harmonisation was a necessity, intended in a very neo-functionalist vein, almost 
automatically flowing from the very existence of other policies adopted at the Community level. 
It is indeed not the result of the Commission's deliberate intent to strengthen its own 
prerogatives (nor is it successful on this matter, anyway). As to MNCs* pressure, it was shown 
that they played quite an important part in the decision-making process; but the primary reason 
for MNCs* participation has probably more to do with their favourable stance vis-à-vis 
liberalisation than their concern to be confronted with similar conditions, whatever these latter 
might be. What is most interesting in the argumentation of Majone is his scepticism concerning 
the eventual outcome of the process. Indeed, in his interpretation, harmonisation is deemed to 
lead to over-regulation; this is the reason why the Commission changed its policy orientations 
and favoured the mutual recognition approach, a much less costly integrative mechanism. This is 
indeed validated by the OPT example.
The above insight are not necessarily good news as far as the European integration 
process is concerned. As a matter of fact, if
“in practice much of what can be termed European integration is in fact about 
regulation” [Mazey, Richardson, 1993: 254],
206 p. Schmitter would agree for whom regulation is a major resource to institutions when they have only a 
limited budget at their disposal (quoted in Mazey, ei al., 1993:254).
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and if regulations at the European level acquire only limited bindingness over national 
regulation, as it happens to be the case of OPT, then the process of integration is necessarily of 
limited success.
3. Process achievement: a potential industrial policy at the European level
What is at stake in the above account is the missed opportunity to design an industrial 
policy at the European level. Indeed, the OPT case presented all the potentials for placing in the 
hands of the Commission a powerful instrument of industrial policy.
To be sure, the OPT arrangement is originally supposed to satisfy to trade policy 
imperatives. However, as illustrated above, the first regulation dealing with economic OPT 
already contained some overt elements of industrial policy. This is so, for example, of the 
necessity for eligible products to be of Community origin, a provision introduced by the 1982 
legislation which is indeed loaded with important industrial implications.*7 The same can be said 
of the necessity to be a producer with facilities located within the Community. Subsequent 
negotiations destined to harmonise the application of the regulation throughout member states 
even accentuated these nascent elements of industrial policy. As a matter of fact,* the opposition 
between member states using the OPT text as an instrument fostering international 
competitiveness and those willing to use the arrangement for preserving employment in the 
Community placed issues of industrial policy at the core of the debate. Thus, from a typical trade 
policy measure, OPT has come 1 0  be an instrument for choosing between two objectives which 
relevance has clearly to do with industrial policy matters.
That trade measures might be used intentionally as an instrument of industrial policy, or 
simply that trade measures entail unintended consequences on the organisation o f industrial 
activity is nothing new. What is particularly interesting in the OPT case is that the process is 
coupled with a simultaneous potential transfer of competence from the national to the 
supranational level.
But the potentials were indeed not seized. Whereas member states were particularly 
aware of the underlying implications of the legislation in industrial-policy terms, the Commission 
remained exclusively focused on the objective of harmonising trade conditions in strict technical 
terms.
im By contrast, recall that the tariff OPT concerns all good placed in free circulation, irrespective of their 
origin.
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5.2  OPT and Widening: the political underpinnings of the regional division o f labour
The OFT story is not only relevant for understanding how effective the deepening of the 
Community is in providing a ‘europeanised’ framework of opportunity and constraint As shown 
in Part H, OPT is also one important determinant of the terms under which regional economic 
integration takes place. At the same time a policy response to international competition, and a 
factor contributing to the widening process, the OPT example thus suggests how the enlargement 
of the Community owes part of its raison d’être to globalisation.1"
The OPT case is telling as far as the underlying logic and the actual outcome achieved 
by the process of enlargement are concerned. Beyond, it is interesting in the context of the 
multiplication of regional co-operation schemes between areas at different levels of 
development Thus, the European enlargement process can be considered to be a useful case 
study highlighting the specificity or, on the contrary, the exemplarity o f the latter.
In a  similar vein to the previous section which focused on the contribution of OPT to the 
deepening process, the present part aims at gauging how effectively the widening process 
develops in the context of the internationalisation of EU firms' production activities: what is 
exactly the nature of the response to the pressure of globalisation proposed by enlargement and 
what is the outcome achieved?
/ .  Theoretical contributions on regional integration
There are several topics addressed the literature on regional integration which can 
provide useful guidelines for making sense of the issues at stake in the OFT story. One important 
characteristic of such a body of literature is its highly eclectic composition, directly ascribable to 
the ill-defined notion of 'integration*. There are indeed various forms and multiple dimensions to 
the phenomenon which invite to adopt as many perspectives. Possible categorisations would 
distinguish economic vs political, regional vs international, microeconomic vs macroeconomic.
lw In fact, enlargement is rightly and commonly considered to be an issue ascribable to the sphere of high 
politics. But if one is to fully understand what the eventual political shape of the European continent will 
be, it is necessary to bring into the picture the terms under which economic interdependence develops 
between the two areas: how exactly Central and Eastern Europe fits into the regional division of labour is 
no less determining than security issues in this respect. Hence the two dimensions should not be held 
separate: if anything, in the name of the indeterminacy relative to the sense of causation. An interesting 
approach to how security matters and economic transactions interact is in Bertsch, Vogel, and Zielonka 
(1991).
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vertical vs horizontal« de jure vs de facto integration ... etc (Panic, 1988], If anything, this 
testifies to the range of the issues at stake in regional integration. Broadly speaking, there are two 
strands of approaches ordering such issues: a first one is concerned with the different possible 
forms regional integration can take, whereas the second one is more interested in the 
consequences of the latter. Of course, the two series of developments are not exclusive.
In the following, a review of the literature will select the most relevant approaches and 
assess the insight they bring into the OPT story. As in the case of similar previous exercises, it 
will be shown that by confronting the OPT empirical evidence with pertinent theories much can 
be learnt from OPT in a feed-back process.
i!
Different stages
A predominant approach considers economic integration to be a process rather than a 
state; a first question has therefore to do with its different stages, and the evolution from one 
stage to another. As a matter of fact, first analyses were taking place in parallel with the 
formation of the European Community, which underlying normative principles of development, 
mainly formalised in Jean Monnet's doctrine, inevitably influenced the former [Machlup, 1977]. 
In 1961, Balassa proposed his dynamic approach to regional integration, with the identification 
of at least four forms representing various degrees of integration: free trade area, custom union, 
common market, and the formation of an economic union. Eventually, the process yields 
complete economic integration [Belassa, 1961: 2], It is not explicit, but Ballassa treats these 
different forms of regional integration as if they were taking place in a chronological order, after 
having progressively gone through such different stages, the process culminates in an all- 
encompassing political integration translating into the enforcement of the principle of 
supranationality.
A slightly different interpretation of the stage approach to regional integration consists in 
distinguishing between positive and negative integration (Tinbergen, 1954:77], Indeed, 
integration can be more or less strong depending on the degree of centralisation of economic 
policies. Whereas during the 'negative' phase of integration, all the barriers to exchange are 
removed, the positive stage sees the implementation of common economic policies. This second 
view corresponds to Balassa's account of the opposition between 'liberalist' and 'dirigist* ideals of 
economic integration: the former is limited to trade liberalisation, the latter has to do with co­
ordination (not necessarily in the context of lifted trade barriers) [Balassa, 1961: 7].
Finally, an additional version of a stage approach to integration rests on the distinction 
between 'shallow' and 'deep' integration [UNCTC, 1993J. In this case it is referred to the 
difference between the integration of trade and that of international production activities; 
although it is now acknowledged that the two go hand in hand [Julius, 1990], there might be a
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short laps of time with trade integration preceding the development of the interpenetration of 
production activities on a regional basis.
Different arrangements
More recent developments tend to set aside a view in terms of chronologically ordered 
stages: the emphasis is rather placed on the difference between the various forms of regional 
integration schemes, characterised by distinctive substantial traits that do not necessarily evolve 
towards a homogenous outcome. One area of research is, for example, the difference between 
free trade areas and custom unions.10'
This second kind of approaches is a prerequisite before tackling the other big issue at 
stake in the theory of economic integration: the welfare consequences of integration.* 110 Viner, a 
definitive reference in this respect, elaborated on the seminal distinction between the notions of 
trade creation and diversion [Viner, I960]. Whereas the former yields an increase of welfare, the 
latter leads to the opposite result; overall, the effects of integration remain indeterminate. 
Although such a result seemed quite robust, an impressive numbers of studies tackled the same 
question, without any major theoretical breakthrough. Some of the most important contributions 
are presented by Massell (1965) who concluded that there is always a non preferential trade 
policy superior to the Custom Union option, by Corden (1972) who introduced the notion of 
economies of scale in the study of regional integration, by Johnson (1965) who modified the 
definition o f welfare traditionally adopted, and by Kemp and Wan (1976) who reached the 
conclusion that a custom union is always beneficial provided that the Common External Tariff is 
fixed in such a way as to leave unaffected trade with the rest of the world, whereas intra-member 
trade is enhanced”1 [Cline, 1994].
Several critiques can be addressed to such developments111, but their main weakness is 
probably their almost exclusive focus on static considerations. As a matter of fact, and as 
suggested by Balassa quite early, it seems unrealistic to neglect the dynamic consequences of 
regional integration which are probably more important than the static welfare effects [Balassa, 
1961], Different analytical tools can be used for doing so, in particular, the assumptions of 
monopolistic competition and oligopolistic market structure, as well as developments concerning
100 E.g. A.O. Krueger who analyses the implications as far as the use of rules of origin is concerned.
110 De Melo, Panagariya, and Rodrik, for example, consider the respective welfare effects of the different 
possible regional integration arrangements (De Melo, Panagariya, 1993).
111 This result is considered by Bliss to be a "typical economist's result" (and indeed the same could be said 
of the ones mentioned above): although it goes to the essential point of gains in efficiency, it assumes that 
policy makers have at their disposal ideal instruments, and that agents (here the rest of the world) react in a 
rational way (Bliss, Braga De Macedo, 1990:20).
11JSee Hine (1994), El-Agraa (1994), De Melo and Panagaryia (1993), Gunter in Greeanway, Hydak, and 
Thornton (1989)...
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endogenous growth.111 *Empirically, it is the Emerson report on the effect of the implementation 
of the single European Act which marks an important contribution in Applied Economics 
(Emerson et ai. 1988]; it was followed by a series of studies which qualified the optimistic view 
of the Emerson report but which dealt with the matter in the same spirit114.
Regional integration vs multilateral liberalisation
A distinct approach to regional integration is rather concerned with its external 
consequences. The debate over the potential clashing objectives of regional arrangements and 
World-Wide trade liberalisation has been recently revived by the development of regional 
schemes of co-operation like the NAFTA, along with the apparent faltering commitment of the 
traditional US commitment to multilateralism [De Melo, Panagaryia, 1993]. Very roughly, there 
is on one side the tenants of multilateralism who stress the contradictions between the two 
liberalisation modalities, and argue that regional arrangements, if not carefully channelled, can 
imperil the wider objective of free trade111; and on the other side, there are those who maintain 
that regional liberalisation is a first step in the establishment of free trade at the world-wide 
scale11*. This second approach is approximately the position expressed by the GATT in its Article 
XXIV, where Custom Unions and Free Trade Areas, if based on the principle of total preference, 
are considered to be 2nd-best paving the way for generalised free trade.
Locational issues
It is worth noting that the questions at stake in the studies on regional integration 
mentioned so far are mainly concerned with efficiency issues: the benchmark adopted to assess 
the effects of regional trade liberalisation -sometimes only implicitly- is an hypothetical state of 
optimal allocation traditionally associated with free trade. In this view, it is assumed that the 
outcome of unrestricted trade liberalisation is known, and that it brings about optimal results; the 
question is thus the extent to which the regional setting for such a process alters the ‘normal' 
issue. This is clearly the case for the problematique 'regionalism' vs 'multilateralism*, as well as 
for the determination of the welfare effects of regional integration. As to other approaches (e.g. 
that concerning the dynamics of regional integration), if they do not deal directly with efficiency 
matters, they neither address the question of the influence of regional integration on the 
distribution of economic activity within an integrated area.
111 See, for example, Ethier, and Horn (1984) and Smith and Venables (1990), quoted in Hine (1994).
114 See Winters, and Venables (1991), and Winters (1992).
111 See for example Bhagwaii (1992a), and 1992b).
114 See for example, Krugman (1992), and (1993).
Yet, allocation issues are no less important Although the consequences of regional 
liberalisation and integration on the allocation of resources seems intuitively far-reaching, there 
are surprisingly few studies addressing the matter. Brown and Stem, for example, identify 3 
channels thereby integration schemes affect member countries: intersectoral specialisation, 
rationalisation effects, and macroeconomic consequences1”
A first strand of researches dealing with the former category seeks to determine the type 
of trade specialisation regional integration brings about As a matter of fact the hypothesis that 
intra-regional trade is more likely to be of an intra-industry sort has been proposed, mainly on the 
basis of the empirical evidence provided by the European experience (see Chapter 4). But this 
attempt does not really tackle the wAere-question.
A second type of researches is ascribable to the field of Economic geography which 
provides, a priori, an ideal background for tackling the impact of trade liberalisation on the 
location of industries: markets are considered to be 'spatial* entities11', and notions like 
'agglomeration* brought into the picture. A first version of this strand dates back to Alfred 
Weber's work on location theory formulated in 1929“*; subsequent analyses adopting a 'spatial' 
view of economic activity comprise, among others, Perroux's discussion of poles of development, 
and Giersch's idea that economic integration weakens agglomeration along national lines1”. 
Balassa himself introduces locational considerations in his theory of regional integration with the 
distinction between mobile and immobile external economies.* 111
But there are some attempts, at the margin between International Economics and 
Economic Geography, addressing locational issues in the context of regional trade liberalisation. 
Krugman and Venables, for example, look at the integration of peripheral low wage countries 
into a core o f larger and more developed countries [Krugman, Venables, 1990]. They propose a 
model for determining the effect of such a process on the competitiveness of the periphery's 
industry where the outcome varies according to the degree of trade liberalisation. When trade 
barriers are high, industries can be marginally relocated in the periphery, with the only objective 
of accessing local markets; when trade is being liberalised with still significant barriers, industry 
is likely to remain in the core countries in order to take advantage of higher economies of scale; 
it is only when trade is completely liberalised that industries are relocated in the periphery to 
take advantage of lower wages. This example is quite unusual in relating the form of trade 
liberalisation to changes in the location of economic activity within an integrating area“1: even
11T Brown and Stem (1989) quoted in Hine (1994).
This characteristics of markets flows from the observation that there are transportation costs, and more 
generally that intermarket transactions entail peculiar costs.
a'*Cf Alfred Weber, Theory o f  Location o f  Industries, 1929, Chicago: Chicago University Press. Quoted in 
Balassa (1961: 193).
Op. cit; 192.
111 Whereas the former are not bound to a certain location, the latter are localised. See Balassa (1961: 195). 
121... as much as its practical relevance is limited.
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when the location effects of trade liberalisation is tackled, only scant attention is paid to the 
forms of trade liberalisation. Trade liberalisation is taken for granted, and barely any distinction 
is made between the process and its result* trade liberalisation is usually identified with its 
outcome, i.e., free trade.™
Regional integration and regional development
Alternative approaches to regional integration rather place the stress on the economic 
dimension o f integration without much reference to the institutional form of the regional setting 
within which the latter takes place.™ This is particularly the case of approaches developed on the 
basis of the empirical observation of the Asian regional model of integration; the latter being 
indeed characterised by the absence of political agreement™ Conceptual tools have been put 
forward such as the ‘flying geese’ analogy according to which a regional dynamics of integration 
is established on the basis of the spread of development models from country to country. ™ 
Applying Vernon* s Product Cycle Model to the Asian regional context international trade 
followed by the relocation of production activities in successive waves, is considered to be the 
channel through which a process upgrading country’s comparative advantages and local 
technological capability takes place.
An interesting counter-argument can be developed on the basis of the notion of Cross- 
National Production Networks. In Ernst’s definition, they correspond to
“the organization across national borders of research and development activities, 
procurement, distribution, product definition and design, manufacturing, and support 
service” [Doherty, 1995].
Their development is to be connected to the transformation of the conditions of 
international competition and to the trends towards the out-sourcing (Tiollowing-out) of firms'
activities.
Bernard and Ravenhill, for example, use the notion of production networks to account 
for the process of regional integration in Asia. The driving force of such a process are: the 
globalisation of production networks, increased intergovernmental dispute over bilateral 
economic relationships, and the rapid pace of technological change [Bernard, Ravenhill, 1995].
™ Thus in modelling trade liberalisation, it is often referred to the complete elimination of tariff. At best 
some proxies for Non Tariff Barriers are the basis for computation.
1M See also the opposition between ‘corporate integration’ and ‘regional integration’.
™ However, mention should of course be made of the ASEAN programme of trade liberalisation.... 
m The ‘flying geese’ analogy was developed, among others, by Bruce Cumings in 1984.
172
They argue that rather than the migration of products across national economies, the Asian 
development pattern produces
‘a new regional division of labour that is based not on national economies but on 
regionalized networks of production’ [Bernard, Ravenhill, 1995: 206].
2. OPT and the political dimension o f economic interdependence
One major assumption characterising most of the above theories of regional integration is 
that although they study the interaction between economic interdependence and the legal 
framework providing for it, the two domains of politics and economics are held separate in the 
sense that they are considered to be ascribable to distinct logics. The OPT example, on the 
contrary, questions the separability of ’pure' economic determinants (market forces) and political 
and institutional factors. There are several facets to this features with different implications.
Trade liberalisation matters
First, the OPT example invites to remedy the lack of consideration given to locational 
issues. More precisely, it pinpoints the politicisation of the effective distribution of economic 
activity.
One illustration of the political dimension of the EU-CEEC pattern of economic 
interdependence is indeed given by the fact that institutional factors like the form and the speed 
of trade liberalisation influence trade specialisation and the division of labour at the regional 
scale. Indeed, the actual process of trade liberalisation to which the OPT arrangement contributes 
is a fully-fledged component of the framework of constraints and opportunities in which firms 
take their decision. It was argued earlier that the OPT legislation not only makes possible 
relocation in sectors heavily protected, but it also biases the overall economic exchanges between 
the EU and CEECs. It does so in at least two ways. First, features like the partial or complete 
suspension of trade restrictions, access to high quality inputs for free and possible technology 
transfers and know how spillovers, represent for local partners truly appealing incentives. This is 
a bias toward OPT at the expense of other possible vehicles of international production [Corado, 
1995].
Second, by liberalising trade in an uneven and protracted way, the OPT arrangement is a 
very effective tool for discriminating between products, firms, and sectors. Drawing its raison 
d’être from the residual existence of trade obstacles during the liberalisation process, the OPT 
example makes clear that trade liberalisation does not take place all at once, suddenly freeing
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market forces. On the contrary, the above analysis of trade restrictions measures pertaining to 
OPT (Chapter 2) showed that the bindingness of the latter is quite significant Thus, the 
transition period during which trade is being liberalised matters; far from being neutral, it has an i
important impact on trade specialisation.117
Seen in this light the OPT arrangement is indeed an ingenious device favouring Western 
producers in the exploitation of CEECs’ comparative advantages at the expense of local firms. It 
creates the basis for compatible patterns of trade specialisation and industrial organisation in 
sectors which are typically a potential source of threat i.e.t where local actors would have the 
best chances to develop their own competitive positions in the so-called "sensitive'* sectors. In 
other terms, it transforms ‘rivalry’ into ‘complementary’ patterns of specialisation [Zysman,
19961
Firm-specific features matter the size of OPT partners
Interestingly enough, the above institutional factors, i.e., the form and the speed of trade 
liberalisation in general, and the OPT arrangement in particular, can have far-reaching impacts 
on the patterns and the terms of economic interdependence between the EU and CEECs. But not 
necessarily the ones expected. Indeed, the empirical part suggests that OPT incidence can go far 
beyond such a ‘shallow* level and digs deeper into the terms under which the regional division of 
labour is shaped.
In fact, it is not simply institutional factors which alter market forces: firm-level 
variables play also an important role. As argued in Chapter 4, institutional and market 
determinants take their full significance through the ‘prism’ of firm-specific variables. It was 
seen that depending on the size of the firms party to an OPT agreement, the OPT arrangement 
yields very different contributions to the patterns of regional integration.
Finns’ size acts as intervening variables by making sense of the bindingness of trade 
restrictions. Big firms with important production capacities, in sectors facing binding quotas, are 
likely to resort to OPT for a large proportion of their production in order to ease quantitative 
restrictions, and access EU markets. In this case, OPT can provide a useful substitute for 
internalisation, thus favouring the ‘vertical quasi-integration’ of firms party to an OPT 
agreement Big firms arc, therefore, more likely candidates for the consolidation of OPT 
partnerships than smaller counterparts.
117 Time considerations, when at all, are tackled in the context of the debate regionalism vs multilateralism. 
See, for example, Hine (1994: 247), and Baghwati in De Melo and Panagariya (1993).
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3. The contribution o f OPT to the dynamics o f regional integration
Different OFT networks* and different trajectories
Very differentiated outcomes result from the fact that firm-level variables intervene in 
the structuration of OPT relationships. It was shown that the notion of ‘OPT Networks’ is an 
intermediate unit of analysis particularly germane to capture the multiple variations of the 
features characterising OPT partnerships. They consist of a ‘trinity’ comprising the home 
country, the host country, and the sector.
Looking at OPT networks made possible the identification of very uneven and 
unsystematic patterns of OPT relations between the EU and CEECs.
For a start, the criteria of the home countries of OPT firms made clear that OPT is a  very 
German story. To a much lower extent, Italian firms were able to take advantage of the 
arrangement in a significant way. It is also a strategy adopted by Dutch, Italian and French 
companies, but at a much smaller scale, and mostly (if not only) in T&C.
A fundamental sectoral difference is given by the divide between the textile and clothing 
industry on the one hand, and sectors like electrical and mechanical machinery, on the other 
hand. Whereas T&C OPT absolute levels and proportions in total trade are increasing at 
exponential rates, the latter sectors have been registering reductions of OPT dependence1”.
As to consideration pertaining to host-country variables, they make clear a striking 
distinction between the former Czechoslovakia which is increasingly attractive to German OPT 
partners and Hungary which markedly reduces its dependence on OPT with German firms.
Further distinction is to be made by combining the above features. German OPT 
networks in the former Czechoslovakia are widely extended across sectors, and tend to be 
characterised by long-term horizons. In Hungary, instead, they are in a withdrawing phase. On 
the face of it, OPT networks involving new-comer Italian partners in Hungary are comparatively 
more dynamic, more footloose, and specialised in relatively original sectors like pharmaceuticals 
and plastics. As to OPT networks in T&C, they involve firms from more diversified home 
countries, and are characterised by extremely high proportion of OPT in total trade.
The use of OPT and its underlying logic is likely to vary widely depending on the OPT 
network considered. The latter are likely to differ in several ways, for example with respect to 
their geographical structure. While some partnerships source increasingly locally (and/or from
*" Further distinguishing between the two latter sectors, strong decreases of OPT absolute levels 
characterise the mechanical sector, whereas the exact opposite tendency is specific to the electrical 
machinery sector...
other CEECs), other make exclusive use of exported inputs. Similarly, as far as the output is 
concerned, certain OPT networks are characterised by a peculiar tendency to gear the processed 
products to  a third EU country rather than to the original home country. OPT networks differ also 
according to functional and organisational considerations: whereas some o f them are closely 
associated with the reorganisation o f  the sourcing system o f big multinational companies at the 
regional level, others are motivated mainly by costs differentials and are designed in a traditional 
bilateral way. Yet another distinctive trait has to do with the nature of the tasks relocated with 
local partners, going from the entire value-added chain to only some specific and usually very 
labour-intensive stages o f  production.
M ost importantly, the fact that the institutional determinants of OPT make sense at the 
level of the firm entails a  wide range o f differentiated outcomes as far as the prospects o f OPT 
partnerships are concerned. There are thus many possible ‘trajectories’ characterising each single 
OPT network, and the size o f OPT partners was shown to be a useful discrim inant
They revolve around a pivotal alternative. In the case o f big firms, OPT agreements are 
more likely to shift away from "one-way" relationships, turn into more equal and balanced 
partnerships, and move up along the value added chain. On the contrary, OPT relations involving 
smaller partners, are more likely to  be sensitive to rising wage levels while distance (proximity) 
cannot remain the only incentive.
The empirical evidence o f Part II speak in favour o f the formation o f Cross-National 
Production Networks (CNPN) in the T&C . Some possibilities were also found mainly between 
Czech and German partners, and mainly in the electrical machinery sector.
In these cases, the contribution of OPT to a complex rationalisation o f production 
activities a t the regional scale is mostly ascribable to individual corporate strategies adopted by 
big firms. The latter adopt a true regional outlook where wages levels, even though they were 
initially primary factors, fade away in comparison with other motives. In the T& C sector, for 
example, relocating to CEECs makes it possible to implement new production techniques which, 
in turns, satisfy to the requirem ents of a more complex and volatile demand. Thus CAM 
techniques1” enable Just in Time and lean production methods. By shortening the cycle of 
production, OPT thus becomes a  powerful instrument to respond very quickly - say 3 days - to 
sudden changes o f fashion and demand.
Big firms in the T& C sector like Hugo Boss (recently bought by Marzotto) and Baumler 
have taken advantage o f the arrangement in this view. They are therefore successful examples of 
strategies keeping up with the latest technological developments.* 130
3” Computer Assisted Methods
130 They offer a picture which contrasts with that brushed by Mytelka in her description of the latest 
sluggish developments in the Korean T&C. See Mytelka 1995.
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In the other cases, on the contrary, it was proposed that OFT most likely corresponds to 
cross-border transactions undertaken by German SME in neighbouring countries in order to ease 
high labour costs at home. Proximity can to a certain extent off-set rising wages, but this type of 
OFT is anyhow likely to be driven by shorter term considerations in the context of a strategy 
designed in a very bilateral view.
Different impacts on regional development
If firm-specific features like the respective size of OFT partners are an important 
intervening variable in the determination of OPT trajectories, it means that the terms of the 
complementarity achieved through OPT take actually their full significance at the level of the 
firm. This has far-reaching implications for the terms and the dynamics of regional economic 
integration and it makes any generalisation impossible.
In the case of the cessation of an OPT partnership, whether foreign partners re-relocate 
their activities further East while transforming their local OFT partnership into long-term 
engagement, or whether they simply withdraw horn their commitment without contemplating 
alternative strategy obviously entails different consequences in terms of local and regional 
development Hence, the trajectories of OFT networks can either contribute to make rival 
specialisation patterns complementary through a durable vertical division of laoour (vs 
homogeneity and horizontal linkages), or merely revert to rivalry. In the former case, rivalry can 
be made complementary either in space (with the possible emergence of Cross National 
Production Networks) or in time (with successive waves of relocation in conformity with the 
predictions of the Product Cycle Model, and the flying geese analogy).
In the former case, OPT contributes to the definition of a  hierarchical division o f labour 
based on regional heterogeneity. On the contrary, when OPT is driven by the search for lower 
factor prices, much will depend on whether local firms can take over OPT production on their 
own, and thus pave the way for indigenous autonomous development Yet another issue at stake 
concerning the case of prolonged OPT partnerships, is the question as to whether local partners 
are durably locked into a low wage specialisation pattern.
The available evidence speaks broadly of a complementarity achieved in space in the 
T&C sector, while cross-border transactions of the ‘maquilladora’ type take place in the other 
sectors, mainly between German and Czech partners. Interestingly enough, the respective trends 
characterising German OPT in Hungary and in the former Czechoslovakia suggest that rather 
than ‘re-relocation’ further East to countries where wage conditions are still favourable, it is an 
‘inbound’ wave of relocation which has occurred, taking advantage of proximity.
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CNPN in T&C convey the most favourable prospects for the development of local 
capabilities, and eventual movements up the market. As a matter of fact, they are in principle an 
adequate vehicle for organising technology transfer. In the other cases where OPT developments 
mainly correspond to ‘workbench’ activities undertaken by German firms in their Eastern 
neighbour countries, the issue in this respect is more uncertain. However, evidence from trade 
statistics and from fieldwork suggested that Hungarian firms were successful at disentangling 
from OPT and at taking over production on their own. If this is anything to go by, even when it 
corresponds to the workbench activities of smaller firms designed on a shorter time-horizon, 
OPT has some potentials for strengthening local capabilities.
Overall, the OPT contribution to the establishment of a regional dynamics of integration 
varies according to the sector concerned, the size of the partner firms, and the partner countries,
i.e., that it differs depending on the considered ‘OPT network*.
An interesting policy implication is that if CNPN which are the direct product of 
Western policy choices, are also the most beneficial in terms of local development, an invitation 
is indirectly extended to local governments to adopt a more active stance: the development of 
local technological capabilities through OPT is also a policy matter.
Answers to theoretical contributions on Regional Integration
The above picture of the contribution of OPT to economic interdependence between 
Eastern and Western Europe provide many direct answers to some distinctions and predictions 
too fast taken for granted in the literature on regional integration.
The fact that the location and distribution of economic activity can be, to a large extent, 
institutionally and therefore politically underpinned has important consequences as far as the 
basic distinction between Tiberalist* and ’dirigist' approaches to regional integration is concerned. 
It questions the pertinence of the position held by the proponents of regional integration limited 
to free trade as opposed to more interventionist developments. In other terms, the validity of the 
distinction between positive and negative integration is at stake. The empirical evidence showing 
how OPT affects CEECs* trade specialisation and the division of labeur between the CEECs and 
the EU thereby anchors the view expressed by Balassa into concrete demonstration; in his words, 
it would be a
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"great error to believe that the decision to create regional unions would re-establish the 
conditions of an economic liberalism extirpating with one stroke all the so-called dirigist 
policies" [Balassa, 1961:9J.
An additional channel through which the institutions implementing regional integration 
alter economic outcome is therefore identified.”1 The OPT story invites to focus on the locational 
consequences of trade liberalisation within a regional context It shows that institutional factors 
like the form and the speed of trade liberalisation are an important source of alteration of market 
determ inants.
In a straightforward way the OPT example also invites to reconsider the distinction 
between shallow integration (limited to trade) and deep integration (encompassing production 
activities as well). As a matter of fact, the institutional background shaping the trade 
specialisation resulting from trade liberalisation resorts primarily to trade policy instruments, but 
its ultimate impact is to be gauged on the organisation of international production activities 
throughout Europe. In this sense, the OPT mechanisms can be viewed as 'Investment-related 
trade measures'; they illustrate how integration through trade and integration through 
international production activities can occur simultaneously, the 2 being different dimensions of 
the same phenomenon.
More generally, one of the most interesting implication of the OPT insight for theories 
on regional integration, has to do with the very differentiated patterns of economic 
interdependence the arrangement can yield. In this respect, adopting narrow units of analysis like 
OPT networks is the only way to capture the many possible variations characterising the 
development of OPT between Western and Eastern Europe and its contribution to the process of 
regional integration. This precludes sweeping generalisations on the terms of East-West 
economic interdependence. For example, concerning the prospects of the expansion of the 
current process of regional integration in Europe, generalisations accounting for the political 
economy of the formation of free trade areas like those put forward by Baldwin in his 'domino' 
theory no longer hold [Baldwin, 1995].
” l Four are already defined by De Melo et al (1993). They are: the functions of 'purchase-commitment', 
'preference-dilution', 'preference asymmetry', and of 'institutional-design' o f regional integration.
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5 .3  Conclusion
The present Chapter explored the way in which an integrated Europe is a response of 
national governments to the internationalisation of firms strategies. Before drawing too general 
conclusions, it is worth addressing the issue of the exemplarity of OPT. Indeed, the mechanisms 
characterising the OPT story are not necessarily at work in other domains of European 
integration. One would therefore be ill-advised to conclude in general on the inappropriateness 
of harmonisation as an integrative mode or on the relevance of the notion of production networks 
to characterise East-West economic interdependence.
This is actually more than a caveat Paradoxically, the limited pertinence of OPT is a 
feature which has itself a general validity. It invites to consider the whole process of integration 
as compounded by a set o f differentiated arrangements, which are not necessarily working in the 
same direction, and which therefore do not necessarily produce a precise, pre-definite outcome. 
It suggests that the Community is not a polity in formation supposedly undergoing a period of 
transition before reaching a final but unforeseen destination111. Rather than a dynamic continuum 
between an intergovemmentalist starting point and a federalist outcome, Keohane and Hoffmann 
convincingly propose to view European integration as a ‘supranational process* which is not 
directionless, but which is not to follow predetermined and/or normative patterns of 
development it is neither an emerging state -or a regime [Keohane, Hoffmann, 191: 10).
What is more, the contribution of the arrangement to European integration itself is far 
from univocal. Whether OPT promotes the deepening of the process and under what (economic) 
terms it participates to the Community enlargement depends on the sectors and the partner 
countries concerned.
In the following, it is necessary to combine the points made in the present Chapter. On 
the one hand, the OPT arrangement did not achieve the centralisation of competence on OPT 
matters at the Community level; on the other hand, its contribution to the terms of economic 
interdependence within an enlarged Europe is highly uneven. 13
133 It is an approach mainly characterising the federalist standpoint.
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Chapter 6. Conclusions: globalisation and governance
The present Chapter draws the conclusions from the above analysis of the contribution of 
OPT to the European integration process, in both its widening and deepening aspects. Its 
objective is to provide an overarching framework of analysis combining the various insights that 
the study of OPT suggests.
As a matter of fact it pulls together different tales which are only apparently 
disconnected. On the one hand, it was shown that the arrangement has been adopted and has 
developed in the context of what is commonly considered to be the progressive loss of political 
control over economic interdependence in certain sectors. However, contrary to what might have 
been expected, this did not favour an effective centralisation of competence at the European 
level. As a result, a nascent Community-wide industrial policy could not take root, and distinct 
national regimes kept on providing different frameworks of constraints and opportunities.
On the other hand, the central part o f  the dissertation insisted on the importance of the 
notion of production networks to account for the patterns of economic interdependence 
developing within the context of the eastern enlargement of the EU. It was made clear that the 
contribution of OPT to the dynamics of regional integration varies widely from OPT network to 
OPT network. It is only in certain sectors and between certain partner countries that the 
mechanisms of OPT do effectively promote a complex and durable division of labour at the 
regional scale.
This concluding Chapter draws the full implications from these evidences for the 
Governance of the economy. It might be tempting to interpret the above developments as an 
illustration of the failure to implement a system of governance of the wider European market 
economy. In fact, they illustrate the failure of transposing the national model o f governance at 
the Community level. At the same time, they pinpoint alternative and sui-generis mechanisms of 
governance underlying the European integration process.
The fact that the strong potentials of the OPT arrangement to establish a system of 
governance at the European level moulded on the national model were not seized suggests the 
inadequacy of the latter to cope with economic interdependence. Such a model presents indeed 
several shortcomings like the reference to the notions of territory and boundaries, and beyond, 
the very way in which political authority in economic matters is exercised.
The mechanisms of governance highlighted by the OPT developments, instead, do not 
necessarily refer to a  territory comprised within boundaries and they do not necessarily involve 
the traditional actors considered to be the exclusive source of politicisation of economic activity. 
The risk is that by being radically new, these mechanisms of governance are not acknowledged
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as such. But they deserve as much if not more attention than the traditional system, if anything 
because they are perhaps more germane for tackling the fast-developing mutations at work in the 
world economy.
Overall, the OFT example suggests that it is perhaps too fast and easily referred to a 
territorial frame as a unit of analysis, and a centralised political authority as a major player in the 
game: as though the governance of the economy could not take place at other levels, and at the 
instigation of actors playing new roles.
6 ,1 The governance of the economy: on the Indeterminacy o f economic necessity
J. Premise
A system of governance of the economy can be defined as a mode of interaction between 
economic and political variables. First comes the economic imperative acting as an irreducible 
constraint Then additional 'political' factors ('exogenous* as economists would put it) complete 
the picture: whereas economic variables have a primary crucial bindingness over the eventual 
outcome, the latter is fully determined only in co-ordination with political variables. In other 
words, because of the (omni)presence in economic action of logics other than that of the market, 
a ‘purely economically-driven economic behaviour is undetermined* (Hollingsworth et al., 
1994J. Overall, according to Hollingsworth, Schmitter and Streeck, a system of governance 
refers to
‘institutional arrangements -including rules and rule-making agents- that regulate the 
transactions inside and across the boundaries of an economic system’ [Hollingsworth et al. 
1994: 4].
This premise is indeed the basis of studies in Political Economy.“  In Rival States, Rival 
Firms, Stop ford and Strange show how common constraints in the international political 
economy can trigger very different policy response. Other classic examples like Hall’s and 
Gourcvitch’s comparative analyses of economic policy, posit as a starting point the 
indeterminacy of economic factors. Whereas Gourevitch refers to the 'politics of policy’
m The research agenda in (International) Political Economy places the emphasis on the synthesis between 
Economics and Politics rather than merely looking at their relations. See Strange (1994:14).
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[Gourevitch, 1986: 2], Hall considers economic policy-making to be a highly political process 
[Hall, 1986].
The above definition is usually associated with some underlying assumptions which tend 
to be perhaps too fastly taken for granted. First, it is commonly implicitly considered that a 
feature characterising a system of governance of the economy is the congruence between the 
domain of application of political variables, and that referred to in economic calculations. 
Second, although such a field of congruence can, in principle, have different dimensions, the 
most commonly adopted is the national constituency. Third, because of such a focus on the 
national frame, state authorities are often considered to be the main, if not the exclusive source 
of structuration.
2. Shortcomings
The above underlying assumptions regarding the working o f a system of governance are 
at best questionable. Some theoretical developments are useful to see why before embarking on 
the analysis of OPT contribution in this respect.
Theoretical perspective
Several theoretical backgrounds studying economic activity under different perspectives 
arc useful to highlight different levels and mechanisms of structuration of economic activity.
Different units o f analysis
The above definition of a governance system invites to further concentrate on the 
question of the unit o f analysis. Starting with as comprehensive”4 as possible a list of the possible 
spatial and organisational boundaries of systems of structuration of economic activity is indeed a 
good way to relativise the unicity of the nation-state level and its associated mechanisms of 
governance. In turns, this will make easier the identification of alternative systems of political 
governance of the economy, which are traditionally neglected if not ignored for the simple reason 
that they do not take place within national frontiers.
Paying attention to the question of the appropriate unit of analysis is a good opportunity 
for putting forward the lowest one which is often neglected: firms. Indeed, before asking whether 
patterns arc to be detected at some higher level of aggregation, the analysis should be grounded
but never exhaustive...
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on a close monitoring of corporate strategies. For example, when studying 'industrial 
restructuring', Ruigrok and van Tulder pertinently refer to
j
"changes in the way goods and services are being developed, designed, produced and 
distributed, i.e., to changes in companies* organisation structures and the technology they 
use” [Ruigrok, van Tulder, 1995:2 ]“1
Indeed, different typologies of possible restructuring strategies should primarily apply at 
firm level. For example, firms may opt for horizontal specialisation (inter-industry switch, 
specialisation and product innovation, up-market and niche strategies), locational specialisation 
(off-shore processing, 'finishing touch' assembly, manufacturers' imports and distribution 
activities, and foreign direct investment), and defensive/rationalisation adjustment (modifying 
the factor content of production and transforming a labour-intensive production process into a 
capitalistic one) [Cable, 1983]. An alternative categorisation is proposed in the Cbmmission 
report on the competitiveness of the European T&C industry and may very apply to the firm level 
as well. There are four options: modernisation of product plants, relocation to low-wage 
countries, specialisation and product strategy, and change of organisation and methods [CEC, 
1993: 35].
Next in the hierarchy of the possible levels of aggregation of economic activity are 
'sectors'. The notion is quite controversial... and ^ould  definitely not be directly taken over from 
trade and industrial nomenclatures.
Sector-level analyses tend to be neglected by the International Business and International 
Production literature. An important exception, however, is given by Rival States Rival Firms 
which show how changes in the conditions of international competition has had uneven impact 
on industries [Stopford, Strange, 1991]. In general, sectors or industries are adopted as a 
pertinent level of analysis in some studies in Comparative Politics.
One question is whether sectors arc referred to in opposition to or in combination with 
the national level of aggregation. Are we talking about national sectors, or is it a "mere" sectoral 
logic across countries which is at stake? This makes a difference as the latter notion is purposely 
designed to address the phenomena of globalisation: whereas a sectoral logic across nation is 
determined by economic and technological factors, national sectors of activity are subject to 
politicisation by national determinants.*“
A related question is whether the sector as a unit of analysis is not sometimes unduly 
exenanged with the firm level. As a matter of fact, it might be that certain firms are big enough
255 Italics added.
*“  Interestingly enough, in this view, globalisation is associated with the prevalence of a universal 
economic rationality depoliticised and reduced to the bare bones of technological necessity.
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to dominate an entire sector in short they are a sector. This is a  danger presented by too literal 
an analysis of statistical figures ordered in nomenclatures. Indeed, the confidentiality principle 
hides the firms behind the headings. Again, whether the activity of just one or two big firms 
accounts for the bulk of a 'sector* activity is a feature which is very much in conformity with the 
'critical size* necessary for facing the new modality of international competition.
These points of contention are those at stake in the notion of "sectors" as interpreted by 
Porter, and the proponents of related notions such as "cluster", "industrial complexes", and 
"global commodity chains"... Porter's analysis of sectors' competitiveness, for example, stresses 
the importance of the national setting. In his view, political variables bear upon corporate 
behaviour through the influence that national authorities in charge of policy-making have on the 
'environment* in which firms decide upon their strategy. To be precise, there are 4  of such 
variables: the so-called '4  diamonds’ ... are all factors fostering the competitive advantage of 
firms. If any aggregation of firms* competitive advantage is to be carried out, it does not go 
beyond the level of the industry, which is deemed to be the appropriate unit for analysing 
competitiveness.”7. Even though the analysis, which is concerned with firm-level variables, rules 
out the notion o f national comparative advantage, it nevertheless still applies to national sectors 
of activity.
Still placed in the context of the national setting, but referring to other mechanisms 
thereby national factors influence economic activity, the analysis of "clusters" is based on 
Freeman and Pavitt’s studies of technological innovations. In a technicist and structural vein, the 
authors address differences of technological capabilities and innovativeness between countries 
and gauge the effects of such differences on international patterns of trade and growth [Dosi et 
al., 1990]. In doing so, they come to the conclusion of the importance of sectoral differences 
between national patterns of specialisation. On this basis, some economists have developed the 
notion o f clusters, better suited to trace structural changes in specialisation than the too 
'merceologist' notion of sectors taken over from usual nomenclatures.1” They show how 
technological capabilities, characterising a given national context, are crucial in determining 
productivity and competitiveness at the level of firms. This in turn impacts at the sectoral level, 
thus establishing a strong relation between sectoral and national variables:
m  Hence the inadequacy of the notion of comparative advantage which applies to the national level. In a 
similar vein, Zysman evokes ‘man-made comparative advantages’ (in Krugman, 1991). It seems that there 
is only a semantic difference between Porter’s strand of arguments and Zysman’s analysis of Japan's 
industrial policy. Indeed, according to the latter, the Japanese authorities managed successfully to build 
"comparative advantages” by strengthening firms’ "competitive advantages”. Here 'comparative 
advantages* are meant to apply to sectors. See Zysman (1983).
*“ See for example Guerrieri (1994), who uses a trade database distinguishing between 4 types of 
industries according to their different techn(oIog)ical requirements: science-based sectors, specialised 
supplier sectors, traditional sectors, natural resource-intensive sectors, and scale-intensive sectors.
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“on the one hand (...) processes of technological changes tend to assume varying sectoral 
features (...), on the other hand, the competitive trade advantages of single countries are 
concentrated on given industries and clusters of industries*’ [Guerrieri, Tylecote, 1994: 
50].
Even though Porter’s and the cluster analyses consider eventual production organisation 
to take (partly) place along national lines, the way is paved to relativise the absolute prevalence 
of national traits in the mode of structuration of economic activity. In concepts like 'industrial 
complex', and global commodity chains, national political variables have a different status: if not 
marginal and loosely binding, they have become only one factor among others. Ruigrok and van 
Tulder, for example, identify ’industrial complexes' which link together core Arms, supplying 
firms, dealers, distributors, workers, financiers, and governments [Ruigrok, van Tulder, 1995:7]. 
Such industrial complexes can be contained within what they define a ’national industrial 
systems’, but this is not necessarily so. One has therefore to distinguish between the two:
“if a national economy contains more than one industrial complex, therefore the 
distinction between the individual complex and the national industrial system becomes 
relevant” [ibid.: pi 17],
Another shift in the level of analysis inspired by the fast developing globalisation of 
economic activity is proposed by Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994) and their notion of 'global 
commodity chains’ (GCC). The definition they put forward is very similar to that of industrial 
complexes:
“a GCC consists of sets of interorganizational networks clustered around one commodity 
or product, linking households, enterprises, and states to one another within the world 
economy” [Gereffi, Korzeniewicz, 1994:2]”*.
The difference is that reference to national determinants is to a higher extent 
relativised.140 The very raison d ’être of global commodity chains is the exploitation of 
opportunities on a global scale141: the three criteria used to distinguish between GCCs (the form
m This definition takes over that proposed by Hopkins and Wallerstein for whom a GCC is a “network of 
labour and production processes whose end result in a finished commodity” (1986:159) quoted in ibid.: 2. 
340 There are other differences with the notion of "industrial complexes" besides the question of the relevant 
unit for analysis: the analysis is less descriptive, and more concerned with dynamic (normative?) 
considerations such as the possibility for upgrading and changing the distribution of wealth along the 
chain.
141 GCCs aim at two broad objectives: reducing either transaction costs or labour costs. The first case 
translates into vertical integration and geographical convergence, whereas the second case is associated 
with contractual forms of inter-enterprises co-operations like sub-contracting. These two cases, in turn, 
correspond to 2 different phases in the cycles that the world economy undergoes [Ibid.: 20].
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of a GCC’s input-output structure i.e., its value-added chain, its territoriality, i.e., its spatial 
configuration of production and its plants distribution, and finally, its governance structure, 
whether centralised or not [ibid.: 7]) can occasionally refer to the national context, but ttey do 
not necessarily and systematically do so.
Among the possible levels of aggregation of economic activity, the national setting still 
occupies a place of first choice. Fair enough it has long been and probably still is a prominent 
'agent of structuration’ of political, economic, and social activity.141 *Determinants which bring 
about the ‘nationalisation’ of the outcome are successfully analysed by the literature on 
Comparative Politics; they can be grasped in a historical perspective, or by a more static analysis 
of national institutions.“*
But the long-standing pre-eminence of national determinants in the structuration of 
economic activity is no reason for neglecting other levels of analysis, and other determinants 
arising from "without" i.e., pertaining to the conditions of competition in the world markets. 
Indeed, there is a clear risk of taking the national framework for granted as illustrated by the bias 
characterising the literature on Comparative Politics.144
It is worth insisting, at this point, that what is at stake is not so much the identification of 
the determinants than the scale on which they are considered to impact It is all too common, 
even when factors on the international setting are acknowledged, to restrict the analysis to their 
consequence on variables defined in strict national terms. Most studies in Comparative Politics 
or in Political Economy make an unquestioned reference to the national setting, which is 
sometimes already at work in the very question addressed. Halls, for example, distinguishes 
between various competing models answering the question as to why nations adopt different 
economic policies141 The factors he identifies are all expected to impact nationally. Whether
For the elaboration of the concept of ‘structuration’ see A. Giddens 
w  Wilks, for example, argues that being histones predominantly national so too are the institutions shaping 
the framework of constraints and opportunities within which economic decisions are taken (Wilks, 1996). 
Reference to national institutions being a major concrete factor that ‘nationalise’ economic behaviour is 
also at the basis of Gourevitch’s analysis of policies adopted in response to economic crises. In a similar
vein, Hollingsworth (1994) considers national institutions to be a possible prism through which economic
necessity is expressed and dealt with.
144 Starting with the seminal work of Shonfield (1965) which pioneered research in comparative capitalism, 
a scries of subsequent studies based their analysis of different economic systems on cross-countries 
comparisons. See for example, Albert (1994).
Ui There are 5 of them: functionalist explanations, cultural analyses, public choice theory, group theories, 
and state-centric models.
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identified on the domestic side,14* or in the international arena14’, the determinants of the 
economic policy-making process 'nationalise' the outcome in terms of economic activity .**
That economic activity is not organised exclusively along national lines means that 
political factors do not (should not be expected to) necessarily bring about the nationalisation of 
economic outcome. Indeed the different levels at which economic necessity is politicised 
correspond fundamentally to different systems of governance of the economy.
Different mechanisms o f governance
Parallel to the distinction between different possible units of analysis corresponds the 
differentiation between various mechanisms of governance. The latter might but need not 
necessarily correspond to the former. However, it worth starting by differentiating specific 
modes of governance of the economy14*, with distinct mechanisms thereby politics impinges on 
economics.** according to the level they possibly apply.
Even so, the endeavour is quite hazardous: if alternative levels of structuration of 
economic activity are acknowledged, it is quite paradoxically not necessarily so of mechanisms 
of political governance. Indeed, politicisation along national lines is often considered to be 
politicisation tout court The answer would highlight that even within the national frame, there 
are different systems of governance of the economy. This will prepare for the subsequent 
identification of alternative, and sometimes radically new systems of governance ...
Traditional instruments of economic policy, whether associated with a liberal stamp, or 
ascribable to a more active conception of state intervention in the economy form an often very
144 The respective organisations of labour, capital, and the state, the organisation of the political system 
through which business interests arc voiced.
14T Constraints at work in the international economy, like the place of one considered country within the 
international division of labour.
** The second major reference in the field, Gourevitch’s analysis, suffers from the same drawback. His list 
of the 5 possible approaches to the choice between different packages of economic policy (classical 
liberalism, socialisation, protectionism, demand stimulus, and mercantilism) differs slightly in comparison 
to Hall’s: cultural factors give way to determinants having to do with economic ideology and the too 
undetermined functional analyses are substituted with ‘production profile* explanations maintaining that 
the preferences of societal actors depend on their place in the domestic and international economy. 
Eventually, he privileges explanations locating the main determinants of economic policy in the 
international system impacting on coalition-building (see his notion of ‘second-image reversed’).
149 Rather than the “governance of the economy”, we should start talking about the “governance of 
international production" as “the economy” can easily be exchanged with “the national economy”.
130 These different modes of governance are certainly not exhaustive. In order to give a better account of 
their complex nature, it is probably safer to consider them to be complementary rather than substitutable.
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unquestioned system of governance of the economy (budgetary, and monetary policy, but also 
trade and industrial policy, rc/de/regulation...). A slightly different approach to the national 
governance of the economy looks at the determinants of such economic policy; in other terms, 
the way interests are co-ordinated and represented, and their influence on policy-making. This 
version of a governance system rests on the assumption that interest groups mediate between 
state and society. There are two contending approaches: pluralism and corporatism"1. Both 
strands of studies are concerned with the question as to how 'collective action*” takes place; they 
consider institutional factors (like the political system) and, to a lesser extent socio-economic 
conditions and market factors, to be the main variables accounting for the form and the 
effectiveness of political expression. Group formation depends on
'‘the impact of national experience, the weight of intraorganizational factors in defining 
interests, and the role of the state in structuring relations among interests" [Berger, 1980: 
10].
Whereas in a pluralist model, interest groups are held to compete in a political market 
none of them could dominate, in a corporatist scheme, labour unions and organised capital are 
two formations characterised by a major clout That the national jurisdiction is the pertinent level 
for analysing (neo)corporatism goes without saying. Indeed, tripartite negotiations between 
labour, industry federations and the government take place under the auspices of the latter, which 
provides the ultimate warrant to the system. But it is also the case of the (neo-)pluralist approach. 
Even though pluralism allows for case-by-case bargains between economic actors (e.g. firms) 
and the political authority thus in principle making possible an analysis partially disconnected 
from national references (see Grant 1987), in practice, the analysis Is systematically carried out 
within distinct national contexts.*3 Thus whether in a pluralist vein, or according to a corporatist 
version, the study o f business representation is irredeemably incline to ask all over the same 
question of
44why different interests are present and organised in various societies and of why from  
country to country the same groups may conceive their interests quite differently” 
[Berger, 1981:6]“
131 This dual opposition is over-simplified. Mention should be made of approaches considering business as 
a "privileged interest" (see W. Grant, 1987), as well as those taking over the notion of 'policy networks' 
(see Marin, and Mayntz, 1991).
151M. Olson in 1965.
" 3 One study of reference is the Research Project of Schmitter and Streeck which produced a large amount 
of sectoral analyses tracing neo-corporatist patterns of negotiations among ‘social partners'. See Schmitter, 
Streeck (1981). One published of such studies is Grant et al. (1988). See also Mariinelli (1991).
“  Emphasis added.
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Yet another way to approach mechanisms of governance referring to the national setting 
consists this time in looking more downstream at the influence of political authorities on the 
environment within which economic decisions are taken. As such, it is a milder way for national 
traits to characterise the outcome. This type of mechanism is the one (implicitly) at work in the 
analysis of clusters and sectors ¿t-la-Porter.
More focused on individual firms, and more disconnected from the national context, the 
‘triangular diplomacy* depicted by Stopford and Strange refers to another mode of governance of 
the economy [Stopford, Strange, 1991]. It is based on a direct bargaining process between states 
and big multinational companies which are partners very much placed on an equal footing.11* It 
implies ad-hoc relations between partners in a negotiation, with outcomes varying from deal to 
deal and no pre-established whatsoever patterns. Here, an important shift has taken place; it is no 
longer referred to the national setting, or territory within which economic activity follows 
specific patterns. Rather, the emphasis is placed on governments; if anything national 
governments. What is important is that the proper unit for analysing the outcome is politicised 
not along national lines, but varies according to the negotiation, i.e., on a firm basis. It should be 
stressed that this view is not to be exchanged with the pluralist version of interest representation. 
Indeed the difference is the very scale on which the two mechanisms of interaction between 
economic and political (f)actors take place. In contrast with the triangular diplomacy model, 
states structures are, in the pluralist view, an overarching framework in which varying interests 
are opposed and harmonised. Similarly, the bargaining model should be held distinct from 
previous analyses of ‘national champions* promoted by the state [Vernon, 1974]. Here again, the 
difference is in the relative position of states and firms: national champions, as powerful as they 
might be, are nevertheless under the sway of the state.
Bargaining relations are also at work between the different elements forming industrial 
complexes and global commodity chains (whether within or without the value chain).111 In this 
view, the transnational reorganisation of production activities in response to international 
competition is very much disconnected from the grip of national determination. In the analysis of 
clusters (to a lesser extent, industrial complexes) the influence of state*s action is acknowledged,
Ui Because of such an equal footing, the word ‘governance* might be an usurpation: the question is indeed 
pertinent as to who governs whom.
2it Interestingly enough, such bargaining relations are associated with rival ‘concepts of control* to which 
such industrial complexes adhere. The notion is borrowed from the Amsterdam school, but is applied to the 
organisation of production. Concepts of control are organised around three main types: the first concerns 
SMEs developing a competitive edge in flexible specialisation, the second is specific to big firms 
undertaking mass-production in a very Fordist line, and the third characterises vertically de-integrated 
firms relying on economies of scope ( ‘Toyotism’).Latcr in the book, 2 additional concepts of control are 
added to the list: the fordist model is split into 2 distinct patterns: in the macro-fordist model, firms adopt 
multidomcstic strategies in a regional context, whereas the micro-fordist model is based on comparative 
advantages, and is more cost-driven. Finally multidomestic are distinguished as well.
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but apart from the fact that it is only one factor among several others, it does not bring about the 
nationalisation of the outcome: the level o f structuration of the economy is less than ever the 
national setting.
Practical relevance
The above theoretical contributions invite to question the assumptions at work in the 
common definition of the governance of the economy along -at least- three lines.
First, the emphasis could be placed on alternative levels where economic necessity is 
politicised. A constituency moulded on the national model even if enlarged is far from being the 
only possibility.
Also, more attention could be paid to the very mechanisms of governance. Proposing that 
politics can make sense of economic variables at different levels, and that there are varying 
mixes of political and economic factors, is tantamount to acknowledge numerous and contrasting 
mechanisms of governance depending, among other things, on the level at which they apply. The 
all too common assumption of the unicity o f the possible mechanisms of governance would have 
thus to be rejected.
Finally, the identification of the source of governance should be reconsidered. That the 
eventual outcome is not necessarily politicised along national lines questions the role of the state, 
and, beyond, of any centralised political instance modelled on its national counterpart as the 
unique possible source of structuration of the economic outcome.
Overall, it appears that the notion of congruence on which a traditional conception of 
governance rests is o f limited pertinence; it can be quite misleading by bringing about too narrow 
a focus on spatial references. On the face of it, there is a multitude of political (f)actors making 
sense of economic variables; there are several ways for them to influence the outcome; and the 
outcome itself is structured at different levels. This requires more flexibility in the choice of the 
unit of analysis one is to adopt when studying economic policy-making and an open-minded 
attitude when considering the mechanisms thereby politics impinge on economics.
6 ,2  The OPT evidence
It is argued below that the OPT story is particularly illuminating in the light of the above 
developments on governance. It is a straightforward illustration of the politicisation of economic
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activity (see Chapter 2). But because the actual politicisation is not necessarily the one expected, 
the OPT example illustrates -indirectly- the shortcomings of a traditional system of governance 
which appears antiquated in a changing world economy. *
1. Rescuing a traditional system o f governance
What happens in terms of governance if the geographical horizons of economic decisions 
extend well beyond the national boundaries? OPT illustrates the attempt to resort to one possible 
option. In a territorially-b(i)ased conception of governance, it is expected that such a mismatch 
calls for a geographical adjustment: the way to recapture political control over economic 
interdependence consists in redefining the spatial realm where centralised political actions apply 
in order to match newly with that of economic decisions. The ultimate objective is therefore to 
restore the congruence between the spatial reference made respectively in economic decisions 
and in the exercised of a centralised political authority.
Centralising competence
A crisis in the governance of the economy can be said to have taken place as the result of 
the dilemma between firms strategies relocating production activities abroad and the objective of 
protecting employment in declining sectors at home. Hence, the mismatch between the scale of 
firms' outlook, and the national frame within which economic policy is effective.
Several stages characterise the process. At first, an OPT policy in the textile and clothing 
industry was devised at the national level. OPT was a compromise solution making possible 
corporate strategies in conformity with the requirements of globalisation, while maintaining the 
process under tight political control. The national frame was still the uncontested reference.
But in the face of the constraint presented by the Community institutions and 
arrangements, OPT had to be ‘europeanised’, i.e., centralised at the Community level. It thus 
testified to the attempt of enforcing the governance of the economy at an alternative level. The 
mechanisms of governance themselves were not modified. What was on the agenda was their 
mere transposition.
Restoring congruence
In a traditional view, the centralisation of political competence in economic matters is 
accompanied by the necessary adjustment of the scale at which the competence of the newly
centralised authority applies to that referred to in economic calculations. This is to restore 
congruence between economics and politics as in the national model.
In this interpretation, therefore, the enlargement of the Community is a necessary 
corollary of its deepening process. And indeed the promised full political integration into the EU 
which is expected to take place following the eventual establishment of a free trade area between 
the EU and some of the Central and European countries can very well be analysed in this light It 
is also in conformity with theories of economic integration (in particular the 'stage approach* 
described in Chapter 5) where political integration is expected to result from full economic 
integration.
Such mechanisms strikingly recalls those described by Braudel in his historical account 
of the emergence of national economies. One would simply refer to the regional instead of the 
national level:
“a national economy is a political space transformed by the state in response to 
necessities and innovations required by material life into a consistent and unified space 
which activities are geared to the same direction** [Braudel, 1985: 103].
Overall, OFT illustrates how the European Integration process in both its widening and 
deepening dimensions owes part of its raison d ’être to the establishment of a system of 
Governance adopted in response to globalisation. On the one hand, devising an OFT policy at the 
Community level is expected to deepen the European integration process by shifting the source 
of governance of the economy from the national to the supranational level. On the other hand, 
the impact OFT has on the division of labour within an enlarged Europe contributes to the 
widening process of European integration. It enlarges the territorial constituency in which such a 
system of governance is expected to reward different social and economic interests. One would 
thus be tempted to conclude that the OFT policy adopted at the EU level is ascribable to the 
establishment of a 'regional economy* under the aegis of a centralised political authority.
2. Unintended consequences: the reasons o f a failure
If this interpretation of the OPT story is correct, i.e., if it is ascribable to the tentative 
establishment of a traditional system of governance at the European level, then the findings of 
the dissertation summarised in Chapter 5 are nothing but the illustration of the failure of such an 
attempt
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First, it was made clear that the centralisation of competence in OPT matters at the 
Community level is only partially achieved. The harmonisation of national regimes was unevenly 
successful in the economic OPT regime. Even in the tariff regime, where an harmonised position 
was already achieved at the Community level, no centralisation of competence effectively occur.
Also, it was shown that the ultimate features characterising OPT relations between the 
EU and CEECs and their impact on the terms of East-West economic interdependence are 
largely beyond the control of Brussels’s policy-makers. Indeed, if what is at stake in the OPT 
policy is to keep under (political) control the regional division of labour, then the objective is 
only partially satisfied for there is an irreducible indeterminacy concerning the effect of trade 
liberalisation. As matter of fact, the contribution of OPT to the regional dynamics of integration 
varies depending on the ’OPT network* considered, and its trajectory. The latter is itself largely 
shaped by firm-specific variables. Thus, institutional factors are only one series altering the 
determinism of market forces; firm-level variables also intervene and filter the ultimate outcome 
which varies widely from production network to production network.
Overall, the process consisting in rolling back boundaries in the hope that the enlarged 
constituency thus created would give rise to a system of governance newly congruent with the 
scale of economic activity is partially ineffective: recovering political control over economic 
interdependence is not to be expected from a mere shift in the scale of application of political 
activity. A regional economy la-Braudel is not to come into being.
The question arises as to the reasons accounting for such a ‘failure’. Do they have to do 
with the mode of transferring competence (harmonisation), with the principle of the transfer (a 
mere ‘transposition’ of similar mechanisms without adaptation), with the very nature of the 
mechanisms transferred, and/or with the scale at which such mechanisms are transferred?
A definitive and clear-cut answer to such questions is difficult as the issues are closely 
intermingling. The reason put forward is therefore likely to be ‘a bit for all these reasons at the 
same time*.
First, there is no reason to believe that patterns of governance moulded on the national 
model can be automatically transferred without loosing their integrity. Mechanisms at work on 
the national constituency might not be so easily manageable over a significantly wider area, and 
indeed the conciliation of the numerous and scattered diverging vested interests in presence in 
the OPT debate proved to be particularly difficult. On the face of it, one could argue that the 
possible ways of governing the economy are closely associated with specific scales of application 
on which their very effectiveness depends.
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1But besides the principle of transposing mechanisms of governance without substantial 
alteration, the adopted scale itself might not be the most germane to answer the challenge of 
international competition and of the globalisation of production activity. As a matter of fact,
“the jurisdiction o f the European Community extends only to part of the world economy** 
[Hollingsworth et al, 1994: ?J...
... but also that of an hypothetical enlarged Community with 20 ,24  or whatever number 
of members. However enlarged, the European constituency is not a transposition of the national 
frame at a higher level and the mechanisms of governance expected to apply at the Community 
level are not those designed at the national one.
6.3  New stories In a  changing world economy
The findings that national prerogatives and firm-level variables are two essential 
determinants of the expected complementarity between Eastern and Western specialisation 
patterns is of tremendous relevance. It makes possible the understanding of the actual way in 
which (and the level at which) the effective politicisation of economic activity occurs. The full 
implication o f this is to be developed in the present section.
1. Alternative levels o f the structuration o f the economy: Blurring boundaries
Whether at the national or at the Community level, the OPT story illustrates the relative 
ineffectiveness of the reference to a bounded territory in the structuration of economic activity. 
In other terms, the politicisation of economic activity does decreasingly take place along national 
lines. The OPT networks identified in Chapter 3 are nothing but an illustration of an alternative 
level of structuration, under the joint influence of institutional and firm-level variables.
It should be made clear that this is not to proclaim the end of national economies, and 
nation-state. It is in fact, right the opposite. ‘National* factors such as the home base of firms 
going abroad“7 are crucial determinants of OPT networks. And indeed, national prerogatives 
were hardly wrested away from member states with the result that strong national traits are a 
primary characteristic o f OPT networks. But that national determinants influence the eventual 
outcome is not to say that the former are in a position to structure economic activity within
257 See the research agenda of Stopford and Strange (1991), as well as the work produced at the Berkeley 
Roundtable on International Economy.
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national constituencies. The question at stake in this respect, is not whether (national) policy 
measures have an impact -of course they have- but where, at which level, ttey impact In the 
words of Bernard and Ravenhill, *
"while transnational networks organize production in ways that do not correspond to the 
boundaries of formal political communities, they still exist concurrently with the inter­
state system’ [Bernard, Ravenhill, 1995:184-85]**
This point, in turn, should make clear that it is not the fact that the economic outcome is 
not systematically "nationalised’ which is interesting per se; this would be merely tantamount to 
discovering ’internationalisation'. What is of interest, instead, is the implication concerning the 
bases o f the exercise of political authority in economic matters. Indeed, the political control of 
economic activity is traditionally conceived and exercised within a  territory. But on the face of it, 
the growing irrelevance of the notion of bounded territory means that
’there is not much left of a territorial basis for authority* [Strange, 1996:45].
Thus, new mechanisms thereby political variables impinge on the organisation of 
economic activity which are emerging in the wake of the globalisation of the world economy 
question the conception of a governance system taking place within a bounded territory and 
stamping its mark over the economic outcome which is at stake. In the words of Ceray, it 
corresponds to a change in the ‘political economies of scale* characterising collective action. 
Indeed, the former, which refers to the ‘calculi of how efficient and effective particular 
economic and political activities are within particular structural contexts* are Increasingly 
disconnected from national boundaries [Ceray, 1994:7].
2. New roles o f old actors: on (he redefinition of the relations between firms and states
As suggested above, calling into question the pertinence of the reference to a territorial 
constituency as an appropriate level for analysing economic activity has a wider implication for 
the political control of economic matters. It makes necessary the reconsideration of the nature 
and Lie role o f the actors party to the game.
One important issue in this respect is the role of the state as one actor of traditional 
paramount importance which is no longer systematically in a position to stamp the national mark
** Emphasis added.
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over the eventual outcome. This is not to say that the state as an agent of structuration of 
economic activity has lost all its competence, but simply that the traditional pattern of state 
intervention in the economic sphere is to be reconsidered.
In Cemy’s interpretation, for example, the ‘competitive state* is substituting for the more 
conventional welfare state by focusing its action on microeconomic issues in order to foster 
competitive rather than comparative advantage [Cemy, 1990]. But this is not enough to pinpoint 
more fundamentally new tasks performed by states which have a strong influence on the 
structuration of economic activity.
As a matter of fact, states have developed functions like that of negotiating agent and 
‘gate-keeper’ and engage in a direct confrontation with firms. In a game of ‘triangular 
diplomacy’, states bargain with other states, and with firms [Stopford and Strange, 1991]. The 
inter-state bargain is more easily acknowledged. Indeed, international agreements like the Multi 
Fibre Agreements have been interpreted in this light' a co-ordinated approach at the international 
level is adopted to recover competence which existence is challenged at the national level by 
world-wide economic interdependence:
“national states in response to the pressures of regime competition and the ‘tyranny of 
external effects’ resulting from internationalisation under nationally fragmented 
governance, may try to defend their 'sovereignty* by collective action through international 
organisation’* [Hollingsworth et al., 1994: 291].
In fact, the bargain involves also the business sphere. In the OFT case, it is the 
Community institutions which provide the forum where such this tripartite confrontation takes 
place. The direct access of multinational companies to the Commission is one evidence 
suggesting a shifting system of governance, which could be acknowledged more thoroughly 
(Coen, 19961.
Symmetric to the reconsideration of the role of the state, is the new ‘political* dimension 
acquired by (big) firms organising their production process across boundaries and deciding upon 
their corporate strategies on a scale disconnected from that of their national basis. This is an 
important feature which is however still neglected. Indeed, parallel to the neo-classical neglect of 
corporations considered to be nothing more than a black box transforming inputs into outputs, 
firms were conspicuously ignored by political scientist25’ In Vogel’s terms, firms were 
considered to be
“  Indeed, if anything, it was “capital” which was approached in political terms. Another approach to the 
political dimension of firms proposed by Political Science was proposed through the study of trusts in the 
United States.
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“an anomaly that upsets the balance between democracy and capitalism"“*
The acceleration of the mutations at work in the world economy under the aegis of big 
multinational corporations has put an end to such extremes.
3. The source and the exercise o f power
The present study suggests that there is more to the redefinition of states and firms* 
traditional functions resulting from the globalisation of economic activity. What is at stake is not 
so much the acquisition of the traditional attributes of power by firms than a move towards the 
redefinition of the very nature of the power they exercise, accompanied by the growing 
effectiveness of their authority.
Thus, it is not (only) that firms are growing state-like, taking over functions which were 
once the exclusive prerogatives of inter-state relations. Fair enough, a picture where big firms 
engage in a ‘bargain’ with states, in a game of ‘triangular diplomacy’“1 is already a challenging 
attempt to bring traditional economic thinking closer to the reality of the functioning of the world 
economy.
Nor is it (only) that, rather ironically,
“the state (...) is having to act more and more like a market player" [Ceray, 1990:230].
But it is also that firms, and market actors in general (i.e., not only big multinationals) 
are increasingly endowed with the capability of influencing the economic outcome in a decisive 
way. In other terms, it corresponds to a shift in the privileged locus of the exercise of power 
away from the traditional political arena to the market
The importance of firm-specific variables in the structuration of OPT networks testifies 
to these general trends. German firms which control their local OPT partners* production chain 
are powerful simply ‘by being there’ [Strange, 1996: 261. They take advantage of a set of 
constraint and opportunity to extend control over local partners. Control or bargaining power 
rather than ownership or profit arc the key variables for understanding the structuration of 
‘commodity chains’ [Gereffi, 1994].
m Quoted in Wilks (1996). 
Stopford, Strange, (1991),
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1Such a type of power is more ‘diffuse’, more ‘impersonal*, and accrue to market rather 
than traditional political actors; but it is certainly not less effective than that referred to 
conventionally. In one word, it is more ‘structural’ [Strange, 1994,1996].
4. The European construction at stake
OFT illustrates the ways in which the European integration process proposes to respond 
to the mutations at work in the world economy. But by calling into question the validity o f the 
mechanisms of governance underlying the process of European integration, it invites to depart 
from a territorially-based conception of governance for managing growing economic 
interdependence.
Bringing the argument to its end is particularly interesting as far as the problématique of 
enlargement is concerned. As a matter of fact fears of enlargement are justified on the basis of 
the dissolution of centralised political competence over an enlarged area. This view thus 
implicitly takes over a conception of governance of the economy intended in its most traditional 
sense: territoriality matters.
The problem is that if such a view implicitly underlies most discussions on enlargement, 
it is not fully acknowledged, making the arguments in favour of delayed membership often 
specious. For example, the purported neutrality of economic liberalisation justifies the fact that 
political membership is postponed1*1; considering the two to be separate issues is indeed a clever 
contrivance to procrastinate eventual memberships.
On the face of it, dropping the cumbersome principle of congruence makes it possible to 
ground the process of political integration on an alternative rationale, and to proceeds with 
alternative forms of political interdependence. Thus, if it does not mean the replication of the 
nation-state model, the way is paved for an unconditional support of the process of enlargement.
This has a wider relevance for the European integration process as a whole. If the 
traditional mechanisms of governance are not the only possible ones ... it is worth focusing on 
where politicisation happens effectively. In short, in the face of an irredeemable loss of 
competence of the political authority in some specific economic matters... identifying alternative
The future developments of the process are indeed at best indeterminate. Displaying high degrees of 
versatility, going from the promises of further sounder promises (...) to sudden cooler positions (The 
Economist Nov. 1995), officials from the Community have not yet set up a definitive schedule for 
integrating their Eastern neighbours. It is commonly agreed that the main difficulties preventing from 
clear-cut positions have to do with the excessive budgetary costs associated with the extension of some 
sensitive common policies (mainly the Common Agricultural Policy, and the participation to the regional 
structural funds).
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areas where the influence of political action is still (or newly) effective is more constructive than 
to endeavour in replicating all over the same recipe, irrespective of the mutations at stake in the 
world economy.
6.4  The Last Words
The political governance of economic interdependence depicted in the dissertation is a 
response to the complain that globalisation brings about the dépolitisation of economic activity. 
Indeed, there is a tendency to associate the emergence of such new forms of economic 
structuration with the progressive retreat of politics: the loss of economic sovereignty over the 
national constituency by the state is equated with the prevalence of economic and technical 
factors. In this view, globalisation produces a unique pattern of behaviour, determined by a 
‘pure* economic rationality where technology would be one of the main driving force. Hence the 
(implicit) refutation of the assumption of the indeterminacy of the final outcome on the basis of 
economic factors alone.
However, the new functions endorsed respectively by states and firms, together with the 
redefinition of the nature of power over economic matters moderates the hypothetical retreat of 
politics. Rather, globalisation questions trad‘ .*:nal modes of governance: globalisation is not so 
much a cause of *depoliticisation’ of economic activity; it rather brings about new forms of
politicisation.
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